

**Supporting a Dual-Earner / Dual-Carer Society:
Policy Lessons From Abroad**

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I. Introduction

The organization of market work and parenting in the United States has changed dramatically in recent decades, and the growth of maternal employment has been one of the most consequential of these changes. Both married and single mothers are much more likely to be employed now than they were forty years ago, with the most dramatic increase observed among mothers of young children. The traditional male-breadwinner / female-homemaker model of family life has become the exception rather than the rule. But rather than eliminating gender inequality, contemporary work and family life arrangements have exacerbated inequality and have created new and difficult problems for families. Some of the most formidable of these problems concern the care of children. With most parents in the workforce, society is facing a new and painful dilemma: *if everyone is at work in the labor market, who will care for children?*

While several other industrialized countries have enacted public provisions that help employed parents to combine earning and caregiving, American families have been left largely to on their own to craft private solutions and coping strategies. Some families accommodate by reducing the employment ties of one parent, overwhelmingly the mother. Others families cope by providing “split-shift” parenting; when one caregiver returns home from work, another heads for the workplace. Still others are placing their children in out-of-home child care and a growing number are doing so before their child’s first birthday. For some, there is no available non-parental care and children are left to care for themselves.

Although families are making valiant efforts to balance work and family, relying on these private solutions to adapt an outmoded model of gendered work to contemporary realities has created new and vexing problems. Squeezed by the movement of mothers into the labor market, families are finding themselves increasingly time poor. Employed mothers, in particular, often find themselves working very long hours in the labor market and the home. Women who reduce their labor force attachments to care for children incur a substantial “mommy tax” on their earnings and career opportunities -- costs that their male counterparts rarely pay. Because

women's increase in labor market hours has not been matched by an increase in domestic and caregiving work by men, gender inequality remains entrenched in the home as well. "Split-shift parenting" creates other problems for families, increasing the risk of divorce and of compromises in parent-child relations. The current child care system, largely left to the consumer market, strains parents' finances, subjects children to care of dubious quality, and impoverishes many child care workers, nearly all of whom are women. Child care costs, combined with the limited availability of paid family leave and other public income supports for families, help explain levels of economic insecurity and poverty in the U.S. that are exceptionally high by international standards.

These problems are not unique to the United States. Families in all industrialized countries are struggling to balance the demands of the labor market with the needs of children, the interests of women as mothers with their interests as workers, and the interests of women with those of men. But many of these problems are more acute in the U.S. than they are in European countries that are at similar levels of economic development. American families are struggling more than their European counterparts, in part, because the U.S. has done much less than other rich countries to provide a package of government policies that help resolve work/family conflicts.

In the next section, we document some of the prices that U.S. women, men and children are paying as families struggle to craft private solutions to work/family conflicts. In the third section, we argue that current debates about work/family issues have failed to provide satisfying solutions to these problems because they have created a false dichotomy between two opposing perspectives. A perspective giving primacy to women's carework suggests that we sacrifice gender equality for the sake of parenthood and children's well-being; an opposing view that stresses women's attachment to the labor market suggests that we sacrifice the interests of children and parents for the sake of gender equality. Drawing on recent scholarship in Europe, we suggest a resolution to this dichotomy by considering as an end vision a "dual-earner / dual-carer society"-- an earning, caring, egalitarian society. In section IV, we lay out the contours of

a public policy package that is consistent with a dual-earner / dual-carer society, including gender-egalitarian family leave rights, early childhood education and care, compatible public school schedules, working time regulations, and income supports. In the fifth section, we examine public provisions in 12 industrialized countries to draw policy lessons for the U.S. In the final section, we comment on the prospects for change in the U.S. context.

II. Problems in a “Half-Changed World”¹

U.S. parents are navigating uncertain new terrain between traditional expectations that mothers will bear the full responsibility for caring for their children in the home and new expectations that all adults will be at work in the labor market. Parents raising children in a half-changed world are grappling with work/family conflicts that were rare even a single generation ago. As families attempt to craft private solutions to these conflicts they are often perpetuating, or even exacerbating, gender inequalities in the labor market and in the home.

Gender inequalities in the labor market. One of the most significant problems associated with private solutions to work/family dilemmas is that they reinforce already deep gender inequalities in employment. Many women leave employment for months or years following the birth of a child. Others work in part-time jobs that are associated with lower hourly wages, reduced access to occupational and public social welfare benefits, restricted opportunities for advancement, and limited job security (Bassi 1995; EBRI 1993; Gornick and Jacobs 1996; Rosenfeld 1993; Tilly 1990). Still others select occupations that permit flexibility, trading “parenting time” for flat wage schedules, fewer benefits, and the absence of career ladders.

What is important is that these reductions in employment are linked to motherhood but, for the most part, they are not linked to fatherhood. In fact, the presence of children is associated with weaker labor market ties for women and *increases* in men’s labor market attachment. Compared to non-fathers, fathers are more likely to be employed and to be employed full-time

(Gornick 1999b), and they earn more per hour (Lundberg and Rose 2002). The differing effects of children on women's and men's employment outcomes is the primary factor underlying gender inequality in the labor market. Because labor market attachment is depressed by the presence of children for women but not for men, women pay steep economic penalties related to the care and nurturing of children.

Ann Crittenden (2001) has labeled the reduction in earnings due to women's disproportionate caregiving responsibilities the "mommy tax." Crittenden (2001) estimates that the total lost earnings over the working life of a college-educated woman can easily top one million dollars. In a middle-income family -- for example, where a father earns \$30,000 per year in full-time work and a mother \$15,000 in part-time work -- the mommy tax will still exceed \$600,000. While the mommy tax is the highest for highly educated women who could command high market wages, it exacerbates gender inequality in the labor market at all levels of income. For families at the bottom of the skills and earnings distributions, particularly single mother families, it greatly heightens the risk of economic instability and poverty.

Gender inequalities at home. The evidence is mixed about whether women and men work the same number of total hours per week, considering time devoted to both paid market work and unpaid work in the home. What differs markedly between men and women is the share of their total work week devoted to paid versus unpaid work. The gender gap in hours devoted to unpaid work has diminished in recent decades, as men's household labor has increased modestly and women's has declined substantially (Gershuny and Robinson 1988; Bianchi et al 2000; Bianchi 2000; Robinson and Godbey 1997). Nevertheless, women continue to do the large majority of unpaid work in the home. As of the middle 1990s, the time women devoted to unpaid work was about twice that of men (Bianchi et al 2000).

The gender gap remains particularly wide with respect to unpaid time spent caring for children (Bianchi 2000; Robinson and Godbey 1997). Bianchi (2000) documents that the time U.S. married fathers spend with their children has risen in recent years. However, she estimates

that they still spend just 56 percent of the time married mothers spend in primary child care activities, 45 percent of the time mothers spend in either primary or secondary activities, and about two-thirds the time in activities with children present. Thus, married fathers' time with children still lags mothers' by a wide margin.

Where do women get the time for all this unpaid caregiving? Mothers who are employed appear to manage the time demands of the labor market and their children by reducing hours devoted to everything else (Robinson and Godbey 1997; Bianchi 2000). Employed mothers spend more than seven fewer hours per week on housework than their nonemployed counterparts. Employed mothers also spend less time sleeping (55 compared to 61 hours per week), less time on personal care (69 compared to 71 hours), and much less time in leisure activities (29 versus 41 hours) (Bianchi 2000). Many employed mothers, especially those with preschool-age children, face a drastic time squeeze.

“Split-shift” parenting. One-quarter to one-third of parents now work nonstandard work schedules, and a substantial share do so in order to arrange what Presser (2003) calls “split-shift” parenting. Split-shift (or “tag-team”) parenting, like other aspects of the work/family balancing act, has a gendered cast. Mothers are four times as likely as fathers (44 percent versus 11 percent) to cite caregiving responsibilities as the primary reason for working nonstandard hours (Presser 2003). And while men's likelihood of working evenings, nights, and weekends is unaffected by the presence or ages of children in the home, women are much more likely to work nonstandard hours when they have a preschool-aged child (Presser 1995). As Presser (1989) observes: “Women generally are the adapters who arrange their work hours around those of their husbands rather than visa versa.... Men are acceptors: they are willing to care for children when mothers are employed” (p. 531).

Is split-shift parenting a viable solution to the problem of balancing work and family obligations? Or is it one more symptom of the problem? Although split-shift parenting may help reduce gender inequalities in the provision of care for children, as well as in housework, it does

so at a high cost to workers and their families. A large body of research from Europe and the U.S. finds that working nonstandard hours -- especially night and rotation shifts -- is associated with a variety of health problems (ILO 1995; Presser 1999); “round the clock” employment also raises the likelihood of workplace accidents (Kauppinen 2001). What Presser (2003) calls the “social consequences” of nonstandard work schedules are also troublesome. Non-day employment is associated with lower marital quality, especially when there are children, much higher divorce rates, and more limited parent-child interactions (Presser 1999). There is also disturbing evidence that children whose parents work night and weekend shifts fare much more poorly in school than other children, in terms of both academic achievement and behavior problems (Heymann 2000).

Child care costs for parents, children, and providers. The movement of women from the home to the labor market when their children are young has greatly increased both the demand for and supply of non-parental child care. Like other solutions to work/family demands, these alternative care arrangements are overwhelmingly private -- in both provision and financing. And like other private solutions, they create difficult problems and tradeoffs for many families.

