REPRESSION AND CRIME CONTROL: WHY SOCIAL MOVEMENT SCHOLARS SHOULD PAY ATTENTION TO MASS INCARCERATION AS A FORM OF REPRESSION

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The disciplinary insurgency that created the academic field of social movement studies distinguished dissent from crime. This dichotomy has led the field to ignore the relation between the repression of dissent and the control of "ordinary" crime. There was massive repression in the wake of the Black riots of the 1960s that did not abate when the riots abated. The acceleration of the mass incarceration of African Americans in the United States after 1980 suggests the possibility that crime control and especially the drug war have had the consequence of repressing dissent among the poor. Social movement scholars have failed to recognize these trends as repression because of the theoretical turn that built too strong a conceptual wall between crime and dissent. Revisiting this dichotomy is essential for understanding repression today.

Black people in the United States are incarcerated at astronomical rates, but social movements scholars have ignored these trends in their theorizing about repression and in their analyses of the decline of the Black movement. This peculiar blindness has arisen because of the disciplinary boundaries created in the 1970s in the academic insurgency that created the field of “collective behavior and social movements.” In this article, I document the massive repression of Black people and revisit the political and academic movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s that contributed both to the mass repression and to its invisibility in the academic study of social movements. I then outline the beginnings of a reconfigured theory of repression that recognizes the importance of the control and repression of “ordinary crime” in the control and repression of political insurgencies. This article calls attention to the relative neglect in mainstream social movement scholarship of the movements by the most oppressed and repressed members of U.S. society.

ISN’T THIS REPRESSION?

Figure 1 shows the long-term trends in Black and White prison admissions in the U.S. Beginning in the mid-1970s, there was a marked rise in imprisonment that accelerated in the 1980s. The imprisonment escalation hit both races, but hit Blacks harder. Since the mid-1990s, the United States has had the world’s highest incarceration rate, five to eight times higher than that of most nations (Walmsley 2007). Even the majority White population has a very high incarceration rate by international standards: the 2005 rate of incarceration for U.S. Non-Hispanic Whites—414 per 100,000 (Harrison and Beck 2006)—is higher than the total incarceration rate for all but 15 of the 216 countries listed in the World Prison Population List (Walmsley 2007) and is two to four times the rate of Western European nations. On top of this extraordinarily high incarceration rate for the majority population, Black Americans are seven times more likely to be incarcerated than White Americans.

* A earlier version of this article was presented at the Resisting Political Repression panel at the Collective Behavior and Social Movements Workshop at Hofstra University on August 9, 2007.
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Many countries have comparable or even higher disparities in incarceration rates for disadvantaged minorities (Tonry 1994a). However, the Black/White racial disparity on top of the already-high rate for the majority population in the United States gives African Americans an incarceration rate that is without parallel anywhere in the world. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that 12% of Black men in their twenties are incarcerated (9% in prison and 3% in jail) and that 40% of all Black men are under the supervision of the correctional system: in prison, in jail, or being supervised while on probation or parole. Petit and Western (2004) estimate that 60% of Black men, age 30-34 who are not high school graduates, have been incarcerated.

Criminologists documented and monitored this rise in arrest and incarceration of Black people as it happened, showing that it was largely due to an increased level of punitiveness in responding to crime, not to rising crime rates. Crime rates in the late 1960s and early 1970s were high, but incarceration continued to climb even when crime went down in the early 1980s and the 1990s. One study in 1999 showed that only 12% of the rise in incarceration between 1980 and 1996 was due to changes in crime rates, while changes in sentencing policies accounted for 88% (Blumstein and Beck 1999). That is, for a given crime, people were much more likely to be sentenced to prison and to be sentenced for a longer time. The rising Black/White disparity in incarceration was due primarily to the drug war and especially the intense policing of Black communities after 1986 around the “crack epidemic.” The racial disparity in incarceration for ordinary crime remained relatively constant—that is, rate of increase was similar for both races—while the racial disparity for drug offenses rose steeply (Mauer and Huling 1995), reaching 20 to 1 by the mid-1990s. Figure 2 shows these trends.

