The basic idea of symbiotic transformation is this: advances in bottom-up social empowerment within a capitalist society will be most stable and defendable when such social empowerment also helps solve certain real problems faced by capitalists and other elites. While it may be possible, through effective popular mobilization and solidarity, to deepen and extend forms of social empowerment even when this threatens the interests of capitalists and other dominant elites, such gains will always be precarious and vulnerable to counterattack. Gains won in a period of heightened mobilization will therefore be undone in periods where such mobilization declines. Forms of social empowerment are likely to be much more durable and to become more deeply rooted, and thus harder to reverse, when, in one way or another, they also serve the interests of dominant groups. The contradictory face of this process is that the institutionalization of such forms of popular power may cumulatively act as an increasing constraint on the actions of dominant elites and the capitalist class.

In this chapter I will examine two forms of symbiotic transformation. The first centers on the ways in which strong collective organization of workers at the national level can generate sustainable forms of collaboration between organized workers and capitalists, or what I will call “positive class compromise”. The second concerns ways in which at the local level civic associations of various sorts can engage in collaborative problem-solving with various elite organizations and local government in ways which enhance social power. Both of these strategies are fraught with dilemmas and difficulties. By emphasizing collaboration over confrontation they risk eroding the mobilization potential of popular social forces and ultimately narrowing the limits of social empowerment rather than expanding them. But they may also contribute to institutionalizing more robust forms of democratic empowerment in ways that enlarge the space of the possible.

I. Class Compromise

The concept of “class compromise” invokes three quite distinct images. In the first, class compromise is an illusion. Leaders of working class organizations — especially unions and parties — strike opportunistic deals with the capitalist class which promise general
benefits for workers but which, in the end, are largely empty. Class compromises are, at their core, one-sided capitulations rather than reciprocal bargains embodying mutual concessions.

In the second image, class compromises are like stalemates on a battlefield. Two armies of roughly similar strength are locked in battle. Each is sufficiently strong to impose severe costs on the other; neither is strong enough to definitively vanquish the opponent. In such a situation of stalemate the contending forces may agree to a “compromise”: to refrain from mutual damage in exchange for concessions on both sides. The concessions are real, not phony, even if they are asymmetrical. Still, they don’t constitute a process of real cooperation between opposing class forces. This outcome can be referred to as a “negative class compromise.”

The third image sees class compromise as a form of mutual cooperation between opposing classes. This is not simply a situation of a balance of power in which the outcome of conflict falls somewhere between a complete victory and a complete defeat for either party. Rather, here there is a possibility of a non-zero-sum game between workers and capitalists, a game in which both parties can improve their position through various forms of active, mutual cooperation. This outcome can be called a “positive class compromise.”

So long as capitalism in one form or another is the only historically available way of organizing an economy, a positive class compromise -- if it is achievable -- will generally constitute the most advantageous context for the improvement of the material interests and life circumstances of ordinary people. If one is interested in advancing such interests, therefore, it is important to understand the conditions which facilitate or hinder the prospects for positive class compromise.

The central idea of symbiotic transformation is that the possibilities for stable, positive class compromise generally hinge on the relationship between the *associational power* of the working class and the *material interests* of capitalists.¹ The conventional wisdom among both neoclassical economists and traditional Marxists is that in general there is an inverse relationship between these two variables: increases in the power of workers adversely affect the interests of capitalists (see Figure 10.1). The rationale for this view is straightforward for Marxist scholars: since the profits of capitalists are closely tied to the exploitation of workers, the material interests of workers and capitalists are inherently antagonistic. Anything which strengthens the capacity of workers to struggle for and realize their interests, therefore, negatively affects the interests of

¹ Throughout this discussion of class compromise I will rely on a simple, polarized concept of the class structure of capitalism in which workers and capitalists are the only classes. For some purposes it is important to deploy a highly differentiated class concept which elaborates a complex set of concrete locations within class structures. My work on the problem of the “middle class” and “contradictory locations within class relations” would be an example of such an analysis (Wright, 1985, 1997). For some problems the causal processes cannot be properly studied without specifying a range of fine-grained differentiations and divisions within classes on the basis of such things as sector, status, gender, and race. For other purposes, however, it is appropriate to use a much more abstract, simplified class concept, revolving around the central polarized class relation of capitalism: capitalists and workers. This is the class concept I will use in this chapter.
capitalists. The conventional argument by neoclassical economists is somewhat less straightforward, for they deny that in a competitive equilibrium workers are exploited by capitalists. Nevertheless, working class associational power is seen as interfering with the efficient operation of labor markets by making wages harder to adjust downward when needed and by making it harder for employers to fire workers. Unions and other forms of working class power are seen as forms of monopolistic power within markets, and like all such practices generate monopoly rents and inefficient allocations. As a result, unionized workers are able to extort a monopoly rent in the form of higher wages at the expense of both capitalists and nonunionized workers.

-- Figure 10.1 about here --

An alternative understanding of the relationship between workers’ power and capitalists’ interests sees this as a curvilinear reverse-J relationship rather than an inverse relationship (see Figure 10.2). As in the conventional wisdom, capitalist class interests are best satisfied when the working class is highly disorganized, when workers compete with each other in an atomized way and lack significant forms of associational power. As working class power increases, capitalist class interests are initially adversely affected. However, once working class power crosses some threshold, working class associational power begins to have positive effects on capitalist interests. As we shall see in more detail below, these conditions allow for significant gains in productivity and rates of profit due to such things as high levels of bargained cooperation between workers and capitalists, rationalized systems of skill upgrading and job training, enhanced capacity for solving macro-economic problems, and a greater willingness of workers to accept technological change given the relative job security they achieve because of union protections. The upward-bending part of the curve, where increases in working class power have positive effects on capitalist class interests, generates conditions for positive class compromise.

-- Figure 10.2 about here --

The rest of this chapter will elaborate the theoretical foundations for this basic idea of positive class compromise. The next section situates the problem of positive class compromise within a broader literature on inter-class cooperation, labor relations and economic governance. This will be followed by a discussion of a general theoretical model and underlying mechanisms for the reverse-J model of positive class compromise.

Situating the concept of Class Compromise

In the most abstract and general terms, class compromise -- whether positive or negative -- can be defined as a situation in which some kind of quid pro quo is established between conflicting classes in which, in one way or another, people in each class make “concessions” in favor of the

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2. The reverse-J shaped relationship between working class power and capitalist interests was first suggested to me in a paper by Joel Rogers (1990).

3. Although the actual term “class compromise” appears mainly within the Marxian tradition of social theory, the substantive idea has much broader currency. I will not limit the discussion here to instances where the term is explicitly deployed.
interests of people in the opposing class. The “compromise” in class compromise is a compromise of class-based interests -- members of each class give up something of value. Class compromise is thus always defined against a counterfactual in which such concessions are not made. Typically this is a situation in which the use of threats, force and resistance plays a more prominent active role in class interactions.

Defined in this way, the idea of class compromise is closely linked to Gramsci's (1971) concept of “hegemony”. Gramsci uses the concept of hegemony to distinguish two general conditions of capitalist society. In a non-hegemonic system, capitalist class relations are reproduced primarily through the direct, despotic use of coercion. In a hegemonic system, in contrast, class relations are sustained in significant ways through the active consent of people in the subordinate classes. Coercion is still present as a background condition -- hegemony is “protected by the armor of coercion” in Gramsci’s famous phrase -- but it is not continually deployed actively to control people’s actions. To quote Przeworski (1985: 136), “A hegemonic system is, for Gramsci, a capitalist society in which capitalists exploit with consent of the exploited.” For hegemony to be sustained over time, there must be, in Przeworski’s (1985: 133-169) apt expression, “material bases of consent”. This, in turn, requires some sort of class compromise: “....the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed – in other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind.” (Gramsci, 1971: 161).