The use of predominantly private nonparental care imposes steep financial costs on families. Among working families with children under age 13, about half pay for child care during their working hours. Across all families, these costs average \$286, or 9 percent of family earnings, per month (Giannarelli and Barsimantov 2000). The costs of child care are substantial on average and, because the distribution of these costs is highly unequal, they are extremely high for some families. Among families with children under age five who have incomes at or below 200 percent of the federal poverty threshold, the one-half who pay for child care spend about 17 percent of family earnings. And among families at or below the poverty line, the one-third who pay for child care spend 23 percent of family earnings (Giannarelli and Barsimantov 2000).

Although American families are paying a lot for child care, the quality of care that they are purchasing may not be very good. There is relatively little regulation of quality or of

caregiver qualifications in private child care settings in the U.S. (Children's Foundation 2000). The lack of public oversight, combined with persistently low wages for child care professionals, has produced a minimally educated and highly unstable caregiving workforce, with many workers cycling in and out of low-paid child care positions. Some child care centers report rates of staff turnover well in excess of 100 percent annually (Whitebook et al 1989). The predictable result of these workforce issues is the provision of often very poor quality care to children. Observational studies of child care centers have concluded that only 15 percent of U.S. child care centers provide "good" quality care; in unregulated family child care and relative care, 50 to 69 percent is assessed as "inadequate" or "fair" to "poor" in quality (Helburn et al 1995; Galinsky et al 1994). Unfortunately, it is the children who are most developmentally vulnerable -- those from poor communities and disadvantaged families -- who are likely to receive the poorest quality care (Helburn et al 1995).

The private child care solution to the work/family dilemma creates another, often overlooked gender penalty: it impoverishes a large, low-wage child care workforce dominated by women. Child care workers in the United States are poorly paid and usually work without either employment benefits or realistic opportunities for career advancement. The average child care center teacher earns between \$13,125 and \$18,988 for full-week, full-year employment (Whitebook 1999), making child care professionals one of the most poorly paid groups of workers in the country. By way of comparison, the average earnings of workers in child care centers are about the same -- and those of family child care providers are barely half -- of the wages earned by parking lot attendants (Whitebook 1999).

Economic insecurity and poverty. The movement of many more women into the labor market during recent decades has created new time demands and other social pressures. But we would surely expect that this increase in household labor supply was good for families' economic wellbeing. Indeed, throughout much of the 1990s, the U.S. experienced one of the most sustained periods of economic growth in recent history. Although many families fared very

well during the 1990s, others continued to experience a starkly different economic reality even in the midst of the economic good times. Child poverty rates dipped slightly starting in the late 1990s, but this drop only succeeded in returning the U.S. to the poverty rates of the 1970s. As of 2000, more than 18 percent of children between the ages of six and 17, and 22 percent of those under age six, were living in officially poor families (Shirk, Bennett, Aber 1999).

If everyone is now at work, why do so many U.S. families continue to live at the margins of self-sufficiency? Demographic and economic factors are crucial, both the high percentage of children in single-parent families and the growth of low wage employment since the 1970s. The paucity of government assistance for families compounds these problems. Even before the welfare reforms of the 1990s, families relying on public assistance were among the poorest of the poor families. Between 1994 and 1999, average welfare benefits declined by 30 percent and receipt of welfare *among poor families* declined a remarkable 33 percent (Meyers, Gornick and Peck 2001).

Limited government assistance is also a culprit in the poverty of working families. The largest single source of help for working poor families is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Although the EITC has provided important assistance for low-earning families, it has not been enough to offset declining real incomes. And it has done little to help families manage the considerable expenses associated with employment. By one recent estimate, only about 15 percent of income-eligible families receive child care subsidies -- with levels varying from 6 to 25 percent across states (USDHHS 1999). In the absence of assistance, child care costs can push near-poor families deeper into poverty.

Of particular importance for families with children, government programs provide very little in the way of income-replacement for workers who withdraw from employment temporarily due to childbirth or other caregiving-related needs. As of 1993, the national Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) grants workers in larger establishments the right to unpaid leave; however, publicly-mandated maternity pay is available in only five states, covering under a quarter of the labor market, and paid leave provided voluntarily by employers is offered to fewer than 4 percent

of women employees. That means that many parents cannot take advantage of their FMLA rights to care for their infants. Nearly 80 percent of employees who do not take FMLA leave when needed report that the reason is that they could not afford unpaid leave (USDOL 2000).

Swimming upstream. Despite the evidence of deeply entrenched gender divisions in market and caregiving work, many families express a desire to share earning and caring more equally. When asked if they would prefer work more hours (with more pay) -- as opposed to the same or fewer hours (with less pay) -- nearly one-quarter of U.S. mothers indicate that they would like to have more hours of employment (authors' calculations, based on data from the International Social Survey Programme). Men, on the other hand, often express a desire to have more hours of time with their families. In a number of mostly qualitative studies, men report dissatisfaction with their responsibility for a disproportionately high share of economic responsibility for their families and disproportionately small role in the care of their children (see, e.g., Barnett and Rivers 1996; Coltrane 1996, Deutsch 1999, and Levine and Pittinsky 1997).

Although many parents express the wish to share earning and caring more equally, those who try to do so, and to spend substantial amounts of time with their young children, are likely to find themselves swimming upstream in contemporary America. For parents whose resources allow them to reduce working time for caregiving, the penalties are likely to be social and professional. Women who choose to spend substantial time away from the workplace to care for young children often find themselves "mommy tracked" away from the most lucrative career opportunities (Crittenden 2001). In the context of gendered sex role expectations, men who make similar choices are likely to find themselves even more severely "daddy tracked." Data from employer surveys indicate, for example, that a majority of managers still believe that part-time working schedules and even brief parental leaves are inappropriate for men (Crittenden 2001). Parents with fewer resources are likely to have even more limited options. With little or no access to paid parental leave, low-earning parents often face a cruel choice between spending

time at home with very young children and earning enough to meeting their families' basic needs. The constrained choices of low-income women are evident in, for example, the fact that rates of leave-taking and length of leaves increased most substantially among higher income women after the passage of the FMLA (Ross 1999).

III. Reconciling Earning, Caring, and Gender Equality:

The Dual-Earner / Dual-Carer Society

At least two distinct perspectives have dominated academic and public discourse about work and family issues during the past four decades. Social scientists, policy analysts, and advocates have written extensively about changes in Americans' working behavior and about new problems for families who are attempting to balance work and family demands. During this same period, American feminists have written volumes about the causes and consequences of gender inequality both at home and in the labor market. Over time, many feminists concluded that the two are inextricably linked, with labor market inequality resting on gendered divisions of labor at home.

There has been surprisingly little meeting of the minds between these perspectives. Much of the work/family literature stresses *women's* connection to their children and locates work/family conflict in women's lives. This perspective suggests that work/family conflict can be solved by crafting strategies that allow women to both work for pay and spend time caring for their children, e.g., paid maternity leave, part-time work, job sharing, telecommuting, flextime. In contrast, much of the feminist literature has focused on enabling women to leave the home and strengthen their ties to the labor market, i.e., to achieve parity with men. This perspective has emphasized policies that support women's employment, including out-of-home child care and the dismantling of employment barriers. While there is much overlap between these perspectives, productive engagement between them has been limited.

In recent years, European welfare state scholars have engaged in a parallel debate about the characteristics of the “woman-friendly welfare state”. One group, writing from a “care perspective,” stresses support for women engaged in various forms of private caregiving. From this perspective, the ideal role of the state is to grant women “the right to time for care” and to remunerate women for care work performed in the home -- in other words, to lower the costs associated with women’s unique role as providers of care. Another perspective, the “women’s employment” or “universal breadwinner” perspective, argues that the primary aim of state policy should be to bolster gender equality in the labor market. “Employment perspective” proponents vigorously critique the “care perspective,” arguing that while it may value and reward women’s unpaid work in the short-run, it works at cross purposes with reducing gender inequalities in the long run, as it cements gendered divisions of labor into place. Those writing from the “care perspective” reply that failing to support women as caregivers disregards many women’s desires to engage deeply in care work, denies women options for remuneration for time spent at home, and ultimately deprives those in need of care of their caregivers’ time.

To reconcile these seemingly incompatible goals, we need to imagine fundamental transformations in both gender *and* labor market arrangements. One version of such a transformed society has been labeled a “dual-earner / dual-carer” society by British sociologist Rosemary Crompton (1999). The dual-earner / dual-carer society² would differ from contemporary society in two important respects. First, men and women would engage symmetrically, as groups, in both paid work in the labor market and in unpaid work in the home.³ In an earner/carers society, men and women would “halve it all,” as American psychologist Francine Deutsch evocatively phrases it, and the benefits and costs of parenting would be shared equally between men and women. Second, the time allocated to caring would not only be de-gendered, it would be substantial. In an earner/carers society, the lion’s share of caring for very young children would be located in the home. Until children are old enough to enter educationally-oriented care (about age two-and-a-half or three), parents would be able to spend substantial time in caring for their own children.⁴

The earner/carer society describes a *societal* arrangement. It serves as a useful heuristic device for considering the provisions of modern welfare states: if we want to create an egalitarian society that values paid work in the labor market and caregiving work in the home, what role will the state need to play in providing support and reducing barriers for women and for men? It is neither a prescription nor a mandate for individual families. While the earner/carer *society* “halves it all” between women and men, such a society would be composed of men and women who choose various combinations of labor market and home time -- depending on various factors, including their preferences, the needs and the life stages of their children, and the resources of their extended families. Likewise, while an earner/carer society would situate the bulk of care of very young children in the home, individual families would be expected to make a variety of choices about their allocation of time to the labor market and to caregiving in the home.