Black people are subject to extraordinarily high rates of surveillance and arrest. For my state of Wisconsin, using data supplied by the state’s Office of Justice Assistance, I calculated an average annual arrest rate for Blacks for 1997-1999 of 41.7 per 100, while the comparable rate for Whites (including Hispanics) in Wisconsin was 6.0 per 100. A majority of these arrests are for low-level offenses, as is true in other jurisdictions (Miller 1996).
young Black men in segregated poor Black urban neighborhoods have been stopped and questioned by the police, and most have been arrested. In short, the United States is one of the most repressive countries on earth. Our Black population is living under a level of surveillance that can only be characterized as a police state.

**Figure 2.** Black-White Disparity Ratios in Prison Sentences, by Offense.

Criminologist William Chambliss gives a vivid account street-level view of this repression based on his observations on police ride-alongs in the early 1990s:

Police departments across the nation police the urban underclass ghetto with a vigilance that would create political revolution were the same tactics and policies implemented in white middle-class communities. In Washington, DC, for example, the police have established a rapid deployment unit (RDU: originally designed for riot control), which routinely patrols the black ghetto in search of law violators. . . . Members of the RDU drive in patrol cars through the ghetto on nightly vigils looking for suspects. ‘Suspects’ include all young black males between the ages of twelve and thirty who are visible: driving in cars, standing on street corners, or in a group observed through a window in an apartment. (Chambliss 1995b: 250-51)

**REPRESSION AND THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF PROTEST**

Social movement scholars and political sociologists more broadly have ignored these trends, because it has not fit their preconceptions of repression. Movement scholarship on repression has focused primarily on the policing of protests and on the other ways that movement actions are shaped and constrained. That is, it has focused on the overt responses to or constraints on specific acts of dissent, not on the repression of dissenters. For example, Christian Davenport defines repression as acts that “violate First Amendment–type rights, due process in the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security” (Davenport 2007) and explicitly excludes deterrence of crime from his scope of inquiry. Some of Davenport’s own research has been explicitly concerned with the massive repression of the Black Power movement (Davenport 2005; Davenport and Eads 2001), but he does not connect this with the wider repression of the Black community. Similarly, studies of the policing of protest focus
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on police at protests and the overt response to specific acts of dissent. (See, for example, Della Porta 1996; Earl 2005; Earl, McCarthy and Soule 2003; Earl and Schussman 2004; Earl and Soule 2006; McCarthy, McPhail, and Crist 1999; McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998; Titarenko et al. 2001; Wisler and Giugni 1999.)

Recent scholarship recognizes the importance of a broader understanding of repression: it just has not gone far enough. In a series of articles that review and critique prior research and theory on repression, Earl argues that the scope of inquiry should be the “social control of protest” and develops a typology of repression that identifies both forms and agents of repression. Earl (2003) stresses the coercive capacities of nongovernmental organizations such as private police forces, business antilabor organizations, and vigilante groups (Earl 2004) and that challenge the view of arrest as a mild form of repression, stressing the costs associated with being arrested (Earl 2005). All of these works, however, focus on the direct regulation of acts of dissent, and none of them mention the control of “ordinary” crime as a possible way of repressing movement actors. In an introduction to a special issue of Mobilization on repression (Earl 2006), Earl expands on these arguments, making it clear that repression can prevent protest by preventing acts of dissent from ever occurring, but still misses the connection between crime-control and movement-control.

This sharp boundary within social movement scholarship between crime control and protest control has its origins in the insurgency that created “collective behavior and social movements” as a subfield within sociology. To understand why that boundary was created, it is important to revisit the political context and academic debates of the late 1960s and early 1970s, especially those around the meaning of the Black urban riots.

REPRESSING THE RIOTS

Today’s young people are generally taught a celebratory history of the civil rights movement and the politics of nonviolent resistance centered on the icons of Martin Luther King, Jr. and Rosa Parks. Our young are rarely taught about the riots, and even many academic sources on the Black movement ignore or downplay the riots. It seems as if those who are old enough to remember the riots are trying to forget them. But the riots and the larger context of violence around the Black movement are central to understanding the massive repression we have seen in the U.S. since then. The most important thing to understand about this story is that the story itself was hotly contested and debated at the time. In fact, there was an intense debate about what to call them: rebellions, insurrections, civil disorders, urban unrest? I use the term “riot” because that is what they were called in the mainstream White press. Dozens of long books and hundreds of articles have told the story in many different ways. In my telling, I am trying briefly to capture the flavor of the debates, emotions, and issues at stake at the time.