Gramsci developed the concept of class compromise in only a sketchy and fragmented form. The scholar who has most systematically and rigorously elaborated this concept is Adam Przeworski. Przeworski makes the central quid pro quo of class compromise explicit:

Given the uncertainty whether and how capitalists would invest profits, any class compromise must consist of the following elements: workers consent to profit as an institution, that is, they behave in such a manner as to make positive rates of profit possible; and capitalists commit themselves to some rate of transformation of profits into wage increases and some rate of investment out of profits (Przeworski, 1985: 182)

Przeworski’s formulation here is close to what I have called “negative class compromise” in so far as he emphasizes the abstention of workers from levels of militancy which would interfere with the production of profits in exchange for material concessions by capitalists. Elsewhere, he explores the positive face of class compromise in his analysis of how Keynesianism, backed by organized labor and social democratic parties in the advanced capitalist countries in the post-World War II period, expanded aggregate demand in ways which ultimately benefited capital as well as labor (Przeworski, 1985: 205-211). The model of class compromise which I develop here can be viewed as an extension and reformulation of Przeworski’s core idea through the elaboration of this positive side of class compromise.

The idea of positive class compromise generated by organized class struggle sits less comfortably within the Marxist tradition, but is at the core of the large literature on social democracy and neo-corporatism (e.g. Korpi, 1983; Soskice, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1990) and
considerable recent work in economic sociology that focuses on the problem of the economic performance of different capitalist economies (e.g. Streeck and Schmitter, 1985; Kenworthy, 1995; Gordon, 1996; Crouch and Streeck, 1997). As Rogers and Streeck (1994:130) put it: “The democratic left makes progress under capitalism when it improves the material well-being of workers, solves a problem for capitalists that capitalists cannot solve for themselves, and in doing both wins sufficient political cachet to contest capitalist monopoly on articulating the ‘general interest.’”

The classic form of this argument is rooted in the Keynesian strand of macroeconomic theory. Full employment, insofar as it implies high levels of capacity-utilization and higher aggregate demand for the products of capitalist firms, potentially serves the interests of capitalists. But it also risks a profit squeeze from rapidly rising wages and spiraling levels of inflation. Keynes himself recognized this as a serious problem: “I do not doubt that a serious problem will arise as to how wages are to be restrained when we have a combination of collective bargaining and full employment” (cited in Glynn, 1995: 37). The emergence and consolidation in a number of countries of strong, centralized unions capable of imposing wage restraint on both workers and employers was perhaps the most successful solution to this problem. In this sense, a powerful labor movement need not simply constitute the basis for a negative class compromise, extracting benefits for workers through threats to capital. If a labor movement is sufficiently disciplined, particularly when it is articulated to a sympathetic state, it can positively contribute to the realization of capitalist interests by helping to solve macroeconomic problems.

The best known empirical study to explore the curvilinear relationship between workers power and capitalist interests is Calmfors and Driffill’s (1988) study of the effects of union centralization on economic performance (see also Pohjola, 1992; Freeman, 1988; Calmfors and Driffill, 1993; Garrett, 1998: 26-50; Rowthorn, 1992). Following Mancur Olson’s (1982) suggestion that “organized interests may be most harmful when they are strong enough to cause major disruptions but not sufficiently encompassing to bear any significant fraction of the costs for society of their actions in their own interests” (Calmfors and Driffill, 1988: 15), they demonstrate that among 18 OECD countries, during the period 1963-1985, economic performance measured in a variety of ways was best among those countries with either highly centralized or highly decentralized wage bargaining structures, and worst in the intermediary countries. A similar result, using different kinds of indicators, is found in Hicks and Kenworthy’s (1998) study of the impact of various forms of cooperative institutions on economic performance. They observe a strong curvilinear relationship between union density and real per capita GDP growth for the period 1960-1989 in 18 OECD countries, indicating that countries with either low or high union density had higher growth rates during these three decades than countries with middling levels of union density.

4 Strictly speaking, Calmfors and Driffill study the relationship between workers power and various measures of general economic “performance” rather than capitalists’ interests as such, but in the context of their arguments this can reasonably be taken as an indicator of capitalists’ interests.
A curvilinear model of positive class compromise\(^5\)

To the extent that increases in working class power can contribute not merely to the realization of working class material interests, but also to the realization of some capitalist class interests, then class compromises are likely to be more stable and beneficial for workers; to the extent that every increase in working class power poses an increasing threat to capitalist class interests, capitalist resistance is likely to be more intense, and class compromises, even if achieved, are likely to be less stable. The intensity of class struggle, therefore, is not simply a function of the relative balance of power of different classes, but also of the intensity of the threat posed to dominant interests by subordinate class power.

If the relationship between workers’ power and capitalists’ interests were the simple inverse relationship of Figure 10.1, then class compromises would always be relatively fragile and vulnerable to attack, for capitalist interests would always be served by taking advantage of opportunities to undermine workers power. Negative class compromise would be the most one could achieve. If the shape of the relationship is as pictured in Figure 10.2, on the other hand, then class compromise can potentially become a relatively durable feature of a set of institutional arrangements. In general, when class conflict is located in the upward sloping region of this curve, class compromises are likely to be both more stable and more favorable for the working class. If the shape of this curve assumes the form of a more U-shaped version of a reverse-J (i.e. if the upward sloping section becomes more symmetrical), then conditions for class compromise can be said to be more favorable; if the reverse-J degenerates into a strictly downward sloping curve, then the conditions for class compromise become less favorable.

In order to more deeply understand the social processes reflected in the reverse-J hypothesis of Figure 10.2, we need to elaborate and extend the model in various ways. First we will examine more closely the underlying causal mechanisms which generate this curve. Second, we will extend the range of the figure by examining what happens at extreme values of working class associational power. Finally, we will examine various ways in which the institutional environment of class conflict determines which regions of this curve are historically accessible as strategic objectives.

Mechanisms underlying the reverse-J relation

The reverse-J curve presented in Figure 10.2 can be understood as the outcome of two kinds of causal processes – one in which the interests of capitalists are increasingly undermined as the power of workers increases, and a second in which the interests of capitalists are enhanced by the increasing power of workers. These are illustrated in Figure 10.3. In broad terms, the downward sloping curve reflects the ways in which increasing power of workers undermines the capacity of capitalists to unilaterally make decisions and control resources of various sorts, while the upward sloping curve reflects ways in which the associational power of workers may help capitalists solve certain kinds of collective action and coordination problems.

Class struggle and compromise do not occur within an amorphous “society”, but within

\(^5\) See the Appendix to this chapter for a more formal elaboration of the theoretical foundations of this model.
specific institutional contexts -- firms, markets, states. The real mechanisms which generate the reverse-J curve in figure 10.3 are embedded in such institutional contexts. Three institutional spheres within which class struggles occur and class compromises are forged are particularly important:

*The sphere of exchange.* This concerns above all the labor market and various other kinds of commodity markets, but in some situations financial markets may also be an arena within which class conflicts occur and class compromises forged.

*The sphere of production.* This concerns what goes on inside of firms once workers are hired and capital invested. Conflicts over the labor process and technology are the characteristic examples.

*The sphere of politics.* Class conflict and class compromise also occur within the state over the formation and implementation of state policies, and the administration of various kinds of state-enforced rules.

There is a rough correspondence between each of these institutional spheres of class conflict and class compromise and characteristic kinds of working class collective organizations: *labor unions* are the characteristic associational form for conflict/compromise in the sphere of exchange; *works councils* and related associations are the characteristic form within the sphere of production; and *political parties* are the characteristic form within the sphere of politics.