What would it take to realize an earner/carer society? It would require transformations in the division of work between men and women, a more family-friendly labor market, and a new role for government. The most fundamental transformation would result from a reallocation of mothers’ and fathers’ time between market and caring work. For mothers *and* fathers to share the caring, men (on average) would need to shift an appreciable numbers of hours from labor market to home when their children are young. For men *and* women to share the earning, women (on average) would need to shift a more modest number of hours from the home to the labor market. Mothers and fathers would essentially meet in the middle in their allocation of time between market and home.

For this to happen, both men and women would need the option to work reduced hours when their children are young, without undue penalties in wages, benefits, and professional opportunities. They would need flexibility in their work arrangements, to attend to the routine and non-routine aspects of family life. And they would need trusted and affordable resources outside the nuclear family to provide care for children during their own working hours.

Individual employers may help bring about some of these changes. Employers in the public and private sectors have developed a number of exemplary policies to make the workplace more "family friendly" and flexible. But employers have few if any incentives to absorb the costs that would result from a significant reallocation of parents' time from the workplace to the home when children are very young, or the costs incurred by the need for out-of-home care for older children. Employers continue to enjoy a free ride on the unpaid work of parents, mostly mothers, who care for dependent family members without compensation and absorb substantial costs. In the absence of mechanisms to forcefully shift these costs back onto employers, there is very little incentive for workplaces to direct substantial resources toward resolving work/family dilemmas.

We cannot expect families to solve this dilemma on their own; nor can we rely on employers to bring about a fundamental transformation of work and family life. And allocating core services for working parents to consumer markets -- as we now do with child care -- produces substantial inequalities across families in financial burdens and in the quality of care received. The achievement of an earner/carer society will be possible only if government plays a more active role in supporting new alternatives and making these choices less costly for individuals and for employers.

IV. Public Policy in Support of a Dual-Earner / Dual-Carer Society.

Although families in the U.S. are left largely to their own devices to manage work and family demands, their counterparts in many western and northern Europe countries are supported by a package of policies that allows parents to reduce their employment hours during their children's earliest years, creates incentives for men to assume a larger share of caregiving in the home, provides affordable substitute care for children while their parents are in the workplace, and assures minimum levels of economic security. These policies provide a blueprint for a welfare state that would be consonant with an earner/carer society.

Family leave. Family leave provisions are fundamental for helping parents to secure sufficient time for caregiving when their children are young. To achieve this goal, leave policies must include both rights and benefits: granting parents the right to take time off to care for children without losing their jobs and providing cash benefits (“wage replacement”) to offset lost wages during periods of leave.

Public family leave provisions consonant with the earner/carer model would have at least four components, all of which have been developed in many European countries. First, mothers would have *maternity leave* rights and benefits that guarantee the right to take time off from work, with pay, around the time of birth or adoption. Second, fathers would have *paternity leave* rights and wage replacement for some period around the time of the birth or adoption. Third, following their maternity and paternity leaves, both parents would be granted longer-term *parental leave*, with both the right to be away from the workplace and cash benefits. Parental leave policies would support a combination of caregiving and market work during children’s early years, say up to the third birthday (when many children would enter full-day preschool). Finally, throughout their children’s lives, parents would be entitled to temporary paid leaves -- often referred to in Europe as *leave for family reasons* -- that would allow them to take brief breaks from employment to care for a sick child or to respond to other family caregiving demands.⁵

The most vexing problems in the design of public family leave policies concern gender equality. If women use extensive leave benefits to take long absences from the workplace for caregiving reasons, leaves have the potential to exacerbate already substantial gender differentials in paid and unpaid work. An obvious first step toward gender equality is the extension of family leave benefits to mothers and fathers. It is equally important to design policies that create incentives that maximize the likelihood that men will take up the benefits to which they are entitled, as women already do nearly everywhere.

Recent European experiences suggests that two features of parental leave design may increase the incentives for men to take up their benefits. First, a high benefit rate -- ideally, one that approaches the worker's full wage -- is fundamental. Because men tend to have higher wages than women, in the absence of full wage replacement it often makes economic sense for mothers rather than fathers to withdraw from the labor market. Leaves that provide flat-rate or low-to-medium earnings-related benefits reinforce this gender differential. Full or high parental leave wage replacement rates maximize fathers' propensity to take advantage of leave rights and benefits (Moss and Deven 1999).

Second, men's incentives to take up leave increase when fathers' rights are granted on an individual basis or are otherwise nontransferable to their female partners. Policies that grant each parent his or her own period of leave create nontransferable rights, as do policies that reserve some portion of the family-based entitlement specifically for fathers. Either approach creates "use or lose" provisions for fathers; leave time that is not taken by the father is lost to the family.

Early childhood education and care (ECEC) and public school scheduling. Early childhood education and care are a second essential support for parents combining earning and caring. If the family leave rights and benefits described above were extended to all parents, mothers and fathers would be able to provide the bulk of care for very young children and to arrange working schedules to provide a portion of the non-school-hour care for older children. For older preschool children, however, and for school-aged children during summers and school holidays, high quality public ECEC is a crucial family support in two dimensions: it provides a safe and affordable alternative to parental care and an enriching experience for children.

ECEC policy consonant with an earner/carer society would reflect several principles that have been fully or partially developed here and abroad. First, early childhood education and care would be provided as a universal child entitlement; that would improve both the availability and affordability of care and provide a critical employment support for mothers and fathers. Second, ECEC would be available during both standard and nonstandard working hours. In the "24/7"

economy of the U.S., opening high quality child care centers during the standard work week will not be enough. With more affordable and acceptable child care options, parents who are currently working nonstandard hours in order to accommodate child care needs may be able to switch to more conventional hours. For those who cannot or do not, a combination of off-hour child care and standard-hour early education experiences would be needed.

Third, the quality of publicly-provided ECEC would be high. The provision of high quality care has obvious benefits for children in those care settings. It is also important for the promotion of gender equality. Parents' decisions to substitute time in the labor market for time in the home are influenced by both the cost of care, relative to their wages, and by their perception of the quality differential between parental and substitute care. Care arrangements of uncertain quality can compromise parents' -- particularly mothers' -- willingness and ability to commit to employment. The quality of care has other implications for the wages and benefits of the overwhelmingly female caregiving workforce. Workers' wages are the single largest input in child care production and their education, training, and tenure are the most robust predictors of child care quality. A commitment to improving the quality of ECEC in the U.S. would necessarily include a commitment to raising the human capital and wages of some of the lowest paid women in the workforce.

Although public schooling serves as *de facto* child care, children's care needs do not end when they start school. Depending on their parents' employment schedules, children may need care before and after school, during school holidays, and summer vacations. With more flexible working arrangements and extended family leave, parents could be available to provide part of this care. But in countries with short school days or years, including the U.S., this solution would still leave many hours of care uncovered. Policies that extend school hours and lengthen the school year to match parents' working schedules would provide another essential support for earner/carer families.

Regulated working time. For parents combining earning and caring, sufficient time for work in the labor market and caregiving in the home is often the scarcest of resources. The model of an earner/carer society assumes that both mothers and fathers will adjust their employment hours in order to provide care in the home -- an option that is currently unavailable or prohibitively expensive (in terms of reductions in income and career opportunities) for many parents in the U.S. Several of the European welfare states provide models for a more active state role in regulating working time to support earner/carer families. First, policies governing the length of the legal work week can shorten overall hours, i.e., from the current legal standard of 40 hours in the U.S. to perhaps 37.5 or 35 hours; additional "right to time off" policies can guarantee parents the right to work part-time while their children are young. Second, labor market regulations can protect workers electing to work less than full time from excessive wage and benefit penalties, by requiring employers to provide equal pay and pro-rated benefits for part-time employees. Third, policies governing worker compensation can lessen the burden, and possibly the extent, of nonstandard hour work among parents. Required wage bonuses for nonstandard work hours, for example, provide incentives for employers to shift workers from nonstandard to standard hours, and -- for the workers who do work these shifts -- bonuses increase their financial rewards.

Economic security for families: universal and targeted income support. Public policies that secure family income are the fourth crucial element in a package of government support for an earner/carer society. A society that encourages men and women to engage symmetrically in market and caregiving work is a society that expects parents to be responsible for the economic support of their families. But it is also a society that allows parents to limit their hours of market work in order to devote time to the care and nurturing of their children. This suggests that all parents, including single parents and those who are low earners, would not be expected to be more than “fully employed.” Due to their low hourly earnings, no parents would be forced to work very long hours, double shifts, or more than one job in order to meet their financial obligations.

One principle for an income support policy in an earner/carer society has already been considered, above, in our discussion of wage replacement rates for parental leaves. But a combination of market work and paid parental leaves would still not guarantee economic security for families headed by very low earners. Income support policies that are fully compatible with an earner/carer society would incorporate at least four other principles that are evident in the social welfare systems of many other industrialized countries.

First, they would socialize a portion of the exceptional expenses that children impose on families. Raising a child to adulthood costs middle-income American families about \$165,000 -- or \$8,500 to \$10,000 per year, depending on the age of the child (USDA 2001). The costs of raising children are high and they are usually imposed during the earliest, and least lucrative, years of adults’ working life. Universal child allowances are a common mechanism through which the European welfare use the tax and transfer system to distribute this burden more equally across families of different types and across the life cycle.