The year 1968 was traumatic on many fronts. Robert Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr. were assassinated. The U.S. antiwar movement was dominating college campus life. Independence movements were strong in Africa. There was revolutionary turmoil in France and protest movements in many countries. All of this social unrest is relevant, but for understanding repression in the U.S., we need to remember the Black urban riots. Race riots are a longstanding feature of U.S. history, but riots prior to the 1960s were usually initiated by Whites and often involved one-sided White attacks on Black communities. The 1960s riots, by contrast, primarily involved Black people looting and burning property. Riots increased in frequency from 1963. The huge 1965 Los Angeles (Watts) riot lasted several days, was covered full-time on television, and included rooftop snipers shooting at firemen and crowds chanting “burn baby, burn”; it has been called the entry of the Black working class into the struggle. There were more riots in 1966 and then a huge wave of hundreds of riots in 1967, including huge riots in Newark and Detroit, and then hundreds of riots again in 1968 after the death of Martin Luther King, Jr. The general time trend can be seen in figure 3, copied from
Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney (1996), which shows event counts from *New York Times* articles. Research by Myers (1997; 2000) shows that riots diffused between cities in waves connected by mass media coverage, especially television broadcast networks, while within cities, participants learned of riots through informal communication (Feagin and Hahn 1973). By the end of the 1960s, virtually every city with a large Black population had had at least one riot; some had had dozens. Whole sections of major cities had been burned out.

**Figure 3:** Black Riots and Other Forms of Racial and Ethnic Protests in 55 SMSAs, 1960-1993

![Figure 3: Black Riots and Other Forms of Racial and Ethnic Protests in 55 SMSAs, 1960-1993](image)

Note: Based on the 1,770 events reported in the New York Times from 1960-1993. 154 of these were riots by Blacks, the remaining 1,616 were other racial or ethnic events. Figure from Olzak et al. (1996)

Part of the debate was where to begin the story. Violence began, of course, much earlier, in the White terrorism of the post-Reconstruction era, in the White communal urban riots of the early 20th century, and in the violent resistance of both Southern Whites and Northern Whites to nonviolent political actions by Blacks. After the Birmingham protest, 1963 saw a huge wave of disruptive nonviolent protests in dozens of cities and a huge wave of White violence in response. Throughout the 1960s, Black leaders and the Black masses hotly debated whether Black people should eschew all protest to avoid White violent retaliation, engage in disruptive protest and respond to White violence with “unmerited suffering” as a moral victory, or fight back when attacked. The White press treated any Black claims to the right to self-defense as extremist violent calls to race war. By 1968, rhetoric had escalated even more, and both Blacks and Whites were using apocalyptic language (see, for example, *Urban America and Urban Coalition* 1969; Yette 1971). Surveys of Blacks conducted between 1964 and 1968 found that 12 to 17% of Black respondents advocated violence as the best way for Blacks to gain their rights, one-third to two-thirds (depending on the survey) said that violence helped the cause, and 11 to 35% (depending on the city) were estimated to have participated in several large riots (Feagin and Hahn 1973: 275-82). Some kind of violent race war seemed possible to many observers; in fact, it seemed to be already underway. A poll in 1968 found that 81% of the population said that “law and order has broken down” and 53% reported “fear of racial violence” (Louis Harris and Associates 1968; Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969). The race war did not happen and the riots declined after 1969.

Contrary to popular belief, however, riots did not go away entirely, as figure 3 indicates. Feagin and Hahn (1973) cite evidence from a variety of sources that there were hundreds of
disorders between 1969 and 1972. There were scattered riots periodically after that, including a big riot in Miami in 1980 (Ladner, Schwartz, Roker, Titterud 1981) and a huge riot in Los Angeles after the 1992 “not guilty” verdict for the police who beat Rodney King with a smaller wave of rioting elsewhere (Associated Press 1992).

