www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intl_update/2013-09/index.html

www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/index_abstract.cfm?ptid=1&pid=915

B. “Did Age Discrimination Protections Help Older Workers Weather the Great Recession?” by David Neumark and Patrick Button (WP 2013-287, September 2013, .pdf format, 46p.). Note: Links to the abstract and full-text can be found at:

www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/index_abstract.cfm?ptid=1&pid=912

www.cbo.gov/publication/44521

www.pensionresearchcouncil.org/publications/document.php?file=1109

crr.bc.edu/working-papers/validating-longitudinal-earnings-in-dynamic-microsimulation-models-the-role-of-outliers/

B. “Housing in Retirement Across Countries,” by Makoto Nakajima and Irina A. Telyukova (WP No. 2013-18, August 2013, .pdf format, 33p.). Note: Links to the abstract and full-text can be found at:

crr.bc.edu/working-papers/housing-in-retirement-across-countries/

Abstract:

Social Security retirement benefits can be claimed at any age between 62 and 70, with delayed claiming resulting in larger monthly payments. In Shoven and Slavov (2013), we show that claiming later increases the present value of lifetime benefits for most individuals. However, this has not always been the case. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of policy changes increased the gains from delay, particularly for couples. In addition, mortality improved and real interest rates fell substantially over this period, further increasing the attractiveness of delay. We perform simulations to examine the role of these factors in changing the gains from delay. We find that the gains from delay increased substantially after 2000, with changes in the interest rate playing the largest role in driving the increase. Using data from the Health and Retirement study, we show that individuals who turned 62 after 2000 are indeed more likely to delay than those who turned 62 before 2000. However, even in the younger cohort, most individuals still claim benefits soon after turning 62. Moreover, we find no evidence of a relationship between the probability of delay and the individual characteristics (e.g., gender, race, or health status) that affect the gains from delay.

www.nber.org/papers/w19370

B. “The Response of Drug Expenditures to Non-Linear Contract Design: Evidence from Medicare Part D,” by Liran Einav, Amy Finkelstein, and Paul Schrimpf (w19393, August 2013, .pdf format, 75p.).

Abstract:

We study the demand response to non-linear price schedules using data on insurance contracts and prescription drug purchases in Medicare Part D. Consistent with a static response of drug use to price, we document bunching of annual drug spending as individuals enter the famous “donut hole,” where insurance becomes discontinuously much less generous on the margin. Consistent with a dynamic response to price, we document a response of drug use to the future out-of-pocket price by using variation in beneficiary birth month which generates variation in contract duration during the first year of eligibility. Motivated by these two facts, we develop and estimate a dynamic model of drug use during the coverage year that allows us to quantify and explore the effects of alternative contract designs on drug expenditures. For example, our estimates suggest that “filling” the donut hole, as required under the Affordable Care Act, will increase annual drug spending by $180 per beneficiary, or about 10%. Moreover, almost half of this increase is “anticipatory,” coming from beneficiaries whose spending prior to the policy change would leave them short of reaching the donut hole. We also describe the nature of the utilization response and its heterogeneity across individuals and types of drugs.

www.nber.org/papers/w19393

crfb.org/document/report-social-security-reform-and-cost-delay

B. “Modernizing the Medicare Benefit,” by Marc Goldwein, Ed Lorenzen, and Jessica Stone (June 2013, .pdf format, 21p.).

crfb.org/document/mot-report-modernizing-medicare-benefit

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intl_update/2013-08/index.html

www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-08-2013/social-security-a-key-retirement-resource-for-women-AARP-ppi-econ-sec.html

B. “Social Security: Who’s Counting On It?” by Alison M. Shelton (August 2013, .pdf format, 6p.).

www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-08-2013/social-security-whos-counting-on-it-AARP-ppi-econ-sec.html

PDF:

www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/NOTES/ran3/an2013-3.pdf

HTML:

www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/NOTES/ran3/an2013-3.html

www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-importance-of-social-security-in-the-incomes-of-older-americans-differences-by-gender-age-race-ethnicity-and-marital-status/at_download/file

More about IWPR:

www.iwpr.org/about/history

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2012-2013/africa/index.html

www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-10-2011/Social-Security-Medicare-Importance-State-Profiles.html

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n3/index.html

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2013/index.html

crr.bc.edu/briefs/new-brunswicks-new-shared-risk-pension-plan/

B. “How Does Women Working Affect Social Security Replacement Rates?” by April Yanyuan Wu, Nadia S. Karamcheva, Alicia H. Munnell and Patrick Purcell (IB No. 13-10, July 2013, .pdf format, 7p.).

crr.bc.edu/briefs/how-does-women-working-affect-social-security-replacement-rates/

crr.bc.edu/working-papers/how-do-the-changing-labor-supply-behavior-and-marriage-patterns-of-women-affect-social-security-replacement-rates/

B. “Social Security and the 2001 Reform of the Railroad Retirement Program,” by Steven A. Sass (WP No. 2013-15, June 2013, .pdf format, 16p.). Note: Links to the abstract and full-text can be found at:

crr.bc.edu/working-papers/social-security-and-the-2001-reform-of-the-railroad-retirement-program/

C. “An Assessment of the 2001 Reform of the Railroad Retirement Program,” by Steven A. Sass (WP No. 2013-14, June 2013, .pdf format, 28p.). Note: Links to the abstract and full-text can be found at:

crr.bc.edu/working-papers/an-assessment-of-the-2001-reform-of-the-railroad-retirement-program/

www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/solvency/index.html

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi_asr/

www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/wp/13_02.cfm

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/oasdi_sc/2012/index.html

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/oasdi_sc/2012/index.html

www.aging.senate.gov/hearing_detail.cfm?id=344057&

www.epi.org/publication/economic-security-elderly-americans-risk/

www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-473

crr.bc.edu/briefs/social-security%e2%80%99s-financial-outlook-the-2013-update-in-perspective/