Second, they would provide a floor of income security for low-skilled workers without creating employment disincentives. The proportion of workers earning very low wages is exceptionally large in the U.S. relative to other industrialized countries. Unless we are willing to deny parenthood to low-wage workers, or to consign them and their children to poverty, low-

earning parents in an earner/carer society would need supplemental forms of income assistance. Income security policies consonant with an earner/carer society would reflect the commitment to allowing parents time for caregiving *and* supporting the employment of both fathers and mothers by providing income benefits that encourage and reward labor market attachment.

Third, they would adapt temporary unemployment assistance to the realities of family and caregiving demands. All of the industrialized countries have provisions for income support during periods of temporary unemployment. The rules and institutional structure of these programs can severely disadvantage parents, however, and this is particularly true in the U.S. Parents who reduce their working hours or interrupt their labor market attachments in order to provide caregiving in the home may find themselves with too few hours or weeks of covered employment to qualify for benefits. Parents who leave a job “voluntarily” for family related reasons -- such as the illness of a child or the loss of a child care arrangement -- may find themselves categorically ineligible for assistance regardless of their earnings history.

Fourth, they would assure the income security of single parents. The model of an earner/carer society begins with the assumption that two adults share the support and care of children. Policies that support parents and provide targeted benefits for those combining earning and caring may actually provide an incentive for more parents to remain actively involved in the care and support of their children -- whether resident or not. But the reality in the U.S. and in other industrialized countries is that a large proportion of children spend part or all of their childhood with a single parent. Assuring the economic security of these families raises particularly difficult challenges. Two of the most important and effective principles for this support are, first, assurance that child support obligations are imposed and paid by non-custodial parents and, second, that custodial parents receive adequate payments, regardless of the earning capacity or cooperation of the absent parent. European programs of “advanced maintenance” payments, which guarantee replacement of the absent parent’s income for all families, provide useful models for child support policies compatible with an earner/carer society.

V. How Are the Industrialized Countries Performing Against this Blueprint?

These policies provide a “blueprint” for a policy package that would support earner/carer families. A substantial body of research suggests that these policies could advance the twin goals of supporting gender egalitarian allocations of time between labor market and home and promoting greater economic security for families (see Gornick and Meyers 2003 for a literature review of policy impacts.) Unfortunately, the U.S. lags many other industrialized countries in their adoption. In this section, we compare family policies across 12 industrialized countries as of approximately 2000.⁶ We pay particular attention to describing policies that are consonant with an earner/carer society and to comparing provisions in the U.S. to those of other rich, industrialized countries.

For this analysis we select countries that represent three distinct welfare state approaches or regimes. Since the 1990 publication of Esping-Andersen’s Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, it has been commonplace for comparative social policy scholars to focus on welfare state regimes, i.e., groups of countries with similar policy characteristics. Esping-Andersen’s three-part typology clusters countries into the *social democratic* welfare states (primarily the Nordic countries), the *conservative* welfare states (continental European countries), and the *liberal* (or residual) welfare states (typified by the English-speaking countries of the U.K. and its former colonies).⁷ In this study, the *social democratic* countries are represented by Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden; the *conservative* countries, by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; and the *liberal* countries, by Canada, the U.K., and the U.S.

Family leave provisions. Nearly all industrialized countries in this comparison sample provide generous parental leave during the first year of childhood and many provide more extensive leave for family reasons after that period. The U.S. stands virtually alone in the lack of *any* national program for paid leave.

Exhibit 1 provides a detailed comparison of three forms of family leave -- *maternity*, *paternity*, and *parental leave* -- across the 12 countries.⁸ National policies grant *maternity* leave rights and publicly-funded benefits in most; only the U.S. fails to provide wage replacement in its national laws. The most substantial benefits for mothers are provided in two *social democratic* countries that have consolidated maternity and parental leave schemes. Drawing on their combined maternity/parental leave rights and benefits, Norwegian mothers are entitled to one year of leave at 80 percent wage replacement (or 42 weeks at full wage replacement), while Swedish mothers can take a year of leave, with most wages replaced, plus three additional months at a lower rate. The five *conservative* countries provide somewhat shorter maternity leaves -- generally about four months -- but they pay relatively high replacement rates (80 to 100 percent). Among the *liberal* countries, Canada and the U.K. have country-wide policies of paid maternity leave but benefits are low in both countries by cross-national standards.

Short-term paid *paternity leaves* for fathers are far more limited. Fathers in the Social Democratic countries can claim two to four weeks of paid paternity leave at the same rates paid to mothers; in the *conservative* countries, fathers in Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands are granted two to four days paid leave at 100 percent wage replacement. While fathers' rights to short-term paternity benefits are extremely limited, all countries now extend longer-term benefits to fathers through *parental leave* policies, although in some cases (the Netherlands, U.K., and U.S.), parental leave is unpaid. In Denmark, for example, following mothers' maternity leave, parents are entitled to share approximately three additional months of parental leave (in practice, about 80 percent receive full pay); Finnish parents may share six months, at about two-thirds pay. Parents in both of these countries then have further rights to leave, also paid, but at lower rates. In general, these benefits can be "fractioned" (i.e., spread out) over longer periods of time, for example, until the child's third birthday in Norway, and until the eighth or ninth birthday in Sweden and Denmark, respectively. This offers parents the opportunity to take up these benefits later in their children's lives if they choose to do so.

Paternity and parental leave rights and benefits are very limited in the *liberal* regime countries. None offer specific provisions for paternity leave and only Canada offers cash payments for parental leave takers during the first year following birth; following a recent doubling of the duration of parental leave benefits, parents can now share 35 of weeks of paid leave. Until 1993, the U.S. lacked any national policy for parental leave. With the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act, parents in firms with at least 50 employees were granted rights to 12 weeks of unpaid, job-protected leaves at the time of childbirth or adoption.⁹

The *social democratic* countries stand out as leaders in creating incentives for fathers to take up leave rights. In addition to the comparatively high replacement rates, three of these countries include a “use or lose” component in the family’s “shareable” benefits. In most of the *conservative* and all of the *liberal* countries, policies that create incentives for fathers’ take up are weak. While rights to parental leave or benefits are fully individualized (fathers have their “own” rights) in the Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S., fathers’ incentives to take the leave to which they are entitled are clearly weakened by the low or non-existent wage replacement.¹⁰

A key characteristic of the European leave programs is that they are all funded through either social insurance schemes or general tax revenues (Exhibit 2). Nearly everywhere, maternity benefits are paid out of consolidated sickness and maternity funds or social insurance funds that finance a broader array of programs; in most cases government subsidies fill in some of the costs. A crucial feature of these funding arrangements is that none mandate employers to provide wage replacement for their own employees -- as is sometimes advocated in the U.S. Furthermore, when the insurance funds do draw heavily on employer contributions, employers do not face “experience-rating”, meaning that their premiums are not determined by the usage rates of their own employees’ (a tax scheme that the U.S., alone, applies to unemployment insurance). Not surprisingly, the *social democratic* countries invest the most in maternity and parental leave (\$594 to \$808 per employed woman); spending levels are lower in the *conservative* countries (\$67 to \$465) and in the two *liberal* countries with paid leave (\$75 to

\$152) (Exhibit 2).¹¹ While public expenditures are substantial for these programs, when considered per capita the cost of paid leave is surprisingly modest, even in the generous *social democratic* countries.

Early childhood education and care. Provisions for early childhood education and care (ECEC) vary dramatically across these industrialized countries, in both institutional arrangements and in service levels. The U.S. (and other *liberal* countries) stand apart from the countries of Europe in their heavy reliance on private market and family arrangements to provide ECEC until the start of public school.

The *social democratic* countries provide care until the start of school through a single public system, usually under the authority of the social welfare system (Exhibit 3). Care is provided primarily through child care centers and, to a lesser extent, organized family day care schemes and public preschool programs for older children.¹² ECEC is generally provided as a right in the *social democratic* countries, although the extent and nature of the ECEC entitlement varies.

The *conservative* countries are more diverse in their organization of public care. In Belgium and France, public ECEC is provided through a dual system of child care centers for younger children and pre-primary schools for children from the age of two and one-half or three until the start of primary school.¹³ Care for the younger children is not universal but pre-primary services are universally available and take-up is nearly 100 percent for the older preschool children. ECEC provisions are more limited in other *conservative* countries. Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands provide a limited amount of public child care for children before the start of pre-primary or primary school, with priority given to children in socially deprived families; ECEC for older children is provided through part- or full-day educational programs.

In the *liberal* countries, including the U.S., child care for the under-threes is provided through mostly private child care centers and family day care homes. A limited number of subsidies provided to help low-income parents cover all or a portion of this private care. The

majority of care remains private, however, in both the source of financing (families) and provision (market or private entities). None of these countries extend guarantees for public child care, and all heavily target and/or means-test public subsidies. Public provision in the *liberal* countries is more extensive for children from age four to the start of primary school, through various forms of (usually part-day) pre-primary programs under the auspices of national, regional or local educational authorities. Pre-primary programs are limited in availability, however, and often targeted on low-income or otherwise disadvantaged families.

Variations in child care and school institutions have critical implications for the levels of ECEC provision (Exhibit 4). The *social democratic* countries are relatively high in inclusion for the under-threes, and the share of older children in public care varies from nearly two-thirds in Finland to 90 percent in Denmark. Among the *conservative* countries, variation in institutional arrangements translates into considerable variation in enrollments. Belgium provides full-day child care services for a large number of children under age three and for nearly all children aged three to five. In France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, in contrast, services for the under-threes are more limited but available for two-thirds or more of those in the older age group.