In the late 1960s, Black Power organizations were expressing political anger and advocating defiance of White law. Before he was killed in 1965, Malcolm X had received wide publicity for criticizing nonviolence as a strategy in the face of White violence. In 1966, SNCC publicly launched the slogan “Black Power” during the march through Mississippi where King and Carmichael debated strategy in front of reporters. Malcolm, Carmichael and most other Black Power advocates understood the slogan to involve economic and political power and the willingness to meet White violence with self-defense, not as a call for armed aggression against White power, but the slogan was frightening to most Whites. There is telling footage in the first episode of part 2 of the *Eyes on the Prize* PBS video (newly re-released): one of the White civil rights workers who participated in the 1966 Mississippi march tells the camera that he felt very frightened when standing in the middle of an angry Black crowd shouting “Black Power.”¹ (Movement scholars who stress the importance of emotion would do well to revisit the frustration and anger of the Black movement in the late 1960s, as well as White fear.)

There were intense debates at the time about the causes and meaning of the riots. Black people generally saw the riots as extreme expressions of Black political grievances, and many saw them as rebellions or insurrections. A large majority of Black people told survey researchers that the underlying cause of the riots was dissatisfaction with racial discrimination and inequality. (Feagin and Sheatsley 1968; Louis Harris and Associates 1968; Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969) One survey in Los Angeles in the late 1960s conducted by a less sympathetic researcher found that Blacks who subscribed to “Black Muslim” ideology were more likely to support riots, also finding that their support was more oriented toward concerns about Black disadvantage than to Muslim theology (Tomlinson 1970). At the same time, Black people disagreed strongly about whether the riots would help, hurt, or make no difference to the Black cause, with roughly equal numbers choosing each option (Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969).

Moderate Black leaders and many social scientists argued that insurrection was the weapon of those whose grievances were not met through peaceful channels (see, for example, Lieberson and Silverman 1965; Lieske 1978). The Kerner Commission (United States National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders 1968), writing after the 1967 riots and before the 1968 riots, argued that the cause of the riots was White racism, discrimination, blocked hopes, and a climate of lawlessness that had been created by widespread White resistance to laws mandating equal treatment. President Johnson officially rejected this report. Social scientists stressed that discriminatory and oppressive police practices both fueled underlying grievances and had exacerbated racial tensions both historically and in the recent era (Marx 1970a; Perez, Berg, and Myers 2003). Bryan (1979) explicitly argues from the survey data that the riots needed to be understood as part of the Black movement. In more recent studies of a longer series of race riots, Olzak and colleagues found that ethnic competition in labor markets predicts riots, not simple deprivation (Olzak and Shanahan 1996; Olzak, Shanahan, and McEneaney 1996). Herman stresses the additional importance of residential succession and spatial competition, showing that most riot fatalities in Detroit and Newark in 1967 occurred in areas of high racial turnover (2005).

Popular White views were very different. Several surveys were cited in a special report written in 1968 one year after the Kerner Commission report (Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969: 103-104). Nearly half (48.5%) of Whites said the disorders had been planned, versus only 18% of Blacks. Instead of “discrimination and unfair treatment” (chosen by 48.5% of Blacks), Whites said that the main causes of the disorder were “looters and other undesirables” (34%) and “Black power or other radicals” (23.5%). When asked their opinion
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of the Kerner Commission report, 53% of whites disagreed that riots were mainly caused by racism, and 59% disagreed that they were not organized. When asked whether disorders help or hurt “the cause of Negro rights,” 64% of Whites said hurt, mostly because they increased “anti-Negro sentiments” (versus 23% of Blacks). When Whites were asked whether Negroes with same education were better or worse off than they were, 42% said better, 46% said same, and 5% said worse. Then when they were shown data that Blacks were worse off and asked why, 19% of Whites chose discrimination, 56% “something about Negroes themselves,” and 19% a mixture of both. A survey of members of Congress found that they tended toward the popular White views of the riots (Hahn and Feagin 1970).

Many Whites mixed sympathy with fear in their views of Blacks. Most Whites in the 1960s understood Black Power to refer to riots and violent resistance and a majority reported feeling afraid of riots (Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969). This was not inconsistent with recognizing the reality of Black grievances. In the same surveys cited above, when Whites were asked if they would approve of programs to improve living conditions for Blacks, 53% said yes even if it cost them a 10% tax increase (Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969).