The central task of our analysis, then, is to examine the mechanisms which enable these different forms of working class associational power -- unions, works councils, parties -- to forge *positive* class compromises within the spheres of exchange, production, and politics. These mechanisms are summarized in Figure 10.4.

*The sphere of exchange*

Capitalists have a range of material interests within the sphere of exchange that bear on their relationship with the working class: minimizing labor costs; having an unfettered capacity to hire and fire without interference; selling all of the commodities they produce; having a labor force with a particular mix of skills in a labor market that provides predictable and adequate supplies of labor. As has often been argued by both Marxists and non-Marxist political economists, some of these interests contradict each other. Most notably, the interest of capitalists in selling commodities means that it is desirable for workers-as-consumers to have a lot of disposable income, whereas capitalists’ interest in minimizing their own wage bill implies an interest in paying workers-as-employees as little as possible.

Increases in working class associational power generally undermine the capacity of individual capitalists to unilaterally make decisions and allocate resources within labor markets. In the absence of unions, capitalists can hire and fire at will and set wages at whatever level they feel is most profitable. Of course, this does not mean that employers set wages without any constraints whatsoever. Their wage offers will be constrained by the tightness or looseness of the labor market, the reservation wages of workers, and, the need to pay workers a sufficiently high
wage to motivate individual workers to work diligently. Capitalists’ decisions are thus always constrained by the actions of individual workers and by general economic conditions. The issue here, however, is the extent of constraint on capitalists imposed by the collective action of workers reflecting their associational power in various forms. Such associational power reduces capitalists’ individual capacity to make profit-maximizing decisions on labor markets and thus hurts their material interests.

If capitalists’ interests within the sphere of exchange consisted entirely of interests in their individual ability to buy and sell with minimal constraint, then something close to the inverse relation portrayed in Figure 10.1 would probably hold. But this is not the case. The material interests of capitalists -- their ability to sustain a high and stable rate of profit -- depends upon the provision of various aggregate conditions within the sphere of exchange, and these require coordination and collective action. The solution to at least some of these coordination problems can be facilitated by relatively high levels of working class associational power.\(^6\)

The classic example of this is the problem of inadequate aggregate demand for the consumer goods produced by capitalists. This is the traditional Keynesian problem of how raising wages and social spending can underwrite higher levels of aggregate demand and thus help solve “underconsumption” problems in the economy. Inadequate consumer demand represents a collective action problem for capitalists: capitalists simultaneously want to pay their own employees as low wages as possible and want other capitalists to pay as high wages as possible in order generate adequate consumer demand for products. High levels of unionization, in effect, prevent individual firms from “defecting” from the cooperative solution to this dilemma. Working class strength can also contribute to more predictable and stable labor markets. Under conditions of tight labor markets where competition for labor among capitalists would normally push wages up, perhaps at rates higher than the rate of increase of productivity thus stimulating inflation, high levels of working class associational power can also contribute to wage restraint (see Calmfors and Driffill, 1988; Glynn 1995; Pontusson, 1997). Wage restraint is an especially complex collective action problem: individual capitalists need to be prevented from defecting from the wage restraint agreement (i.e. they must be prevented from bidding up wages to workers in an effort to lure workers away from other employers given the unavailability of workers in the labor market), and individual workers (and unions) need to be prevented from defecting from the agreement by trying to maximize wages under tight labor market conditions. Wage restraint in tight labor markets, which are important for longer term growth and contained inflation, is generally easier where the working class is very well organized, particularly in centralized unions, than where it is not.

These positive effects of workers strength on capitalist interests in the sphere of exchange need not imply that capitalists themselves are equally well organized in strong employers

\(^6\) This does not mean that working class associational power is a necessary condition for the solution to such coordination problems. There may be other devices which may constitute alternative strategies for accomplishing this. All that is being claimed is that working class associational power can constitute a mechanism which makes it easier to solve such problems.
associations, although as the history of Northern European neo-corporatism suggests, strongly organized working class movements tend to stimulate the development of complementary organization on the part of employers. In any case the ability of workers power to constructively help solve macro-economic problems is enhanced when capitalists are also organized.

Assuming that the positive Keynesian and labor market effects of working class power are generally weaker than the negative wage-cost and firing discretion effects, the combination of these processes yields the reverse-J relationship for the sphere of exchange in Figure 10.4.

*The sphere of production*

A similar contradictory quality of the interests of capitalists with respect to workers occurs within the sphere of production: on the one hand, capitalists have interests in being able to unilaterally control the labor process (choosing and changing technology, assigning labor to different tasks, changing the pace of work, etc.), and on the other hand, they have interests in being able to reliably elicit cooperation, initiative and responsibility from employees.

As working class associational power within production increases, capitalists’ unilateral control over the labor process declines. This does not mean that capitalists are necessarily faced with rigid, unalterable work rules, job classifications, and the like, but it does mean that changes in the labor process need to be negotiated and bargained with representatives of workers rather than unilaterally imposed. Particularly in conditions of rapid technical change, this may hurt capitalist interests.

On the other hand, at least under certain social and technical conditions of production, working class associational strength within production may enhance the possibilities for more complex and stable forms of cooperation between labor and management. To the extent that working class strength increases job security and reduces arbitrariness in managerial treatment of workers, then workers’ time horizons for their jobs are likely to increase and along with this their sense that their future prospects are linked to the welfare of the firm. This in turn may contribute to a sense of loyalty and greater willingness to cooperate in various ways.

The German case of strong workplace-based worker organization built around works councils and co-determination is perhaps the best example. Streeck describes how codetermination and works councils positively help capitalists solve certain problems:

What, then, is specific about codetermination? Unlike the other factors that have limited the variability of employment, codetermination has not merely posed a problem for enterprises, but has also offered a solution. While on the one hand codetermination has contributed to growing organizational rigidities, on the other hand, and at the same time, it has provided the organizational instruments to cope with such rigidities without major losses in efficiency....(Streeck, 1992: 160)

...the works councils not only shares in what used to be managerial prerogatives, but also accepts responsibility for the implementation and enforcement of decisions made under its participation. This constellation has frequently been described as ‘integration’ or ‘cooptation’ of labor or organized labor, in management; with the same justification,
however it can be seen as ‘colonization’ of management, and in particularly manpower management, by the representatives of the workforce. The most adequate metaphor would probably be that of a mutual incorporation of capital and labor by which labor internalizes the interests of capital just as capital internalizes those of labor, with the result that works council and management become subsystems of an integrated, internally differentiated system of industrial government which increasingly supersedes the traditional pluralist-adversarial system of industrial relations. (Streeck, 1992: 164)

This tighter coupling of interests of labor and capital with the resulting heightened forms of interclass cooperation helps employers solve a range of concrete coordination problems in workplaces: more efficient information flows within production (since workers have more access to managerial information and have less incentive to withhold information as part of a job-protection strategy); more efficient adjustments of the labor process in periods of rapid technological change (since workers are involved in the decisionmaking and are thus less worried that technological change will cost them their jobs, they are more likely to actively cooperate with the introduction of new technologies); more effective strategies of skill formation (since workers, with the most intimate knowledge of skill bottlenecks and requirements, are involved in designing training programs). Most broadly, strong workplace associational power of workers creates the possibility of more effective involvement of workers in various forms of creative problem-solving.