In terms of inclusiveness, parents in the U.S. and other *liberal* countries consistently receive the least from government -- particularly when their children are young. For children under age three, fewer than five percent are served in public child care (including those in public care and those in care with public subsidies other than tax credits).¹⁴ By the age of three to five, about half to three-quarters are in some form of publicly-supported care, including child care, pre-school or public schools; by age five, most children in these countries are in public school. Both pre-primary services and the first year of public school are often only part-day, however, leaving employed parents to find private care during the remainder of their working hours.

Extensive systems of public ECEC in many of the European countries translate into substantial investments in children (Exhibit 5).¹⁵ Sweden spends nearly \$5000, and Denmark over \$4,000, per year for each child in the population under school-age. Spending in the

conservative countries is lower, largely due to lower enrollment of children under age three in public care. The *liberal* countries spend much less per child. The U.S. spends the least of the seven countries for which we have data, investing only \$548 per child under school-age via direct provisions, subsidies and tax credits combined. Between 1997 and 2000, spending in the U.S. rose substantially -- to \$679 per child under school-age -- but it remains well below the level of expenditure in any of these comparison countries.

As noted above, parents' needs for substitute care do not stop when their children enter primary school. The extent of this need varies with the standard school day and school year and, on this dimension, U.S. schools provide less assistance than those in many other countries. The American school day, which averages between six and seven hours, is slightly shorter than the school day in some other countries. Even more dramatically, American children generally attend school about 180 days per year, while children in most European countries spent 190-200 days per year in school; that adds up to as many as four additional weeks.¹⁶

Regulated working time. During the 1990s, in several European countries, legislation combined with collective bargaining shortened the standard work week -- generally to the range of 35 to 39 weekly hours. The motivations have been varied, including creating jobs, supporting families, and strengthening gender equality in divisions of labor. While Europeans have debated the benefits of a *shorter* work week, a number of factors have combined to lengthen annual working time in the U.S. (For a detailed discussion of working time regulations across these 12 countries, see Gornick and Meyers 2003).

The *social democratic* countries are especially active, and from a "family-friendly" perspective. In Denmark, for example, which reported the lowest annual hours in Europe as of 1998, working time reduction remains an active issue; the explicit focus is to meet the needs of families. In Sweden, working time reduction remains at the top of the public policy and collective bargaining agendas, as "a way to improve the well-being of workers and increase

equality between men and women” (32 HOURS 1998). As of 2000, normal weekly hours in these four countries ranged from 37 (in Denmark) to just over 39 (in Finland).

Activity is underway in the *conservative* countries as well. In 1997, prominent labor and academic leaders called for Belgium to shift to a 35-hour work week, and, in 2000, the 35-hour workweek became law in France (32 HOURS 2000). By 2000, all five of these countries had reduced the normal work week to below 40 hours.

Along with efforts to shorten working hours for all workers, some European countries have adopted policies specifically aimed at freeing parents’ time for caregiving. In Sweden, for example, all parents have the right to work six hours per week, with job protection (and pro-rated remuneration), until their children reach the age of eight (Haas and Hwang 1999). In 2001, Germany passed a law granting the right to work part-time to all workers in establishments with more than 15 employees; the Netherlands has established a similar right for employees in enterprises of 10 or more workers. Belgium grants employees the right to work 80 percent time for five years. And France has enacted a right to part-time work exclusively for parents. In most cases, these regulations give employers a safety valve; they can refuse a change on certain business grounds, but those grounds are often subject to judicial review.

No similar efforts to reduce working time were evident in the U.S. during this period. The work week in the United States fell steadily during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, until the five-day, 40-hour week became the legal standard in the 1930s. In recent years, the U.S. has seen no substantial reduction in working hours and Americans currently report the longest work hours, both weekly and annually, among these 12 countries (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Jacobs and Gornick 2002.) Working time scholars attribute some of these excess work hours to weak labor market regulations or collective agreements, including the lack of rules establishing maximum work hours, or minimum vacation days, both of which are common elsewhere.

The U.S. also lags its European counterparts in employment protections for part-time workers. In Europe, there has been a gradual extension of employment protections to part-time

workers, through rulings established using European sex discrimination legislation combined with collective bargaining (Smith, Fagan, and Rubery 1998). Supra-national organizations have taken the lead in this policy movement (Bolle 1997). The 1994 *Part-Time Work Convention* (175) & *Recommendation* (182) of the ILO, for example, call for measures that ensure that part-time workers receive the same protection as full-time workers, with respect to the right to organize, occupational safety and health, wages, maternity protection, sick leave, and holidays (ILO 1994). The Council of the European Union's *Directive on Part-Time Work*, adopted in 1997, has even broader language, requiring that "in respect of employment conditions, part-time workers shall not be treated in a less favourable manner than comparable full-time workers solely because they work part time" (Council of the European Union 1997). That is interpreted to mean non-discrimination in pay and benefits, as well as advancement opportunities.

The U.S. has not followed its European counterparts in the extension of protections to part-time workers, and, by European standards, provides low levels of protection for these workers (Gornick and Jacobs 1996). Partly for this reason, the U.S. has a comparatively large pay gap between part-time and otherwise similar full-time workers (Bardasi and Gornick 2003) and larger differentials in access to health insurance and other employment-based benefits.

Economic security for families. One of the most fundamental functions of the welfare state is the assurance of the economic security of those who are attached to the labor market, as well as those who are not. In the provision of support for families with children, the U.S. is an exceptional laggard, by international standards, in at least four dimensions.¹⁷

First, nearly all of the countries surveyed here, other than the U.S., provide universal cash transfers to families with children in the form of family or child allowances. These benefits are designed to partially offset or socialize the costs of rearing children, and are typically provided regardless of parents' work history or current income.

Second, child support policies in other countries are more effective in ensuring income replacement for custodial, single parents. In many countries, private child support payments are

replaced or guaranteed by the state when absent parents cannot or do not pay. The U.S. states, which have lead responsibility for child support policies in the U.S., have become more aggressive in their efforts to collect child support from non-custodial parents. But none of the states assure that custodial parents receive child support assistance in the form of advance or guaranteed payments if the non-custodial parent does not pay. Indeed, just the opposite is true for many of the poorest U.S. families. Parents on public assistance in the U.S. are obligated to cooperate with the collection of child support but collections are retained by the state; at state discretion, the custodial parent may receive all of the collection, a small pass-through (typically \$50), or nothing.¹⁸

Third, means-tested social assistance programs are less restrictive, and more generous, in most of other industrialized countries. The main form of cash assistance for families with children in the U.S., Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (or TANF), is both extremely restrictive in coverage and very meager in benefit levels. In contrast, means-tested assistance programs in other countries usually serve broader and more diverse populations -- blending single- and dual-parent families, and families with and without paid workers -- and benefit levels are generally higher as well as indexed to changes in prices or wages. When combined with other forms of cash assistance, such as child allowances and advance payments of child support, these means-tested benefits assure that families with children have a minimum level of income and a cushion against poverty due to unemployment or very low-wage work.

Fourth, the U.S. lags its European counterparts in protections for temporarily unemployed workers, especially with respect to the economic security of families with children (Gornick 1999b). Typically, disqualifications for “voluntary job separations” are less stringent than they are in the U.S. -- where, in all but five states, the disqualification lasts for the entire unemployment spell. Unemployment compensation is more widely available to part-time workers elsewhere, including those currently seeking part-time work, than is the case in the U.S. And many of these countries -- including Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K.-- have Unemployment Assistance programs, which specifically provide means-

tested cash assistance for unemployed workers who are not eligible for insurance-based benefits, either because they fail to meet the eligibility requirements or because they have exhausted their benefits.

Variation in the generosity of provisions for family income are evident in public spending on cash benefits for families (Exhibit 6).¹⁹ When family allowances for children, family support benefits, lone parent cash benefits, paid family leave and refundable tax credits for families (e.g., the U.S.'s EITC) are considered together, the *social democratic* countries spend substantial, and relatively similar, amounts on cash benefits for families. Across the four countries, spending averages about 2 percent of GDP, or just about \$1850 per child per year. Expenditures in the *conservative* countries are much more varied, ranging from a low of 0.8 percent of GDP in the Netherlands to a high of 2.4 percent in Luxembourg. Across these five countries, per child spending averages just over \$2,200 per year.

Among the *liberal* countries, the U.K. spends about the amount, per child, as do the less generous of the conservative European countries. The U.S. lags quite dramatically, spending only 0.5 percent of GDP or about \$650 per child per year.

VI. Prospects for Change in the United States

The U.S. lags many other rich, industrialized countries in the provision of support to families -- and to "earner/carer" families in particular. In this, we may have much to learn from our counterparts in Europe. But translating "European style" policy configurations to the U.S. would require a substantial mobilization of political support and the exercise of political will. Given current political trends, is the development of policies that support an earner/carer society politically feasible in the U.S.? And are U.S. policy-makers willing to look abroad for lessons about family policy?

Support for any form of social policy expansion may seem unlikely in the wake of the 1996 welfare reform, which reversed the 61-year entitlement to public assistance for families

with children, and drastically reduced cash benefits. While the welfare reform may be read as a sign of social policy retrenchment, it may also, paradoxically, signal support for new forms of government assistance to low-income families. Alongside the public assistance cuts, Congress authorized a large expansion in child care subsidy assistance for the working poor, expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit, and increased health insurance for children in low-income families. These federal policy reforms provide encouraging evidence that support for expanding some forms of family policy can co-exist with widespread opposition to traditional public assistance.