The riots had political consequences, as a substantial body of scholarship has documented. For example, Button’s (1978) detailed compilation of qualitative interview data and quantitative expenditure patterns show substantial impacts on policies to prevent riots through welfare payments, low income housing, jobs programs—especially summer jobs programs for youths, which were seen as “riot insurance”—and training for police in better community relations, especially before 1968. Feagin and Hahn (1973) provide another summary of these responses. Haines (1983) showed that foundation funding for moderate Black political organizations also escalated in response to the riots.

But alongside the “carrot” of improved social provision was the “stick” of coercive social control. Comparing the percentage increase in per capita expenditures of various types in all the cities over size 50,000 that did and did not have Black riots, Welch (1975) found a strong positive effect of riots on increases in police expenditures; the difference for welfare expenditures was positive but not significant, while there was no difference for the other kinds of expenditures. There were substantial expenditures on riot control, including increasing funding and training to the National Guard and the Army as military back up to police for riot control, a build up of domestic intelligence and surveillance capacity and coordination, including undercover agents from both military and the FBI as well as local police, and increased federal funding for local police departments (Urban America and Urban Coalition 1969; also see Button 1978: 107-179 and Feagin and Hahn 1973: 226-38). By 1968, there had been a huge military build up to prepare for a possible civil war, as well as a huge build up in police departments all over the country. Local police, the FBI, the U.S. Army, and the CIA all had major domestic surveillance operations that had placed informers and agents in virtually every movement organization in the country.

In the 1964 election, Goldwater made “safety in the streets” and opposition to civil rights part of his campaign platform, and Black Republicans were essentially driven out of the party (Branch 1998); Goldwater was soundly defeated by Johnson even as White Southerners changed from Democrat to Republican. By the 1968 election, support for the repressive response to riots had grown. Humphrey argued that riots were caused by discrimination and deprivation, and many still agreed with him, but it was Nixon’s law-and-order program and the “Southern strategy” that won the election, with overtly racist George Wallace taking another 13% of the popular vote. Although Nixon continued funding for many of the social welfare “prevention” programs until the threat of riots was deemed low after the 1972 election, his administration and especially his attorney general, John Mitchell, escalated the federal support for the repressive approach to riot control. There was a huge increase in federal funding for police between 1968 and 1972, including a doubling of federal funding for riot control by local police (Button 1978: 138-39).
Not only riots were repressed in the 1960s, of course. The White populace in general and key elements of the White elite—particularly the FBI and the US military—believed that the Black riots were planned and orchestrated by Black militants with Communist connections, or by Black Muslims (who, while not Communist, were seen as just as dangerous). Communist conspiracies also were believed to underlie the other radical movements of the period, including especially the student antiwar movement and all of the various left-wing parties and tendencies that flowered in that era, but also all the radical ethnic movements, including the Chicano and American Indian movements, as well as Black separatists and militants. The massive repression of all types of “radical” social movements is well documented (Marx 1970a; 1973; and 1974). There was massive surveillance and infiltration of the whole array of left wing and ethnic minority organizations, and also of the KKK, and this repression played a major role in disrupting the organizations against which it was directed.

In short, the more recent focus on institutional channeling and other forms of “soft” repression should not blind us to the magnitude of “hard” repression brought to bear on leftist movements generally in the 1960s and 1970s. At the same time, the repression directed toward the White leftist movements should not blind us to the even more violent and coercive repression directed against Black Nationalist groups (Davenport 2005) as well as anyone who was deemed an instigator or likely participant in a Black riot (i.e., a poor young Black man). In particular, it is important to recognize the threat represented by the Black urban riots and the massive military and paramilitary forces put together to deal with this threat.