With so many positive advantages of such cooperative institutions, it might seem surprising that strong workplace associational power is so rare in developed capitalist countries. The reason, as I have argued throughout this paper, is that such cooperative advantages come at a cost to capital. Streeck recognizes this even in the German case:

Above all, codetermination carries with it considerable costs in managerial discretion and managerial prerogatives.....Integration cuts both ways, and if it is to be effective with regards to labor it must bind capital as well. This is why codetermination, for all its advantages, is seen by capital as a thoroughly mixed blessing.....Both the short-term economic costs and the long-term costs in authority and status make the advantages of codetermination expensive for the capitalist class, and thus explains the otherwise incomprehensible resistance of business to any extension of codetermination rights. (Streeck 1992: 1965)

Because of these costs, capitalists in general will prefer a system of production in which they do not have to contend with strong associational power of workers in production. Thus, the reverse-J shape of the functional relation between workers’ power and capitalists’ interests within

7. It is possible, under certain social and cultural conditions, for some of these forms of cooperation to emerge and be sustained without strong workplace associational power of workers. This is often the way the relatively cooperative system of employment relations in Japan is described (e.g. Nakane, 1984), although others have criticized such culturalist views (e.g. Aoki, 1988: 304ff). In any event, under many conditions high levels of worker cooperation within production are likely to be difficult to sustain if they are not backed by some form of significant associational power.
production.

The sphere of politics

The two components of the reverse-J relationship between working class associational power and capitalist interests are perhaps most obvious in the sphere of politics. As a great deal of comparative historical research has indicated, as working class political power increases, the capitalist state tends to become more redistributive: the social wage increases and thus the reservation wage of workers is higher; taxation and transfer policies reduce income inequality; and in various ways labor power is partially decommodified. All of these policies have negative effects on the material interests of high-income people in general and capitalists in particular. Working class political power also tends to underwrite institutional arrangements which increase working class power within the sphere exchange and often within the sphere of production as well. Working class associational power in the political sphere, therefore, may also contribute to the downward sloping curves in the spheres of exchange and production.

The upward sloping class compromise curve in the sphere of politics is the central preoccupation of social democracy. The large literature on tripartite state-centered corporatism is, in effect, a literature on how the interests of capitalists can flourish in the context of a highly organized working class (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Schmitter and Lembruch, 1979; Schmitter, 1988). Sweden, until the mid-1980s, is usually taken as the paradigm case: the social democratic party’s control of the Swedish state facilitated a set of corporatist arrangements between centralized trade unions and centralized employers’ associations that made possible a long, stable period of cooperation and growth. The organizational links between the labor movement and the social democratic party were critical for this stability, since it added legitimacy to the deals that were struck and increased the confidence of workers that the terms of the agreement would be upheld in the future. This made it possible over a long period of time for Swedish capitalism to sustain high capacity utilization, very low levels of unemployment, and relatively high productivity growth. State-mediated corporatist anchored in working class associational strength in the political sphere played a significant role in these outcomes.

The inventory of mechanisms in Figure 10.4 provides a preliminary set of variables for characterizing the conditions of class compromise within different units of analysis across time and space. Class compromises within the sphere of exchange can occur in local, regional, national labor markets, or within labor markets linked to particular sectors. Production level compromises typically occur within firms, but they may also be organized within sectors.8 Class

8. In the spheres of production and exchange, there may be considerable heterogeneity in the shape of the class compromise curves and the degree of working class associational power across firms and sectors. The result is that within a given country the conditions for class compromise may be much more favorable in some firms and sectors than in others. Within the sphere of production, it is easy enough to see how the upward sloping curve can be restricted to a particular sector or even firm, since most of the gains from cooperation are contained within firms. In the sphere of exchange, while many of the positive effects of high levels of unionization for capitalists come from aggregate, macro-economic effects, some of the positive effects -- such as stabilization of labor markets, rationalized skill formation, and wage restraint in tight labor markets -- may be concentrated in specific sectors or localities. The reverse-J curve characterizing a given sphere, therefore, is itself an amalgamation of the distribution of such curves.
Compromises in the sphere of politics are especially important within the nation state, but local and regional political class compromises are also possible. The emergence of various forms of meso-corporatism involving local and regional levels of government may indicate the development of political class compromises within subnational units. The reverse-J curves that map the terrain of class compromise, therefore, can be relevant to the analysis of class compromises in any unit of analysis, not simply entire countries.

Different countries, then, will be characterized by different combinations of values on these three pairs of class compromise curves. In Germany, for example, working class associational power is especially strong within the sphere of production, somewhat less strong in the sphere of exchange, and rather weaker in the sphere of politics. In Sweden -- at least in the heyday of social democracy -- it has been very strong in the spheres of exchange and politics, and perhaps a bit weaker in the sphere of production. In the United States, working class associational power as dwindled within all three spheres, but is strongest in the sphere of exchange within certain limited sectors. The overall reverse-J curve for class compromise within a society, therefore, is the result of a complex amalgamation of the component curves within each of these spheres.

Making the model more complex: extending the theoretical domain of variation

The range of variation in Figures 10.3 and 10.4 can be considered the typical spectrum of possibilities in contemporary, developed capitalist societies. It will be helpful for our subsequent analysis to consider what happens when working class power increases towards the limiting case of society-wide working class organization and solidarity simultaneously in all three spheres of class compromise. This corresponds to what might be termed “democratic socialism,” understood as working class collective control over capital.

What happens to capitalist class interests as working class associational power approaches this theoretical maximum? Figure 10.5 presents the relationship between one crucial aspect of capitalists’ interests -- their control over investments and accumulation (allocation of capital) -- and working class power. The control over investments is perhaps the most fundamental dimension of “private” ownership of the means of production within capitalism. In most capitalist societies even as working class power increases, this particular power of capital is not seriously eroded. Even with strong unions and social democratic parties, capitalists still have the broad power to disinvest, to choose their individual rate of savings, to turn their profits into consumption or allocate them to new investments, etc. Of course, all capitalist states have capacities to create incentives and disincentives for particular allocations of capital (through

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9. The actual variation across time and place is, of course, much more complicated than is being portrayed here. Countries will vary not simply in where they are located on each of these curves, but also on: 1) the relative weights of the various curves in defining the overall configuration for the society; 2) the units of analysis within countries within which class compromises are most rooted; 3) the specific shapes of the component curves themselves. In some times and places, for example, the upward-sloping segments of some of the curves might be relatively flat, in other cases, quite steep. My theoretical understanding of these relations is insufficient to say anything very systematic about either of these two sources of variation.
taxes, subsidies, tariffs, etc.). And in special circumstances “disincentives” can have a significant coercive character, effectively constraining capitalists’ capacity to allocate capital. Still, this fundamental aspect of capitalist property rights is not generally threatened within the normal range of variation of working class power. When working class associational power approaches its theoretical maximum, however, the right of capitalists to control the allocation of capital is called into question. Indeed, this is the heart of the definition of democratic socialism -- popular, democratic control over the allocation of capital. This suggests the shape of the curve in Figure 9: a relatively weak negative effect of working class power on capitalist interests with respect to the control over the basic allocation of capital until working class power reaches a very high level, at which point those interests become seriously threatened.\(^\text{10}\)

When Figure 10.5 is added to Figure 10.3, we get the roller-coaster curve in Figure 10.6. There are two maxima in this theoretical model: the capitalist utopia, in which the working class is sufficiently atomized and disorganized to give capitalists a free hand in organizing production and appropriating the gains from increased productivity without fear of much collective resistance; and the social democratic utopia, in which working class associational power is sufficiently strong to generate high levels of corporatist cooperation between labor and capital without being so strong as to threaten basic capitalist property rights. These two maxima, however, constitute quite different strategic environments for workers and capitalists. Statically, capitalists should only care about where they sit on the vertical axis of this figure: if you draw a horizontal line through the figure that intersects the curve at three places, capitalists should be statically indifferent among these three possibilities. Understood dynamically, however, capitalists in general will prefer points in the left hand region of the curve.