Federal and state policymakers are also considering policies that benefit families more widely. Many of the initiatives receiving the most attention over the last twenty years -- including allowances or refundable tax credits for families, paid family leave, and universal pre-school -- are similar in design to the universal policies in European countries, and to the elements of the package that we have described. This suggests that now, more than ever, U.S. policy-makers have much to gain from studying European family policy designs.

The European experience also provides encouraging evidence that family policies are economically feasible, even in fiscal hard times. In recent years, the U.S. press has frequently characterized European welfare states as undergoing severe, across-the-board social policy retrenchment. But far from dead or dying, many of these countries are in fact increasing commitments in several areas of social provision. Expansions have been particularly great during the 1980s and 1990s in the policy areas that we have outlined, including child care and parental leave (Gornick and Meyers 2001). These programs remain politically popular, in part because they are effective in shoring up women's employment and reducing child poverty, and in part because their financing avoids unduly burdening employers.

As more families in the U.S. struggle to combine employment and parenthood, the possibility that government could do more to help families is resonating with a broad spectrum of society. Americans are often characterized as deeply suspicious of government intrusions into private life, but recent surveys suggest that U.S. parents believe that government is not doing enough to support employed parents. Large majorities support paid family leave and they want it

to be publicly financed (Zero to Three 2000); substantial majorities of Americans also say they support amendments to working time regulation that would extend workers' options for choosing between pay and working time (Hewlett and West 1998). Americans express support for government assistance with child care (Lake Sosin Snell Perry 1998; Wall Street Journal/NBC 1998), after-school programs (Mott Foundation 1998),²⁰ and longer school days and school years (Hewlett and West 1998).

For a new approach to family policy to become a reality, Americans will need to translate their support for these policies into political demands. In The Missing Middle Theda Skocpol (2000), envisions mobilization of these demands through broad political alliances that transcend age, race, and class divisions in their support for reforms similar to the package that we describe in this chapter. By aligning interests on both social insurance and family benefits, and shifting the focus of social policy from means-tested programs for the disadvantaged to universal supports, she suggests that “there are bright prospects for a new progressive politics focused on social supports for all working parents (143).”

Expanding our vision of family policy to support an earner/carer world has the potential to close other political cleavages as well. Formulating leave, child care, and labor market policies that explicitly extend benefits to fathers as well as mothers has the potential to engage men in support of family policy. Designing policies as supports for both employment and caring, shared equally by women and men, holds promise for closing the schism between feminists oriented to reducing gender differentials and advocates focused on rewarding caregiving in the home and securing child wellbeing. The earner/carer framework may also engage conservatives who have traditionally opposed the expansion of government support for families. The model of an earner/carer society supports the employment of women, including low-income women; it encourages parents to spend time with their children; and it strengthens fathering -- three elements of the contemporary conservative agenda. By building political bridges across these long-standing divides, the model of an earner/carer society may help re-energize support for family policy development in the United States.

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¹ We thank Peggy Orenstein for the phrase "a half-changed world". See her book Flux, Women on Sex, Work, Love, Kids and Life in a Half-Changed World for an account of women's struggles to balance family with self-sufficiency, in a society filled with conflicting pressures.

² While we prefer the full label -- the "dual-earner / dual-carer" society -- as it stresses a vision of time allocation *between* family members, we will shorthand this as the "earner/carers" society (or model), from here on out. In either case, our intention is to encompass single as well as coupled parents. Clearly, single parents also struggle to balance earning and caring, sometimes alone, sometimes working with other family members.

³ This analysis of the earner/carers model focuses on heterosexual couples because we are concerned with problems of gendered divisions of labor within families. It is important to note that an earner/carers society would include and support same-sex as well as heterosexual couples. In fact, same-sex couples raising children could serve as a model, in that paid and unpaid work hours are not allocated, within couples, according to gendered expectations.

⁴ The assumption that earner/carers parents would provide substantial care for their own children should not be read as an indictment of substitute care for young children. A large and growing body of research has identified the earliest months of life as a critical developmental period. While research on the effects of substitute care, in general, has found that children benefit from high quality early childhood education and care, studies of the effects on very young children have reached mixed conclusions. We suggest here that parents should have the right to choose how to spend their own time during the first months after childbirth and the right to decide the type of care that their children will receive.

⁵ It is important that family leave provisions support and remunerate time spent caring for all family members -- including, for example, disabled and elderly adults -- but for our purposes, we are focusing on child-related provisions.

⁶ The choice of countries and the time period is determined by the requirements of a larger study, from which this chapter is drawn. This study analyzes policy provision, and labor market and other outcomes, using data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS); LIS includes micro-data for each of the 12 countries as of the middle 1990s.

⁷ In the *social democratic* regime, entitlements draw on the principle of the universal rights of social citizenship and policies stress full employment for both men and women; in the *conservative* regime, entitlements are based on work performance and policies are both status-preserving and compatible with the idea of subsidiarity (the primacy of community and family provision); in the *liberal* countries, entitlements derive primarily from assessments of individual need and important categories of benefits are means-tested.

⁸ This policy typology is standard in cross-national family leave research (see e.g., OECD 1995). *Maternity leave* is granted only to mothers for a limited period around the time of childbirth. *Paternity leave* is granted only to fathers, also for a limited period around the time of childbirth. *Parental leave* is long-term leave available to parents -- mothers and fathers -- to allow them to take care of an infant or young child over a period of time. This is usually granted in addition to, and typically following, the maternity and paternity leave.

⁹ As of 2002, one state -- California -- grants paid parental leave. California provides six weeks of leave to both mothers and fathers, paid at approximately 55 percent wage replacement, subject to an earnings cap.

¹⁰ Several countries also provide other forms of *leave for family reasons*, i.e., temporary paid leave throughout their children's years at home. The most extensive provisions are in place in the *social democratic* countries, although generous provisions are also available in Germany. As with other forms of leave, leave for family reasons raises issues about incentives for fathers' participation. The strongest incentives for fathers to take up these rights and benefits are in Norway and Germany, where the rights are both individualized and highly paid. In the U.S., women or men covered under the Family and Medical Leave Act can take leave for family reasons to care for a parent, spouse, or child, but the leave remains unpaid.

¹¹ These expenditures correspond to 1998 and are reported in 2000 PPP-adjusted U.S. dollars.

¹² The term child care centers (or centres) refers to care in organized centers that may be public, publicly-supported private organizations, or fully private in funding and service provision; family day care refers to care that is provided in home settings that are regulated and may be financed by the public sector. We use the term "child care" inclusively to refer to child care centers and day care homes, as distinct from pre-primary programs.

¹³ Pre-primary (or preschool) refers to care provided with public funds specifically as an educational service before the start of primary school education. Providers may be public or publicly-supported private organizations.

¹⁴ For more information on financing mechanisms, see Meyers and Gornick 2003.

¹⁵ Cross-nationally comparable ECEC expenditure data were available only for seven countries. These expenditures are given in 2000 PPP-adjusted U.S. dollars.

¹⁶ For a detailed discussion of school schedules across these countries, see Gornick, Meyers, and Ross 1997, and Gornick and Meyers 2003.

¹⁷ For a more detailed treatment of cash benefits for families in these countries, see Gornick (1999a).

¹⁸ U.S. child support policies may even reduce the amount of assistance received by the poorest families on public assistance. Recent research suggests that aggressive state efforts to collect child support may lead to a net loss of income because non-custodial parents withdraw informal support to the parent of the child.

¹⁹ Expenditures data are from the OECD Social Expenditure Database. For further analyses of cash benefit expenditures on families in these 12 countries, see Gornick forthcoming.

²⁰ These polling data are available on-line (http://www.childrensdefense.org/cc_polls.htm).

**EXHIBIT 1:
Family Leave - Maternity, Paternity, and Parental Leave Provisions
(approximately 2000)**

(currency amounts in 2000 US dollars, PPP-adjusted)

	Maternity Leave Benefits (paid)	Paternity Leave Benefits (paid)	Parental Leave Benefits (unpaid and paid)	Incentives for Fathers' Take-Up
Social Democratic Countries				
DK	18 weeks. 100% of wages up to flat-rate ceiling of DKK2,758 [US\$321] per week, equal in practice to about 60% prior wages. Due to collective agreements, many employers "top up" so 80% of parents receive 100% wage replacement.	2 weeks (ten days). Benefit is same as maternity pay.	<p>Paid leave: Parents may share 10 weeks of parental leave. Benefit level same as maternity leave. Extended to 12 weeks if father takes 2 weeks. As with maternity, 80% receive full wage.</p> <p>Following parental leave, each parent entitled to 26 weeks of additional child care leave (13 weeks if after 1st birthday). Benefit level is 60% of parental leave benefit level; sometimes supplemented by local authorities. Available until child's 9th birthday.</p>	<p>"Use or lose": 2 weeks of leave added to the 10 weeks of <u>parental leave</u> and designated for the father (for a total of 12 weeks); if he does not take them, they are lost to the family.</p> <p>Individual, non-transferable entitlement: The <u>child care leave</u> is granted to each parent and may not be transferred.</p>
FI	18 weeks [105 days]. Benefit based on graduated replacement rate: approximately 70% at low income, 40% at medium income, 25% at high income (equal, on average, to approximately 66%).	3 weeks [18 days]. Benefit is same as maternity pay.	<p>Paid leave: Parents may share 26 weeks [158 days] weeks of parental leave. Benefit level is 66% of earnings, flat-rate if not employed.</p> <p>Following parental leave, family entitled to 108 weeks home care leave, on the condition that the child is not in public child care. Benefit paid at a low flat-rate of approximately FIM2900 [US\$475] per month. Available until child's 3rd birthday.</p>	--
NW	Paid leave: Parents may share 52 weeks of leave at 80% of wages, or, alternatively, 42 weeks at 100% of wages. (9 weeks exclusively for the mother, 4 exclusively for the father). Benefits subject to maximum income of NOK290,261 [US\$26,876] per year. Benefit can be paid while parent is employed 50% - 90% time, and leave time is extended accordingly. Available until child's 3rd birthday.			"Use or lose": 4 weeks of leave are designated for the father; if he does not take them, they are lost to the family.
SW	Paid leave: Parents may share 65 weeks [15 months] of leave. Benefit level is 80% of earnings for 52 weeks [12 months]; flat rate for remaining 13 weeks [3 months], at approximately SEK1800 [US\$187] per month. Earnings-related benefit subject to maximum income of approximately SEK270,000 income [US\$28,000] per year. Benefit can be paid while parent is employed part-time and leave is extended accordingly. Available until child's 8th birthday.			"Use or lose": 4 weeks of leave are designated for the father; if he does not take them, they are lost to the family.