**RIOTS AND ACADEMIC INSURGENCY**

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, social scientists were part of the public debates about the meaning of riots. It mattered politically whether the riots were seen as “just crime,” as “extreme protest” or as “rebellions” or “insurrections.” Naming and classifying the riots was itself a political act. Although a majority of Whites defined the riots as meaningless violence or a Communist and/or Black Power conspiracy to overthrow the U.S., many social scientists argued that riots were not merely crime, not uncontrolled or senseless, and should be viewed as extreme expressions of political grievance. Social scientists cited evidence that rioters rarely killed people (most deaths in riots were rioters shot by police or merchants); that businesses tended to be attacked or spared depending on whether their owners were Black or White and whether they hired local residents and treated local customers with respect; that measures of the level of grievance tended to predict which cities would have riots; and that rioters often gave political accounts of their actions (see, for example, Feagin and Hahn 1973; Oberschall 1973).

In naming the relation between riots and crime, social scientists were not only engaging the intense political debates of the time, but also they were constructing an academic insurgency that linked political and professional agendas. The resource mobilization turn of the 1970s was not merely a particular theoretical perspective, but a movement to found a specialty in the study of collective behavior and social movements. Before 1970, there was no subfield of collective behavior and social movements (CBSM) in U.S. sociology. Social movements, when they were studied at all, were seen as marginal phenomena in other fields, and were most often classed as a subtype of deviance. Theoretical accounts of 1960s protests most often invoked social psychological theories that treated protest as an emotional response to strain or tension, not a purposive attempt to attain well-defined political goals. (Prior theory, of course, was never as one-sided as these critics said, but addressing this issue is outside the scope of this article.) In stressing the importance of collective action, collective resources and capacities, and political goals, the resource mobilization insurgency was both taking a stand in the political debates of the time about the meaning of protest and riots, and,
at the same time, demarcating an academic “turf.” One part of the boundary setting involved distinguishing religious movements from political movements; this early boundary was weakened by later social psychological and cultural turns in theorizing. But another part of this boundary setting involved distinguishing “mere crime,” the province of criminologists and the field of “deviance,” from protest, the province of the insurgent academic specialty of CBSM.

A great deal of scholarship in the 1970s addressed questions of the relation between disruptive civil strife (especially urban riots) and other crime, often with the agenda of demonstrating that urban riots were not “merely crime” or unorganized mindless emotional eruptions. Historical research on urban violence found that violent crowds were common in European cities in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Scholars took different positions about the relation between common crime and collective protest or violence. Rudé (1988) conducted one influential line of work. Examining patterns of crime and rioting in London and Paris in the 18th century, he argues that riots tended to occur in areas dominated by working class people with occupations and stable abodes, not in the high-crime highly transient areas of the urban underclass, specifically critiques Chevalier for confusing “individual antisocial behavior with the collective action of social groups,” and says: “The two may occur together, as they often did in nineteenth-century Paris (we have but to consult the police files to establish the point) but they arise from different causes, have their own distinctive histories, and there is no necessary connection between the two” (1988: 237). He concludes the chapter by saying: “The whole question needs further study but, paradoxically, was it not rather the stability of old social relationships that provided the characteristic seed-bed of rebellion and collective protest, and not the instability of mass migration, uprooting and the dissolution of old social ties?” (1988: 238)

Gurr and his colleagues also studied patterns of collective protest, urban violence, and crime in several cities in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries (Gurr 1976; Gurr, Grabosky and Hula 1977). Like many others who analyze social control, Gurr stresses that authorities create crime by deciding what to criminalize. Summarizing findings across studies, Gurr (1977b) draws several generalizations. First, all the cities studied had high levels of urban rioting and crime in the late 1700s and a general decline in both crime and urban rioting thereafter. A high proportion but not all periods of rising crime were associated with periods of collective strife. Second, rioting and violent contention always has been criminalized, while the trend of history is the gradual decriminalization of nonviolent civil strife. Similarly nineteenth century laws criminalized vagrancy and unemployment, requiring lower classes to accept any employment offered to them. The general arc of history, at least through the early 1970s, was toward legalization of more forms of collective contention and greater power and resources for lower-class workers. Police forces were originally private armies raised by the elites to protect their own interests, especially from violent collective action. Police reform and the incorporation of police into the state arose from a confluence of elite desires to protect themselves from collective violence and middle-class desires to protect themselves from theft.

