Note on this week’s agenda: This agenda is not as crisply organized some of the previous seminars. Some of the items are topics, others questions. I found it more difficult to distill thematic groupings or general rubrics from the interrogations this time, and there are a couple of interrogations from which I didn’t see a clear agenda item (which is NOT to say that the interrogation was uninteresting or irrelevant – I just didn’t quite see how to put it on the agenda).

1. Review of the four “theories of meaning” of concepts in Pawson. (Mark)
2. Formalism:
   • why is the mathematics issue so important to Pawson? (Elizabeth)
   • does formalism force reality into abstract categories? (Ana)
   • extension of a formal system to new substantive fields (Brett)
   • why better than contestabilism (Mark)
   • ordinary language reasoning vs formal reasoning (Matt Nichter)
   • what conditions must be met to satisfy “formal calculus”? (Matt Dimick)
3. Ideal type concepts: what precisely is an ideal type? (Gokcen)
4. The value of eclecticism. (Elizabeth)
5. Can concepts be used outside of the conceptual framework in which they are embedded? Contrast between cafeteria vs relational-network view of concepts. (Matt Desmond)
6. Competing concepts of class in Marx & Weber: how should competition be understood? (Matt Dimick)
7. Concepts as hypotheses (Matt Desmond, Matt Nichter)
8. Concepts as means and concepts as ends. (Matt Desmond)
9. Is there an “endpoint” to the process of concept formation? (Fabian)
10. Measurement:
    • The problem of precision and measurement in concept formation. (Wayne)
    • are measurement mechanisms neutral instruments across frameworks? (Ana)
11. operations: what is the relation to concept formation (Dan)
12. Concepts & experience: is it valid to base validity of concepts on logic and definitions “outside of experience”? (Dan)
13. improving concepts in experimental vs nonexperimental contexts (Mark)
14. History of ideas & practices of concept formation: is it necessary to embed this in a history of ideas? Does t matter whether the elaboration of conceptual constraints “misrepresents” the “original” theories or concepts in which those constraints appear? (Matias)
15. The problem of infusing historically-specific context into the meaning of concepts: why does Pawson see this as a problem? Is it? (Martin)