B. “How Important Is Medicare Eligibility in the Timing of Retirement?” by Norma B. Coe, Mashfiqur R. Khan and Matthew S. Rutledge (IB No. 13-07, May 2013, .pdf format, 6p.).

crr.bc.edu/briefs/how-important-is-medicare-eligibility-in-the-timing-of-retirement/

waysandmeans.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=335830

www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/2013/index.html

www.nasi.org/research/2013/social-security-finances-findings-2013-trustees-report

www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/index_abstract.cfm?ptid=1&pid=856

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/eedata_sc/2010/index.html

B. “Congressional Statistics, December 2012,” (May 2013, .pdf and Excel format, 114p.).

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/factsheets/cong_stats/2012/index.html

www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-459

Abstract:

An enhanced version of a structural model jointly explains benefit claiming, wealth and retirement, including reversals from states of lesser to greater work. The model includes stochastic returns on assets. Estimated with Health and Retirement Study data, it does a better job of predicting claiming than previous versions. Alternative beliefs about the future of Social Security affect predicted outcomes. Effects of three potential policies are also examined: increasing the early entitlement age, increasing the full retirement age, and eliminating the payroll tax for seniors. Predicted responses to increasing the full entitlement age are sensitive to beliefs.

www.nber.org/papers/w19071

B. “The Spillover Effects of Medicare Managed Care: Medicare Advantage and Hospital Utilization,” by Katherine Baicker, Michael Chernew, and Jacob Robbins (w19070, May 2013, .pdf format, 39p.).

Abstract:

More than a quarter of Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare Advantage, which was created in large part to improve the efficiency of health care delivery by promoting competition among private managed care plans. This paper explores the spillover effects of the Medicare Advantage program on the traditional Medicare program and other patients, taking advantage of changes in Medicare Advantage payment policy to isolate exogenous increases in Medicare Advantage enrollment and trace out the effects of greater managed care penetration on hospital utilization and spending throughout the health care system. We find that when more seniors enroll in Medicare managed care, hospital costs decline for all seniors and for commercially insured younger populations. Greater managed care penetration is not associated with fewer hospitalizations, but is associated with lower costs and shorter stays per hospitalization. These spillovers are substantial – offsetting more than 10% of increased payments to Medicare Advantage plans.

www.nber.org/papers/w19070

C. “Framing Lifetime Income,” by Jeffrey R. Brown, Jeffrey R. Kling, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Marian V. Wrobel (w19063, May 2013, .pdf format, 22p.).

Abstract:

We provide evidence that individuals optimize imperfectly when making annuity decisions, and this result is not driven by loss aversion. Life annuities are more attractive when presented in a consumption frame than in an investment frame. Highlighting the purchase price in the consumption frame does not alter this result. The level of habitual spending has little interaction with preferences for annuities in the consumption frame. In an investment frame, consumers prefer annuities with principal guarantees; this result is similar for guarantee amounts below, at, and above the purchase price. We discuss implications for the retirement services industry and its regulators.

www.nber.org/papers/w19063

waysandmeans.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=334291

www.nasi.org/research/2013/social-security-disability-insurance-action-needed-address-f

www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/

Abstract:

Social Security benefits are currently provided as a lifelong benefit stream, though some workers would be willing to trade a portion of their annuity streams in exchange for a lump sum amount. This paper explores whether allowing people to receive a lump sum as a payment for delayed retirement rather than as an addition to their lifetime Social Security benefits might induce them to work longer. We model the factors that influence how people trade off a Social Security stream for a lump sum, and we also examine the consequences of such tradeoffs for work, retirement, and life cycle wellbeing. Our base case indicates that workers given the chance to receive their delayed retirement credit as a lump sum payment would boost their average retirement age by 1.5-2 years. This will interest policymakers seeking to reform the Social Security system without raising costs or cutting benefits, while enhancing the incentives to delay retirement.

www.nber.org/papers/w19032

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v73n2/index.html

www.nasi.org/research/2013/strengthening-social-security-views-among-african-americans

www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/curbing-federal-agency-waste-and-fraud-new-steps-to-strengthen-the-integrity-of-federal-payments

www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201323/201323abs.html

www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/NOTES/pdf_notes/note152.pdf

www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/NOTES/pdf_notes/note151.pdf

waysandmeans.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=330425

www.cbo.gov/publication/44090

B. “Differences Between the Traditional CPI and the Chained CPI,” by Rob McClelland (Apr. 19, 2013).

www.cbo.gov/publication/44088

waysandmeans.house.gov/calendar/eventsingle.aspx?EventID=328603

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/ssi_monthly/2013-03/index.html

B. International Update, April 2013 (April 2013, HTML and .pdf format, 3p.).

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/intl_update/2013-04/index.html

C. Monthly Statistical Snapshot, March 2013 (April 2013, HTML and .pdf format, 3p.).

www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/2013-03.html

www.socialsecurity.gov/OACT/solvency/GMoore_20130329.pdf

dem.sagepub.com/content/12/2.toc

International Social Security Review (Vol. 66, No. 2, April-June 2013).

onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/issr.2013.66.issue-2/issuetoc

Journal of Aging & Social Policy (Vol. 25, No. 2, 2013).

www.tandfonline.com/toc/wasp20/25/2

www.urban.org/retirement_policy/url.cfm?ID=412801