www.bls.gov/opub/btn/volume-2/retirement-and-medical-benefits-who-has-both.htm

crr.bc.edu/working-papers/does-access-to-health-insurance-influence-work-effort-among-disability-cash-benefit-recipients/

B. “How Will Older Workers Who Lose Their Jobs During the Great Recession Fare in the Long-Run?” by Matthew S. Rutledge, Natalia Orlova, and Anthony Webb (WP No. 2013-09, April 2013, .pdf format, 32p.). Note: Links to the abstract and full-text can be found at:

crr.bc.edu/working-papers/how-will-older-workers-who-lose-their-jobs-during-the-great-recession-fare-in-the-long-run/

www.ebri.org/publications/notes/index.cfm?fa=notesDisp&content_id=5157

www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-112

www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0049765

B. “Relation of Pulse Pressure to Long-Distance Gait Speed in Community-Dwelling Older Adults: Findings from the LIFE-P Study,” by Kevin S. Heffernan, Todd M. Manini, Fang-Chi Hsu, Steven N. Blair, Barbara J. Nicklas, Stephen B. Kritchevsky, Anne B. Newman, Kim Sutton-Tyrrell, Timothy S. Church, William L. Haskell, and Roger A. Fielding (PLoS ONE 7(11): e49544. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0049544, XML, HTML, and .pdf format, 6p.).

www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0049544

C. “Validity and Reliability of a Tool for Determining Appropriateness of Days of Stay: An Observational Study in the Orthopedic Intensive Rehabilitation Facilities in Italy,” by Aida Bianco, Domenico Flotta, Francesca Lotito, Carmelo G. A. Nobile, Claudia Pileggi, and Maria Pavia, for The Collaborative Working Group (PLoS ONE 7(11): e50260. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050260, XML, HTML, and .pdf format, 6p.).

www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0050260

D. “Cognitive Processing Speed in Older Adults: Relationship with White Matter Integrity,” by Geoffrey A. Kerchner, Caroline A. Racine, Sandra Hale, Reva Wilheim, Victor Laluz, Bruce L. Miller, and Joel H. Kramer (PLoS ONE 7(11): e50425. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0050425, XML, HTML, and .pdf format, 10p.).

www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0050425

www.ebri.org/publications/ib/index.cfm?fa=ibDisp&content_id=5119

Abstract:

Across a wide set of non-group insurance markets, applicants are rejected based on observable, often high-risk, characteristics. This paper argues private information, held by the potential applicant pool, explains rejections. I formulate this argument by developing and testing a model in which agents may have private information about their risk. I first derive a new no-trade result that theoretically explains how private information could cause rejections. I then develop a new empirical methodology to test whether this no-trade condition can explain rejections. The methodology uses subjective probability elicitations as noisy measures of agents beliefs. I apply this approach to three non-group markets: long-term care, disability, and life insurance. Consistent with the predictions of the theory, in all three settings I find significant amounts of private information held by those who would be rejected; I find generally more private information for those who would be rejected relative to those who can purchase insurance; and I show it is enough private information to explain a complete absence of trade for those who would be rejected. The results suggest private information prevents the existence of large segments of these three major insurance markets.

papers.nber.org/papers/w18282

B. “Defying Gravity: How Long Will Japanese Government Bond Prices Remain High?” by Takeo Hoshi, Takatoshi Ito (w18287, August 2012, .pdf format, 63p.).

Abstract:

Recent academic papers have shown that the Japanese sovereign debt situation is not sustainable. The puzzle is that the bond rate has remained low and stable. Some suggest that the low yield can be explained by domestic residents’ willingness to hold Japanese government bonds (JGBs) despite its low return, and that as long as domestic residents remain home-biased, the JGBs are sustainable. About 95% of JGBs are currently owned by domestic residents. This paper argues that even with such dominance of domestic investors, if the amount of government debt breaches the ceiling imposed by the domestic private sector financial assets, the JGB rates can rapidly rise and the Japanese government can face difficulty rolling over the existing debt. A simulation is conducted on future paths of household saving and fiscal situations to show that the ceiling would be breached in the next 10 years or so without a drastic fiscal consolidation. This paper also shows that the government debt can be kept under the ceiling with sufficiently large tax increases. The JGB yields can rise even before the ceiling is hit, if the expectation of such drastic fiscal consolidation disappears. This paper points out several possible triggers for such a change in expectation. However, downgrading of JGBs by credit rating agencies is not likely to be a trigger, since past downgrades have not produced any change in the JGB yield. If and when the JGB rates rapidly rise, the Japanese financial institutions that hold a large amount of JGBs will sustain losses and the economy will suffer from fiscal austerity, financial instability, and inflation.

papers.nber.org/papers/w18287

Abstract:

The majority of private health insurance in the U.S. is administered or issued by for-profit insurers, but little is known about how for-profit status affects outcomes. We find that plausibly exogenous increases in local for-profit market share induced by conversions of Blue Cross and Blue Shield affiliates in 11 states (and 28 distinct geographic markets) had no significant impact on average premiums, uninsurance rates, or medical loss ratios. However, we do find significant increases in Medicaid enrollment and a reallocation of medical spending toward rivals of BCBS. Moreover, in markets where the converting BCBS affiliate had substantial market share, fully-insured premiums for employer plans increased significantly. The results suggest that the welfare effects of subsidies for new not-for-profit insurers, such as those in the Affordable Care Act, are likely to depend on entrants’ eventual market share.

papers.nber.org/papers/w18286

crr.bc.edu/working-papers/spousal-labor-market-effects-from-government-health-insurance-evidence-from-a-veterans-affairs-expansion/

www.kff.org/medicare/8289.cfm

Abstract:

We model the labor market impact of the three key provisions of the recent Massachusetts and national “mandate-based” health reforms: individual and employer mandates and expansions in publicly-subsidized coverage. Using our model, we characterize the compensating differential for employer-sponsored health insurance (ESHI) — the causal change in wages associated with gaining ESHI. We also characterize the welfare impact of the labor market distortion induced by health reform. We show that the welfare impact depends on a small number of “sufficient statistics” that can be recovered from labor market outcomes. Relying on the reform implemented in Massachusetts in 2006, we estimate the empirical analog of our model. We find that jobs with ESHI pay wages that are lower by an average of $6,058 annually, indicating that the compensating differential for ESHI is only slightly smaller in magnitude than the average cost of ESHI to employers. Because the newly-insured in Massachusetts valued ESHI, they were willing to accept lower wages, and the deadweight loss of mandate-based health reform was less than 5% of what it would have been if the government had instead provided health insurance by levying a tax on wages.

papers.nber.org/papers/w17933

www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2012/11_0241.htm

www.aarp.org/relationships/caregiving/info-02-2012/Call-to-Action-What-Experts-Say-Needs-to-Be-Done-to-Meet-the-Challenges-of-Family-Caregiving-AARP-ppi-ltc.html

B. “Health Insurance for 50 to 64 Year Olds,” by Gerry Smolka, Megan Multack, and Carlos Figueiredo (February 2012, .pdf format, 16p.).

www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info-02-2012/Health-Insurance-Coverage-for-50-64-year-olds-insight-AARP-ppi-health.html

C. “Setting the Record Straight about Medicare,” by Keith D. Lind (Fact Sheet, February 2012, .pdf format, 5p.).

www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info-02-2012/Setting-the-Record-Straight-about-Medicare-fact-sheet-AARP-ppi-health.html

www.aarp.org/health/medicare-insurance/info-02-2012/Health-Insurance-Coverage-for-50-64-year-olds-insight-AARP-ppi-health.html