**EXHIBIT 1:
Family Leave - Maternity, Paternity, and Parental Leave Provisions
(approximately 2000)**

Conservative Countries				
BE	15 weeks. 82% of wages for 1st 4 weeks [1 month], plus 75% of wages thereafter. Benefits during first month not subject to ceiling; thereafter benefits subject to maximum income of approximately \$95/day.	3-4 days. 100% of wages.	<u>Paid leave:</u> Each parent entitled to 13 weeks [3 months] full-time leave or up to 26 weeks [6 months] of half-time leave. Parents taking leave receive flat-rate benefit payment of BF20,400[US\$551] per month. Available until child's 4th birthday.	Individual, non-transferable entitlement: Father has his own leave entitlement that may not be transferred. However, the low replacement rate is a disincentive to take-up.
FR	16 weeks for 1st 2 children, 26 weeks for 3rd and subsequent children. 100% of wages, up to maximum of FF387 [US\$59] per day.	no paid paternity leave.	<u>Paid leave:</u> Parents may share 156 weeks [3 years] of leave. No benefit paid for 1st child; benefit level is flat-rate FF3024 [US\$462] per month for second and subsequent children. Benefit can be paid at reduced rate while parent is employed part-time. Available until child's 3rd birthday.	--
GE	14 weeks. 100% of wages.	no paid paternity leave.	<u>Paid leave:</u> Parents may share 156 weeks [3 years] of leave. Benefit is flat-rate of DM600 [US\$309] per month for 2 years or up to DM900 [US\$464] per month for 1 year. Benefits are income-tested, but majority of families qualify (during the first six months, then the income limits are lower and about half qualify). Benefits can be paid during part-time employment of up to 30 hours per week. Paid leave can be used until child's 2nd birthday; 3rd year of leave may be used until child is 8 years old.	--
LX	16 weeks. 100% of wages.	2 days. 100% of wages.	<u>Paid leave:</u> Each parent entitled to 26 weeks [6 months] full-time leave; one parent can receive flat rate of LF60,000 [US\$1,471] per month. Benefit can be paid at half rate if parent works part-time. One parent must take parental leave directly following maternity leave; other can take leave until child is 5 years old.	Individual, non-transferable entitlement: Father has his own leave entitlement that may not be transferred. However, the low replacement rate is a disincentive to take-up.
NL	16 weeks. 100% of wages, up to daily maximum of 310 guilders [US\$154] per day.	2 days. 100% of wages.	<u>Unpaid leave:</u> Each parent entitled to leave of the equivalent of 13 weeks [3 months] at their usual hours of work per week. Standard take-up is 26 weeks [6 months] at 50% working time. Available until child's 8th birthday.	Individual, non-transferable entitlement: Father has his own leave entitlement that may not be transferred. However, the absence of wage replacement is a disincentive to take-up.

**EXHIBIT 1:
Family Leave - Maternity, Paternity, and Parental Leave Provisions
(approximately 2000)**

Liberal Countries				
CN	<p>15 weeks. 55% of previous average insured earnings, up to a maximum benefit of C\$413 [US\$350] a week.</p> <p>Plus family supplement for low-income earners (less than C\$25,921 [US\$21,967]) raises replacement rate to 80%.</p>	no paid paternity leave.	<p><u>Paid leave:</u> Parents may share 35 weeks of parental leave; combined maternity [15 weeks] and parental benefit cannot exceed 50 weeks. Benefit rate is same as for maternity (55% up to a maximum of \$413 [US\$350] a week.) Parents can continue to work, earning the greater of \$50 [US\$42] per week or 25 per cent of their weekly benefit rate without affecting their parental benefits. Available until child's 1st birthday.</p>	--
UK	<p>Statutory Maternity Pay (stricter eligibility): 6 weeks at 90% of wages, plus 12 weeks at flat rate (£60.20 [US\$92]) a week.</p> <p>Maternity Allowance (broader eligibility): 18 weeks. Paid at lesser of 90% of wages or flat rate (£60.20 [US\$92] a week).</p>	no paid paternity leave.	<p><u>Unpaid leave:</u> Each parent entitled to 13 weeks full-time leave per child. No more than 4 weeks can be taken in any given year. Available until child is 5 years old.</p>	<p>Individual, non-transferable entitlement: Father has his own leave entitlement that may not be transferred. However, the absence of wage replacement is a disincentive to take-up.</p>
US	<p>No national policy of paid maternity leave.</p> <p>Some benefits paid under temporary disability insurance (TDI) laws in 5 states: California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island. Approximately 23% of the US population resides in these states.</p> <p>Maximum duration: 26-52 weeks; average duration: 5-13 weeks.</p> <p>Maximum weekly benefits: \$170 - \$487; average weekly benefits: \$142 - \$273.</p>	no paid paternity leave.	<p><u>Unpaid leave:</u> Each parents entitled to 12 weeks family and medical leave (if employer has 50+ employees and work history requirements fulfilled). Available until child's 1st birthday</p> <p>Several states extend federal leave; generally, state laws broaden coverage (including smaller employers) and/or increase duration.</p> <p>California enacted paid parental leave in 2002. Pays approximately 55% wage replacement for 6 weeks, subject to earnings cap.</p>	<p>Individual, non-transferable entitlement: Father has his own leave entitlement that may not be transferred. However, the absence of wage replacement is a disincentive to take-up.</p>

**EXHIBIT 1:
Family Leave - Maternity, Paternity, and Parental Leave Provisions
(approximately 2000)**

Notes:

All durations are expressed as weeks, to help with interpretation. Where authors converted from days, years, or months, original duration is given in square brackets. All currency amounts expressed as 2000 US dollars, adjusted for purchasing power parities.

"Use or lose" days were implemented in Denmark in 1999; Norway in 1993; and in Sweden in 1995.

Danish parental leave reformed March 2002. Entitlement increased to 32 weeks (to be shared between them) at same pay as maternity; 80% of employers still top up. Other changes increased the flexibility of parents' take-up options.

Finnish parents can replace home care leave payment with payment for private child care provider. Finland introduced incentives for fathers' take-up in 2003.

Norwegian parents can use cash benefit to pay for private child care (for children aged 1 or 2) if child is not in a public slot. In addition to paid parental leave, each parent is entitled to (according to "Law of work conditions") one year's leave without salary.

As of 2002, French fathers entitled to 11 working days (2 weeks), paid at same rate as maternity benefit. French parents on parental leave working 50% time receive 66% of full benefit; parents working 50-80% time receive 50% of full benefit.

As of January 2001, the Netherlands government offers subsidies to employers who provide paid leave, to defray some of the costs.

Canadian maximum pertains to benefit level, not maximum covered earnings. Maximum benefit of US\$413 a week converts to approximately US\$17,500 per year, or equivalent to 55% of about US\$32,000 in earnings. Also, the national government pays benefits, but rights to take leave are established at the Provincial level.

As of 2003, both maternity leave benefits in U.K. extended from 18 to 26 weeks; and fathers entitled to 2 weeks paid paternity, paid at same rate as Statutory Maternity Pay.

Source: Table based on material presented in Gornick, Janet C. and Marcia K. Meyers. 2003. Families That Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment, Russell Sage Foundation.

**EXHIBIT 2:
Public Maternity and Parental Leave Expenditures and Financing
(approximately 2000)**

	Maternity and Parental Leave Expenditures, 1998	Financing of Maternity Leave	
	per employed woman (in 2000 US dollars, PPP-adjusted)	contribution framework	contributors
Social Democratic Countries			
DK	\$594	funded by employers and government	employers pay whole cost for 1st 2 weeks; local government whole cost from 3rd week
FI	\$673	funded through sickness insurance fund	employers; employees; government; government pays substantial subsidy
NW	\$808	funded through global social insurance fund	employers; employees; government; government pays substantial subsidy
SW	\$608	funded through sickness insurance fund	employers and government
Conservative Countries			
BE	\$234	funded through global social insurance fund	employers; employees; government (paid from sickness and invalidity fund)
FR	\$431	funded through health care insurance fund	employers; employees; government
GE	\$465	funded through health care insurance fund	employers; employees; government; employers pay a substantial share as they are required to "top-up" public benefit
LX	\$414	funded through sickness insurance fund	employers; employees; government
NL	\$67	funded through general unemployment fund	employers; employees; government
Liberal Countries			
CN	\$152	funded through unemployment insurance fund	employers; employees
UK	\$75	funded through global social insurance fund	employers; employees; government; government pays substantial subsidy
US	\$0	in states with programs, funded through temporary disability insurance (TDI) funds	in states with programs, various combinations of employer and employee contributions

Note: Expenditure data are from OECD's Social Expenditures Database (SOCX). These data include expenditures on "maternity and parental leave" as a single line item. Totals include public and mandated private spending; thus, expenditures in Germany include both the social insurance payments and the mandated employer "top up". Expenditure data pertain to 1998 -- except for Luxembourg (1990) and the Netherlands (1989), where later data are not available.