It is at least in part because of this threat of a society-wide shift in the balance of class power that capitalists might prefer for working class associational power to remain to the left of the social democratic “peak” of this curve even though this peak might be theoretically advantageous to capitalist interests. Arriving at the peak looks too much like a Trojan Horse: small additional changes in associational power could precipitate a decisive challenge to capitalists interests and power. The local maximum of the “social democratic utopia” in Figure 10.6 may thus be a kind of tipping point which is seen by capitalists as too risky a zone to inhabit. This is one interpretation of the strident opposition by Swedish capitalists to the initial

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\(^\text{10}\) The x-axis in figure 10.6 is working class associational power undifferentiated into the spheres of production, exchange, and politics. It thus represents an under-theorized amalgam of the associational power within the three spheres (which are themselves amalgams of associational power across the various units of analysis that make up a sphere). The underlying intuition is that viable democratic socialism requires high levels of workers associational power within all three spheres, and that a sustainable threat to fundamental capitalist property rights under democratic conditions can only occur when such unified associational power occurs. This does not imply, however, that the three spheres are of equal weight in this theoretical gestalt. Traditionally Marxists have argued that working class power at the level of the state is most decisive for challenging capitalist property rights, whereas syndicalists have argued that the pivot is workers power within production.
formulation of the “wage-earners fund” proposal in Sweden in the 1970s. The wage earners fund, as initially conceived, was a proposal through which Swedish unions would gain increasing control over the Swedish economy via the use of union pension funds to purchase controlling interests in Swedish firms. From the point of view of economic performance and even the middle-run profit interests of Swedish firms, it was arguable that this might be beneficial for Swedish capital, but it raised the possibility of a long-term slide towards democratic socialism by significantly enhancing the power of Swedish labor. The result was a militant attack by Swedish capital against the Social Democratic party. As Glynn (1995:53-4) writes: “The policies which the Social Democrats were proposing impinged on the authority and freedom of action of business which was supposed to be guaranteed in return for full employment and the welfare state. This seems to lie at the root of the employers’ repudiation of the Swedish model, of which full employment was a central part.”

**Working Class interests and the class compromise curve**

Figure 10.7 adds working class interests to the class compromise curve in Figure 10.6. The different regions of these curves can be thought of as specific hypotheses about the effects of marginal changes of working class power on the relationship between workers’ interests and capitalists’ interests:

1. The gap between workers interests and capitalist interests is greatest at the ends of the spectrum: when working class associational power is weakest (the fully atomized working class) or at the maximum strength (democratic socialism).

2. Increases in working class associational power steadily increase the realization of working class material interests up to relatively high levels of associational power. Of course, in actual historical processes of increasing working class power it may well happen that there will be episodes in which the resistance of capitalists results in declines in the realization of working class interests. Nevertheless, in general, increasing workers power is expected to improve the realization of working class interests.

3. There is one region of the curve where the functional relation between workers power and class interests has the same general shape for both workers and capitalists: the upward sloping section to the right of the liberal democratic trough. This is the region of maximally stable positive class compromise.

4. As working class power extends beyond corporatist associative practices, the immediate realization of working class interests again decline. This region of the curve defines the “transition trough” between capitalism and socialism discussed by Adam Przeworski (1985). Capitalists respond to the threat of losing control over the allocation of capital by disinvesting, shifting investments to other places, or by more organized forms of a “capital strike”. This has the effect of provoking an economic decline which hurts workers’ material interests. It is only when workers associational power increases to the point at which investments can be
democratically allocated (in the sense of democratically-imposed direction on allocation) that the working class interest curve once again turns upward. Once there is a full realization of hypothetical democratic socialism, the interests of workers and capitalists are once again maximally divergent.

**One more complexity: zones of unattainability**

In the practical world of real capitalist societies, not all values within this theoretically defined range are historically accessible. There are two different kinds of exclusion-mechanisms which have the effect of narrowing the range of real possibilities. These can be termed **systemic** exclusions and **institutional** exclusions.

**Systemic exclusions** define parts of the curve that are outside the limits of possibility because of the fundamental structural features of the social system. Specifically, the presence of a **constitutionally secure democracy** removes the fully repressed and atomized working class part of the curve from the historical stage, and the presence of **legally secure capitalist property rights** removes the democratic socialism part of the curve. This does not mean that there are no historical circumstances in which these zones of the curve might become strategically accessible, but to get there would require a fundamental transformation of the underlying social structural principles of the society.

**Institutional exclusions** refer to various kinds of historically variable institutional arrangements, formed within the limits determined by the systemic exclusions, which make it difficult or impossible to move to specific regions of the curve. For example, restrictive labor law can make it difficult to extend working class associational power towards the corporatist associative practices part of the curve (Rogers, 1990). On the other hand, generous welfare state provisions which render workers less dependent on capital, and strong associational rights which facilitate unionization may make it difficult to move towards the right-wing managerialist region. Such institutional exclusions, of course, are themselves the outcomes of historical conflicts and should not be viewed as eternally fixed. But once in place, they help to define the range of feasible strategy immediately open to actors, at least until the time when actors can effectively challenge these institutional exclusions themselves.

These two forms of exclusion are illustrated in Figure 10.8. The central region of the curve defines the space that is immediately accessible strategically. To use a game theory metaphor adopted by Alford and Friedland (1985), this is the domain of ordinary politics, of liberal vs conservative struggles over “plays” within a well-defined set of institutional “rules of the game”. The other regions of the curve become the objects of politics only episodically. Reformist vs reactionary politics are struggles over the rules of the game that define institutional exclusions; revolutionary vs counter-revolutionary politics are struggles over the systemic constraints that define what game is being played. The creation and destruction of these barriers of exclusion are the central stakes in processes of ruptural transformation, where the central issues are mobilization of power resources, victories and defeats.

-- Figure 10.8 about here --
In Figure 10.8, the “zones of unattainability” defined by the systemic and institutional exclusions symmetrically span the tails of the theoretical curve of possibilities. There is no reason, of course, to believe that the real world is this neat. Indeed, one of the reasons for introducing this complexity is precisely to provide tools for understanding forms of variation across time and place in these exclusions. This historical variability is illustrated in Figure 10.9 which compares the United States and Sweden in the periods of most stable Swedish social democracy and American liberal democracy.

Systemic exclusions in the United States and Sweden are roughly comparable: both have structurally secure democratic states and capitalist property relations. Where they differ substantially is in the nature of the historically variable institutional exclusions which confront their respective working classes.

In the United States, a variety of institutional rules create a fairly broad band of institutional exclusions to the right of the central trough of the curve. Electoral rules which solidify a two-party system of centrist politics and anti-union rules which create deep impediments to labor organizing all push the boundary of this zone of institutional exclusion to the left (Rogers, 1990). On the other hand, such things as the weak welfare state, the very limited job protections afforded workers, and laws which guarantee managerial autonomy all have the effect of narrowing the institutional exclusions centered around right-wing managerialist anti-associational practices. The band of accessible strategy in the United States, therefore, affords very little room to maneuver for labor and keeps working class associational practices permanently lodged on the downward sloping segment of the curve to the left of the trough.

Swedish institutional exclusions, particularly during the most stable period of Social democracy, all work towards facilitating working class associational power. Labor law is permissive, making it quite easy to form and expand union membership, and the generous welfare state and job protections significantly reduce the scope of right-wing managerialist strategies. The result has been that the Swedish labor movement has for a long time been located on the upward sloping section of the curve to the right of the trough.

