CDHA CAAR

A. “Defined Benefit Pension Plan Distribution Decisions by Public Sector Employees,” by Robert L. Clark, Melinda S. Morrill, David Vanderweide (w18488, October 2012, .pdf format, 57p.).

Abstract:

Studies examining pension distribution choices have found that the tendency of private-sector workers is to select lump sum distributions instead of life annuities. In the public sector, defined benefit pensions usually offer lump sum distributions equal to employee contributions, not the present value of the annuity. Using administrative data from the North Carolina state and local government retirement systems, we find that over two-thirds of public sector workers under age 50 separating prior to retirement from public plans in North Carolina left their accounts open and did not request a cash distribution from the pension system within one year of separation. Furthermore, the evidence suggests many separating workers, particularly those with short tenure, may be forgoing important benefits due to lack of knowledge, understanding, or accessibility of benefits. In contrast to prior research in the private sector, we find no evidence of a bias toward cash distributions for public employees in North Carolina.

papers.nber.org/papers/w18488

B. “The Revenue Demands of Public Employee Pension Promises,” by Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua D. Rauh (w18489, October 2012, .pdf format, 64p.).

Abstract:

We calculate increases in contributions required to achieve full funding of state and local pension systems in the U.S. over 30 years. Without policy changes, contributions would have to increase by 2.5 times, reaching 14.1% of the total own-revenue generated by state and local governments. This represents a tax increase of $1,385 per household per year, around half of which goes to pay down legacy liabilities while half funds the cost of new promises. We examine sensitivity to asset return assumptions, wage correlations, the treatment of workers not currently in Social Security, and endogenous geographical shifts in the tax base.

papers.nber.org/papers/w18489

C. “Linking Benefits to Investment Performance in US Public Pension Systems by Robert Novy-Marx, Joshua D. Rauh” (w18489, October 2012, .pdf format, 44p.).

This paper calculates the effect that introducing risk-sharing during either retirement or the working life would have on public sector pension liabilities. We begin by considering the introduction of a variable annuity for the retirement phase, modeled on the Wisconsin Retirement System, in which positive benefit adjustments are granted only if asset returns surpass 5% but benefits cannot fall below their initial levels. This change would reduce unfunded accrued liabilities by around 25%, and would lower the annual contribution increases required to target full funding in 30 years by 11%. If there is no minimum benefit guarantee, the impact of introducing variable annuities is substantially larger: the unfunded liability would fall by over half and required annual contribution increases would fall by 44%. Alternative measures that have similar effects on costs include increasing employee contributions by 10.3% of pay while keeping benefits unchanged; or giving employees a collective DC plan with an employer contribution of 10% of pay for future service. We discuss these results in the context of models of lifecycle portfolio choice, which suggest that employees should generally prefer to take risk earlier in their lives rather than later.

papers.nber.org/papers/w18491