Source: Table based on material presented in Gornick, Janet C. and Marcia K. Meyers. 2003. Families That Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment, Russell Sage Foundation.

**EXHIBIT 3:
Institutional Arrangements and Entitlements for Publicly-Supported Early
Childhood Education and Care
(approximately 2000)**

	Primary Public ECEC Institutions	Entitlement for Children Age 0 - 2	Entitlement for Children Age 3 - School-Age
Social Democratic Countries			
DK	<i>Vuggestuer</i> : for children age 6-36 months; <i>Børnehaver</i> : for children age 3-6 years; <i>Aldersintegrerede institutioner</i> : for children 6 months-6 years; <i>Børnehaveklasse</i> : half-day pre-primary through school system for children age 6.	yes, from age 1 or younger	
FI	<i>Paivahoito</i> for children age 0-6; <i>6-vuotiaiden esiopetus</i> (preschool) for 6 year olds.	yes	
NW	<i>Barnehage</i> : children age 0-5.	no	
SW	<i>Forskola</i> : for children age 0-6; <i>Forskoleklass</i> : preschool through school system for children age 6.	yes, from age 1	
Conservative Countries			
BE	<i>Kinderdagverblijf</i> (Flemish) and <i>Creche</i> (French): for children age 0-36 months; <i>Kleuterschool</i> (Flemish) and <i>Ecole Maternelle</i> (French): for children age 2.5-5.	no	yes, from 30 months
FR	<i>Creche</i> : for children age 0-36 months; <i>Ecole Maternelle</i> : for children age 2-5 years.	no	yes, from 30 to 36 months
GE	<i>Krippe</i> : for children 0-36 months; <i>Kindergarten</i> : for children age 3-5 years.	no	yes, from age 3 (part-day)
LX	<i>Foyer de Jour</i> : includes <i>creche</i> (0-36 months), <i>jardin d'enfants</i> (2-3 years), and <i>groupes scolaires</i> (4-12 years); <i>Enseignement Prescolaire</i> : compulsory pre-primary for children age 4; <i>Education précoce</i> : optional pre-primary for children age 3.	no	yes, from age 4
NL	<i>Kinderopvang</i> , <i>Gastouderopvang</i> and <i>Peuterspeelzaal</i> : for children age 2 month - 3 years old, and sometimes older children as well. <i>Basischool</i> for children age 4-5.	no	yes, from age 4
Liberal Countries			
CN	Market-based care main option for children below age 5. Public pre-primary (usually part-day) available for 4-year olds in some provinces.	no	
UK	Market-based care main option for children below age 4. Part-day public nursery education: 4- and some 3-year olds.	no	yes, from age 4 (part-day)
US	Market-based care main option for children below age 5. Public Pre-K and Head Start: for some children age 4.	no	

Notes:

In Denmark, an estimated 87% of municipalities guarantee places for all children between ages 1-5; national law mandates child care slots be provided within 3 months of parent request (or shorter, following parental leave); few children are on waiting lists.

In Finland, every child under school age has an unconditional right to day care provided by the local authority once the mother or father's period of parental allowance comes to an end, irrespective of the parents' financial status or whether or not they are in paid work.

In Norway, universal access is a political priority and access varies by location.

Swedish municipalities required to provide fee-paying spaces for all children aged 1-12 whose parents work or are in school. Spots must be made available "without unreasonable delay" - defined as 3-4 months. An estimated 95% of municipalities are able to meet requirement. As of 2001, children of unemployed parents also have right to services.

In Luxembourg, pre-primary school, *education précoce*, for 3-year olds will be available in all communes by 2005.

In the U.K., by 2004, part-time nursery school is planned for all 3 year olds. Sure Start program provides comprehensive services for children aged 0-3 in deprived areas; goal is to extend services to 1/3 of poor families by 2004.

Source: Table based on material presented in Gornick, Janet C. and Marcia K. Meyers. 2003. Families That Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment, Russell Sage Foundation.

**EXHIBIT 4:
Enrollment in Publicly-Supported Early Childhood Education and Care
(approximately 2000)**

	Share of Children Served in Publicly-Financed Care, Under Age 1	Share of Children Served in Publicly-Financed Care, Ages 1,2 Years	Share of Children Served in Publicly-Financed Care, Ages 3,4,5 Years	Usual Hours of Operation, Pre-Primary Programs	Share of Children Served in Publicly-Financed Care, Age 6 Years -- in Countries Where Primary School Starts at Age 7	Start of Compulsory Schooling
Social Democratic Countries						
DK	15%	74%	90%	7:00 am to 6:00 pm all year.	98%	7
FI	few	22%	66%	7:00 am to 5:00 pm all year.	92%	7
NW	2%	37%	78%	full day (41 or more hours per week).	not applicable	6
SW	few	48%	82%	6:30 am to 6:00 pm all year	93%	7
Conservative Countries						
BE	15%	42%	99%	8:30 am - 3:30 pm with after-school care available. Wednesday afternoon closed.	not applicable	6
FR	few	20%	99%	8:40am to 4:30pm during term time. Wednesday afternoon closed.	not applicable	6
GE	few	5%	77%	Generally morning or afternoon sessions during school year, without lunchtime.	not applicable	6
LX	few	3%	67%	8am to 4pm but usually closed for two-hour lunch each day and Tuesday & Thursday afternoons.	not applicable	4
NL	17%		71%	Child care full day; preschool (for 4+ year olds during term time) 8:30 am to 2:00 pm	not applicable	5
Liberal Countries						
CN	few	5%	53%	Part-day, part-year.	not applicable	5-6
UK	few	2%	77%	Varies by type of program, from 2.5 to 6.5 hours per day.	not applicable	5
US	few	6%	53%	Usually part-day, part-year.	not applicable	5-6

Notes:

In Sweden, does not include additional enrollments in family child care which may be publicly subsidized and supervised.

In Finland, although few children under age one were in child care, as of 2000, 97% of children under age 3 received some form of family support, through leave, home care allowance, or child care.

In France, an estimated 9% of children under age 3 are in creche (mostly under age 2) and 11% are in ecole.

In Germany, approximately 80% of 3-5 year olds are in care part-time.

For the Netherlands, 71% reflects average of 17% of 3 year olds in public care and 99% of 4 and 5 year olds in pre-primary or primary school.

In the U.S., 53% based on estimates of approximately 6% of children in subsidized arrangements and 47% in pre-K or kindergarten.

Source: Table based on material presented in Gornick, Janet C. and Marcia K. Meyers. 2003. Families That Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment, Russell Sage Foundation.

EXHIBIT 5:
Spending on Early Childhood Education and Care, per Child
(middle 1990s)
(in 2000 US Dollars, PPP-adjusted)

Social Democratic Countries	
DK	\$4,050
FI	\$3,189
SW	\$4,950
Conservative Countries	
FR	\$3,161
NL	\$1,369
Liberal Countries	
UK	\$780
US 1997	\$548
US 2000	\$679

Notes:

Spending estimates are for approximately 1995 (unless otherwise noted), converted to 2000 U.S. dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity.

Total spending calculated per child of relevant ages given country-specific institutions and available data: day care, nursery and pre-primary education for children 0-4 in UK; federal and state child care subsidies, Head Start, and state Pre-K programs for children 0-4 in US ; creche and ecole maternelle for children 0- 5 in France; public child care for children 0-4 in the Netherlands; public care for children 0-6 in Sweden, Finland, Denmark.

For Finland, does not include Private Care Allowance, received by an estimated 2% of 0-6 year old children.

For U.K., does not include recent expansions of Sure Start and public nursery schools.

Source: Table based on material presented in Gornick, Janet C. and Marcia K. Meyers. 2003. Families That Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment, Russell Sage Foundation.

**EXHIBIT 6: Expenditures on Cash Benefits for Families,
1998
(in 2000 US Dollars, PPP-adjusted)**

	As a Percentage of GDP	Per Child Under Age 18
Social Democratic Countries		
DK	1.5%	\$1,822
FI	1.9%	\$1,883
NW	2.2%	\$2,249
SW	1.6%	\$1,417
Conservative Countries		
BE	2.1%	\$2,265
FR	1.5%	\$1,390
GE	2.0%	\$2,247
LX	2.4%	\$4,270
NL	0.8%	\$884
Liberal Countries		
CN	0.8%	\$793
UK	1.7%	\$1,557
US	0.5%	\$650

Note: Expenditures include cash benefits for families, i.e., programs targeted on families (family allowances for children, family support benefits, and lone parent cash benefits), as well as paid family leave and refundable tax credits for families. Approximately, 60% of the expenditures in the U.S. are accounted for by the EITC.

Source: Table based on material presented in Gornick, Janet C. and Marcia K. Meyers. 2003. Families That Work: Policies for Reconciling Parenthood and Employment, Russell Sage Foundation.