Actors living within these systems, of course, do not directly see this entire picture. To the extent that the institutional exclusion mechanisms have been securely in place and unchallenged for an extended period of time, they may become entirely invisible and the parts of the curve which they subsume may become virtually unimaginable. From the vantage point of actors within the system, therefore, the range of “realistic” possibilities may look like those portrayed in Figure 10.10 rather than Figure 10.7. The American labor movement faces a terrain of possibilities which places it chronically on the defensive. Every marginal increase of workers strength is experienced by capitalists as against their interests, so whenever the opportunity arises, capitalists attempt to undermine labor’s strength. Anti-union campaigns are common and decertification elections a regular occurrence. In Sweden, at least until recently, the institutionally delimited strategic environment is much more benign for workers. The central pressure on capitalists has been to forge ways of effectively cooperating with organized labor, of
creating institutional spaces in which the entrenched forms of associational power of workers can be harnessed for enhanced productivity. This needs not imply that employers actively encourage enhanced working class associational power, but it does suggest less sustained effort to undermine it.

The immediately accessible strategic environments of workers' struggles for associational power as illustrated in Figure 7.13 should not be viewed as fixed by an unalterable historical trajectory. The range of attainable possibilities can change, both as the result of conscious political projects to change institutional exclusions and as the result of dynamic social and economic forces working “behind the backs” of actors. Institutional exclusions are created by victories and defeats in historically specific struggles; they can potentially be changed in a similar fashion. But equally, dynamic changes within economic structures can potentially change the shape of the curve itself. It is to that issue which we now turn in a more speculative manner.

Transformations of the terrain of class compromise

If the general model of class compromise we have been exploring is reasonably on target, then this suggests that the prospects of positive class compromise can be altered through three different routes:

1. by changes in the basic shape of the curve;
2. by changes in the institutional rules of the game which determine the range of institutional exclusions; and
3. by changes in the associational power of workers within the strategically accessible range of possibilities.

The first of these involves the functional relations depicted in Figures 10.3 and 10.4, the second involves the institutional “zones of unattainability” in Figure 10.8, and the third concerns the specific location within a strategic space as in Figure 10.10. A full-blown theory of class compromise, then, would provide an account of the causal processes which generate these three kinds of effects.

I cannot offer such an elaborated theory. What I will do in what follows is propose some relatively speculative hypotheses about the way certain developments in contemporary capitalism may be affecting the first of these elements in the model of class compromise, the overall shape of the reverse-J curve at the heart of the model. Specifically I will focus on the possible impact of increasing international competition and globalization of capital on the shape of the curve.

For purposes of understanding the changing conditions for positive class compromise, the critical part of the curve in Figure 10.3 is the upward sloping segment in which working class associational power positively helps capitalists solve various kinds of collective action and coordination problems. Figure 10.11 presents a set of tentative hypotheses about how globalization and increasing international competition might affect the relationship between workers’ power and capitalist interests within each of the three institutional spheres of class compromise.
Consider first the effects of globalization on the sphere of exchange. One of the standard arguments in discussions of globalization is that the increasing mobility of financial capital and globalization of markets has undermined the “Keynesian” solutions to macro-economic problems in advanced capitalism. To the extent that the market for the commodities of capitalist firms are increasingly global, the realization of the economic value of those commodities depends less upon the purchasing power of workers in the countries within which those firms are located. Furthermore, heightened international competition and the constant threats by employers to move production abroad has served to reduce wage pressures thus reducing the positive effect of strong unions on the problem of wage restraint. The positive effects on capitalist interests of strong, centralized labor unions has thus probably been reduced by globalization. While there may still be some positive value for capitalists of a strong labor movement in terms of collective action problems of predictable, well ordered labor markets, especially with respect to the problem of skill formation, nevertheless it seems that, on balance, globalization is likely to depress the positive slope of the first curve of Figure 10.11.

-- Figure 10.11 about here --

Globalization may have quite different effects in the sphere of production. The characteristic form of working class associational power within production are works councils and other forms of organized workers representation within the process of production. As already noted, strong works councils may serve employer interests in a variety of ways: they may increase productivity through greater worker loyalty; they may help spot problems and improve quality control; they may increase the willingness of workers to accept flexible job classifications and work assignments; they may facilitate the process of intra-firm skill formation. Under conditions of the intensified competition that comes from increased globalization, the positive impact of each of these effects could increase. If, therefore, there are significant untapped sources of increased productivity obtainable through enhanced cooperation at the point of production, and if working class associational power within production facilitates such cooperation, then the upward sloping part of the class compromise curve within the sphere of production may rise more steeply as a result of increased competitive pressures.\(^{11}\)

The extent to which these effects on the prospects of positive class compromise in the sphere of production occur depends upon the nature of technology, the labor process and the organization of work. As Streeck (1991, 1992), Aoki (1988) and others have argued, the maximally productive use of advanced technologies often requires higher levels of information-coordination, problem-solving and adaptability than in traditional mass production. To the extent that strong working class associational power within the sphere of production enhances the levels of trust between employees and managers, and such trust is necessary for such new forms of

\(^{11}\) Again, just to reiterate the central argument behind the reverse-J curve: works councils, like all forms of working class associational power, also have negative effects on capitalist interests. Works councils impose various kinds of rigidities on employers which interfere with their capacity to unilaterally reorder production in the face of competitive pressures. The downward sloping curve -- not shown in Figure 15 -- might therefore descend more precipitously under conditions of intensified global competition. The claim here, then, is not that the net effect of globalization necessarily enhances the value of institutions like works councils, but simply that the positive effects become stronger.
work organization, the positive effect of workers’ power on capitalist interests may be strengthened. On the other hand, if the technological conditions of production foster weak interdependencies among workers within highly atomized labor processes, increased globalization and competitive pressures would probably not enhance the positive effects of workers’ associations within production. This suggests that there are probably strong interactive effects (rather than merely additive effects) of globalization and technological change on the conditions for class compromise within production.

Perhaps the most commonly told story about the negative effects of globalization on the prospects of positive class compromise concerns the sphere of politics. Because of the heightened international mobility of capital, especially financial capital, the argument goes, the capacity of states to engage in deficit spending and other reflationary policies has eroded (Stewart, 1984). One of the key ways in which a politically well-organized working class positively benefitted capitalists in the past was by creating the conditions for expansive state spending programs which bolstered aggregate demand. The reduced fiscal autonomy of the state resulting from increased globalization both reduces the benefits from such policies and the capacity of the state to sustain them, and thus reduces the positive slope of the class compromise in the sphere of politics.

If these arguments are roughly correct, then this suggests that there will be a tendency under conditions of globalization for class compromises, if they are to occur at all, to be more heavily concentrated within the sphere of production in contrast to earlier periods in which class compromises were particularly institutionalized within the spheres of exchange and politics. This in turn is likely to generate tendencies towards an intensification of dualism within developed capitalist economies in which some sectors of the labor force are in a position to forge productivist class compromises while others are not.

Dualistic tendencies, of course, are not a new phenomenon. In the 1960s and 1970s there was much discussion of dual labor markets and the division between the “monopoly” and “competitive” sectors of the economy. But in the past, class compromises within the spheres of exchange and politics sometimes had the effect of muting the effects of such dualisms. Strong unions helped to create wage norms which diffused throughout the economy, benefiting workers not in the most organized sectors, and social democratic class compromises in the state underwrote a social wage which partially decommodified labor power, again benefiting all workers. The erosion of conditions for stable class compromise in the sphere exchange and the state, therefore, risks eroding these countervailing forces to deepening dualism.

II. Local civic empowerment

- discussion of examples like Porto Alegre
- civic renewal movement in the US
- discuss Chuck sable democratic experimentalism
III. Conclusion
In order to analyze the relationship of working class associational power to capitalist class interests and class compromise, it is important to understand the strategic contexts for the conflicts of interests of workers and capitalists. We will do this by exploring a series of stripped-down game theory models based on a highly simplified picture of class conflict in which workers and capitalists each face a binary strategic choice: to cooperate with the other class or to actively oppose its interests. Because the actors in this game have qualitatively different roles in the system of production, the meaning of “cooperate” and “oppose” are different for each. As summarized in Figure 10.12, for workers to cooperate with capitalists means that they work hard and diligently in order to maximize the capitalists’ rate of profit. Workers rely primarily on market mechanisms (changing jobs) as a way of expressing dissatisfaction with pay or working conditions; while they may have collective associations (unions), they do not engage in active struggles to collectively pressure capitalists for improvements; nor do they engage in political struggle to advance workers interests against those of capitalists. To oppose capitalists is to struggle against them, individually and collectively, in order to raise worker incomes and enhance the extent to which workers control their own labor effort, and thus to minimize the extent to which capitalists exploit and control workers. This includes political struggles to expand worker rights and their capacity to organize collective associations. For capitalists, cooperation with workers means paying workers as much as is possible compatible with maintaining a rate of profit sufficient to reproduce the firm; accepting workers’ organizations (unions and parties) and responding to worker demands over working conditions; and moderating their own consumption in favor of employment-generating investment. To oppose workers’ interests means paying them as little as possible, given market and technological constraints; getting as much labor as possible out of workers; and resisting worker organizations. As in the case of workers, such opposition includes political action such as opposing unemployment benefits and welfare safety nets that raise the reservation wage and supporting restrictive labor laws that impede unionization. Taking these two alternatives for each class yields the four possible configurations of class conflict presented in Figure 10.13. In terms of these alternatives, “positive class compromise” constitutes the situation in which both classes agree to cooperation (C,C).¹²

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¹² Optionally, in the real world, the options are much more complex than this stark contrast – not only are there various degrees of opposition and cooperation, but a variety of qualitatively distinct forms of both. Nevertheless, for purposes of developing a general inventory of strategic contexts for class compromise in which mutual cooperation occurs it will be useful to abstract from such complexity and examine games in which members of each class (considered either as individuals or as members of associations) make such simple, dichotomous choices.
combinations of cooperation and opposition. Model I can be called a *Unilateral Capitalist Domination Game*. Here, the best outcome for capitalists is (C,O): workers cooperate with capitalists (working hard, not organizing, etc.), and capitalists oppose workers (pay them only what the market dictates, oppose collective organization, etc.). The second best outcome for capitalists is mutual opposition, (O,O). In this game, capitalists are sufficiently powerful relative to workers that they can punish workers at relatively little cost to themselves when workers organize against them. Workers are thus worse off under (O,O) than under *unilateral* workers cooperation (C,O). Struggle doesn’t pay. In this game, therefore, (C,O) will be the equilibrium outcome: capitalists are always better off opposing workers, and given that capitalists oppose workers, workers are better off cooperating with capitalists.

Model II represents the standard Marxist view of class conflict in which the interests of workers and capitalists are treated in a purely inverse relation as a zero-sum *Pure Conflict Game*. The optimal situation for capitalists is that they oppose the interests of workers while workers cooperate with them (C,O). The second best situation for capitalists is mutual cooperation (C,C). This, however, is less advantageous for workers than is mutual opposition (O,O). In the traditional Marxist view, because the interests of workers and capitalists are strictly polarized, it is always better for workers to struggle against capitalists -- to actively oppose capitalist interests -- then to willingly cooperate. The C,C solution, in effect, is an illusion: “cooperative” capitalists, the argument goes, treat workers only marginally better than capitalists who actively oppose workers, but cooperative workers are much less able to force their employers to make concessions than are oppositional workers. Above all, when working class associations actively cooperate with capitalists they weaken their capacity for mobilization and, ultimately this invites capitalists to oppose workers interests, thus leading C,C to degenerate into C,O. The O,O option, therefore, generally promises a better long term payoff for workers than does the C,C option. As a result of such struggles there will be moments when capitalists indeed do make concessions to workers as a result of these struggles -- grant them pay raises, improve working conditions, etc. These concessions are at best a negative class compromise -- concessions in the face of struggle. For both classes in this game, opposition is better than cooperation regardless of what the other class does, and thus the equilibrium will be mutual opposition (O,O) — active forms of class struggle.¹³ The class struggle is much more like trench warfare with occasional victories and defeats for each combatant, and perhaps periods of relatively stable balances of forces underwriting a negative class compromise.

Model III is the standard *Prisoner’s Dilemma Game*. This is a game with symmetrical payoffs for the two classes: (C,C) is the second best outcome for each class and (O,O) is the third best outcome. Unlike in Model I, mutual opposition is now costly to capitalists. This implies that workers have sufficient power to be able to punish capitalists within class struggles. Unlike in Model II, however, workers are better off in mutual cooperation than mutual opposition. Both classes are thus better off if they cooperate with each other than if they mutually oppose each other. Still, if this were a one-shot game, in standard PD fashion the equilibrium outcome would

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¹³ Even though mutual opposition is the equilibrium solution, Model I is not a prisoners’ dilemma for workers since in a prisoner’s dilemma actors prefer mutual cooperation to mutual opposition.
be (O,O) since both classes could improve their payoffs by defecting from the mutual cooperation outcome. If this is a repeated game, as it would be in the real world of class interactions, then the outcome is less determinate. As Axelrod (1984) and many others have shown, in an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, mutual cooperation can be a stable solution depending upon the ways opposition in future rounds of the game is used to punish players for noncooperation in earlier rounds. As the possibility of a stable C,C solution occurs, then positive class compromise also becomes possible.

Model IV is a standard Assurance Game: for both classes the optimal solution is mutual cooperation and unilateral cooperation is worse than mutual opposition. Unless there is reasonable confidence that the other class will cooperate, therefore, mutual cooperation is unlikely to occur. If class conflict was an assurance game, the failures of cooperation would primarily reflect a lack of enlightenment on the part of actors -- they simply don’t know what’s good for them. This corresponds to the views of a certain kind of naive liberalism, where conflict is always seen as reflecting misunderstanding among parties and “win-win” solutions are always assumed to be possible.

A strict Assurance Game of this form is unlikely in capitalist economies since a situation in which capitalists can get full cooperation from workers without having to make any concessions – the (C,O) outcome – is unlikely to offer capitalists inferior payoffs to mutual cooperation. Nevertheless, there may be situations in which the (C,C) pay-off moves in the direction of an Assurance Game, and certainly situations in which the gap for both classes between C,C and O,O becomes very large.

Finally, Model V, the Unilateral Workers Domination Game, is the symmetrical model to Model I. Here workers are sufficiently strong and capitalists sufficiently weak, that workers can force capitalists to unilaterally cooperate, including forcing them to invest in ways that enhance future earnings of workers (thus making O,C preferable to C,C for workers). This corresponds to the theoretical idea of democratic socialism: an economy within which workers effectively dominate capitalists.14

Lurking in the background of the models in Figure 5 is the problem of power: the balance of power between workers and capitalists can be thought of as determining which of these strategic games is being played. As illustrated in Figure 6, as working class power increases from extremely low levels (and thus as the ability of workers to impose sanctions on capitalists increases), the (O,O) alternative in Model I shifts downward and then to the right. This shifts the configuration in the direction of Model II in which working class militancy becomes sustainable and the possibility of negative class compromise -- a class compromise based on the balance of force -- emerges. Further increases in working class power begin to move the (C,C) option to the right creating the prisoner’s dilemma of Model III. This sets the stage for the possibility of positive class compromise. As working class associational power pushes (C,C) in Model III in an

14. In this theoretical conception of socialism, capitalists, albeit with curtailed property rights, can exist within a socialist economy just as they existed centuries earlier within a feudal society. It is another question how stable and reproducible such a structure of class relations would be. For a formal model of a sustainable socialist society within which capitalists still have some economic space, see Roemer (1994, 1996).
upward direction towards the north-east quadrant approaching the Assurance Game in Model IV, the possibility for a positive class compromise increases: the gains from stable, mutual cooperation increase.\textsuperscript{15}

If it were the case that increases in working class associational power could actually push the \((C,C)\) payoff into the north-east quadrant of this payoff matrix, then the overall relationship between workers’ power and capitalists’ interests would be a J-curve, not a reverse-J. That is, the highest across-game equilibrium payoff for capitalists would be the \((C,C)\) payoff in the Assurance game rather than the \((C,O)\) payoff in the Unilateral Capitalist Domination game, and thus it would be in the interests of capitalists to accept (and even encourage) high levels of workers power in order to create the conditions for the Assurance Game to occur. It is a central substantive assumption of the Marxian framework deployed in this paper that because of the underlying antagonistic, exploitative character of capitalist class relations, this situation does not occur. Stable, mutual cooperation can still occur, but it is because with sufficient power the threat of opposition by workers prevents the \((C,O)\) option from being an equilibrium, not because mutual cooperation is the best of all possible payoffs for capitalists.\textsuperscript{16}

The two curves in Figure 10.14 are both nonlinear: the \((O,O)\) curve is convex with a decreasing slope, while the \((C,C)\) curve is convex with an increasing slope. The nonlinear shape of these relations is important for the proposed reverse-J model of class compromise, since if these two curves were each linear they would generate a linear overall relation between workers’ power and capitalists’ interests. The \((O,O)\) curve is convex and downward sloping because relatively modest levels of workers’ power can create considerable damage to capitalists’ interests but are insufficient to generate much sustainable gain for workers. Increases in workers’ power from negligible to moderate, therefore, increase the punishment-capacity of workers considerably. Beyond a certain point, however, there are diminishing returns in the additional degree of harm to capitalists generated by additional working class strength. Once workers are sufficiently strong to prevent capitalists from arbitrarily firing workers, for example, being even stronger does not yield additional gains in job security. The \((C,C)\) curve is nonlinear upward sloping because the positive gains capitalists can realize by virtue of workers’ power only occur when workers are sufficiently well-organized and solidaristic that their associations can effectively sanction defectors from cooperation both among their own members and among capitalists. Until worker associations are at least moderately powerful, they lack this dual-disciplining capacity and thus generate little positive effect on capitalist interests.

This, then, is the central game-theoretic logic underlying the argument developed in this

\textsuperscript{15} As portrayed in Figure 6, working class power only affects the \((O,O)\) and \((C,C)\) curves; the \((C,O)\) and \((O,C)\) curves remain fixed. The critical issue in the shifts across the models in Figure 5, of course, is the change in the relative location of the four payoffs, and this in principle could occur because of changes in the location of \((C,O)\) or \((O,C)\) as well as the mutual opposition or mutual cooperation payoffs.

\textsuperscript{16} It is difficult to find direct empirical evidence that the shape of the curve is a reverse-J -- i.e. that capitalists are best off in the \((C,O)\) equilibrium of the unilateral capitalist domination game. The observation that in countries with relatively disorganized working classes, such as the United States, the capitalist class and CEOs are personally much richer than in countries with highly organized working classes is consistent with the reverse-J argument, but is clearly confounded by many other factors.
paper: as working class power increases, the unilateral capitalist domination game is initially shifted to a pure conflict game making negative class compromise possible; with further increases in working class associational strength the strategic environment can shift towards an iterated prisoners dilemma opening the prospect for positive class compromise. The more the game shifts towards an assurance game -- even though it is unlikely to actually become one -- the more stable the possibility of positive class compromise will become. Underlying this double shift is thus the problem of the relation of working class associational power to the interests of capitalists.

-- Figure 10.14 about here --
Figure 10.1
Conventional view of the relationship between working class power and capitalist class interests
Figure 10.2
Curvilinear relationship between working class power and capitalist class interests
Figure 10.3
Decomposition of the relationship between interests of capitalists and associational strength of workers
Chapter 10. Symbiotic Transformation

### Extent of Working Class Power

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<th>Capitalist class interests threatened by increasing working class power</th>
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<td>Sphere of politics</td>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>Unilateral political influence over redistributive policies</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>Unilateral ability to hire, fire and make wage offers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sphere of production</td>
<td>Works Councils</td>
<td>Unilateral ability to control labor process and job structure</td>
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**Figure 10.4**
Decomposition of relation between Working class power and capitalist class interests In the spheres of politics, exchange and production
Chapter 10. Symbiotic Transformation

Figure 10.5
Interests of capital and power of workers with respect to control over investments
Chapter 10. Symbiotic Transformation

Extent of Realization of Capitalists' Interests

High

Low

Classwide leftwing associative practices
Rightwing managerialist anti-associational practices
Corporatist associative practices
Classwide leftwing associative practices

Capitalist Utopia: unconstrained capitalist control
Social Democratic Utopia: optimal cooperation between capital and labor for mutual benefit

Liberal Democratic Trap: too much worker organization for capitalists; insufficient organization for workers
Democratic Socialism: Workers power defines the economic space for capitalist interests

Degree of Associational Practices in Economic Organization and Politics

greater working-class atomization
greater working-class organization

Figure 10.6
Expanded Model of Working Class Associational Power and Capitalist Class Interests
Chapter 10. Symbiotic Transformation

Extent of Realization of Class Interests

High

Low

Capitalist Utopia: unconstrained capitalist control

Social Democratic Utopia: optimal cooperation between capital and labor for mutual benefit

Liberal Democratic trap: too much worker organization for capitalists; insufficient organization for workers

Transition through between social democratic capitalism and democratic socialism

Degree of Associational Practices in Economic Organization and Politics

Fully repressed and atomized working class

Rightwing managerialist anti-associational practices

Corporatist associative practices

Classwide leftwing associative practices

greater working-class atomization
greater working-class organization

Figure 10.7
Working Class Associational Power, Working Class Interests, and Capitalist Interests
Figure 10.8
Working Class Associational Power and Capitalist Interests in Democratic Capitalism
Chapter 10. Symbiotic Transformation

Extent of Realization of Capitalists' Interests

Classwide leftwing associative practices

Rightwing managerialist anti-associational practices

Corporatist associative practices

Degree of Associational Practices in Economic Organization and \( P_t \)

Fully repressed and atomized working class

Systemically excluded possibilities

Institutionally excluded possibilities (historically variable)

Figure 10.9
Working class associational power and capitalist interests in Liberal Democratic Capitalism (United States) and Social Democratic Capitalism (Sweden)
Figure 10.10
Strategic Environment for Feasible Associational Politics as seen by the actors in social democratic capitalism and liberal capitalism
Hypothesized effects of globalization and increasing competition on the class compromise curves in the spheres of exchange, production and politics
## Workers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cooperate with capitalists</th>
<th>Oppose capitalists</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cooperate with workers</td>
<td>C, C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppose workers</td>
<td>O, O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Meaning of Cooperate & Oppose for different Classes

**Workers:**

- **Cooperate:** Work hard and diligently to maximize the profits of capitalists
- **Oppose:** Minimize the extent to which capitalists exploit and dominate workers

**Capitalists**

- **Cooperate:** Pay workers as much as possible and treat them fairly in the work place; accept workers organizations
- **Oppose:** Pay workers as little as possible and get as much work out of them as possible; resist workers organizations

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**Figure 10.12**

Strategic Options for Workers and Capitalists
Figure 10.13
Possible Strategic Games and Pay-offs for Workers and Capitalists
Chapter 10. Symbiotic Transformation

Transformation of the *Unilateral Capitalist Domination Game* into a *Prisoners' dilemma* and then towards an *Assurance Game*

Figure 6. Working Class Power and the Transformation of the Strategic Context of Class Compromise

Figure 10.14

Working class power and the transformation of the strategic context of class compromise