There was a specific sub-debate about the empirical relationships between rates of common crime and the level of urban disruption. Some (for example, Gurr) found that there was a high (although not perfect) correlation between eras of collective dissent and eras of rising crime. Others (for example, Eisinger 1973) argued that collective protest substituted for crime, that people who could air their grievances politically had less need or motivation to commit crime. One oft-cited study from the era published in a psychiatry journal found that it was particularly Black-on-Black violent crime that declined in three southern towns during civil rights protests; these authors stressed that oppression would turn anger inward toward one’s own group and that collective protest reduced this self-destructive impulse (Solomon, Walker, and Fishman 1965). Still others (for example, Lodhi and Tilly 1973) found little correlation (positive or negative) between the two across time or locale and concluded that they had different causes.
Distinguishing between crime and dissent became one of the signifiers of the resource mobilization turn, although the original sources never explicitly make the distinction as sharp as it later became. While agreeing that the Black riots were a form of protest, Marx stressed that not all riots necessarily were protests, that there were also “issueless riots,” such as brawls after sporting events (Marx 1970b). McCarthy and Zald never mentioned crime in their most widely cited articles (McCarthy and Zald 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1977), nor did Snyder and Tilly (1972).² Oberschall (1978) criticized breakdown theorists for equating collective violence with crime and seeing a sharp break between collective violence and peaceful protest, arguing that collective violence is just as purposive; the sentence structure presupposes that crime is purposeless but does not assert it.

By 1980, the idea that social movements and crime had anything to do with each other had disappeared as a topic of discussion in social movements circles. By the 1990s, CBSM had grown to be one of the largest specialties in sociology with its own literature and its own graduate preliminary examinations, while criminology had often moved into separate criminal justice departments. None of the theoretical turns in the study of social movements since has revisited the question of the relation between crime and dissent, nor of the relation between control of crime and repression of movements. It is time to take another look at it.

**REPRESSING THE RIOTERS**

The apparatus of coercive repression was ramped up in response to the Black urban riots and other social disorders, including disorderly antiwar protests on campuses. But policing and coercion in Black communities stayed high, even after the disorders died down, as figure 1 shows. In fact, social control expenditures continued to rise and the U.S. started escalating policing and incarceration. Police funding in the 1970s was increased more in cities with larger black populations and that had strong civil rights movements (Carroll and Jackson 1982), and crime was higher in cities that had strong civil rights movements (Jackson and Carroll 1981).

Gary Marx, who had been studying covert repression of political movements in the 1960s and early 1970s, showed how these same techniques were being used to police Black communities by the late 1970s in anticrime efforts such as undercover fencing operations and infiltration of criminal gangs (Marx 1980; 1981; 1982). In the 1980s and 1990s, these same surveillance operations were put in the service of the drug war, the major source of the mass incarceration of Black people after the mid-1980s. By 1990, the United States was effectively a police state for its Black citizens, and to a lesser extent, for poor Whites, as well. The crucial thing to understand is that a repressive strategy initially triggered by massive urban unrest and other social movements was maintained and expanded long after the riots abated. It was not aimed at preventing unrest by repressing riots; it was preventing unrest by repressing potential rioters. People were not arrested and incarcerated for dissent or even for rioting; they were arrested and incarcerated for crimes.

Some scholars from the era argued that the potential rioters were precisely the people most likely to offer strong political challenge to those in power, to push forward a militant Black movement. For example, Feagin and Han (1973) argued that riots fostered the development of militant Black Power ideology, that Black militants saw riots as direct coercive action to force political change. They also cited Caplan’s “New Ghetto Man” (Caplan 1970), which described rioters and other Black militants as “resolutely dedicated to the eradication of exploitation and oppression by open confrontation with white America” (p. 300), and politically more active, more likely to vote, more knowledgeable about politics, and more likely to see riots as justified. Feagin and Han also offered quotations from Tomlinson (1969) that called rioters the “cream of urban Negro youth in particular and urban Negro citizens in general.”
Repression or Crime Control?

It is statistically indisputable that the escalation in repressive crime control and the supply-side drug war were disproportionately focused on African Americans. But it is intensely disputed both politically and academically whether this focus was a justified and appropriate response to high levels of crime and drug dealing among African Americans, a thinly veiled strategy of political repression, or an indirect and unanticipated harmful consequence of well-meaning (or politically motivated) policy responses to crime and drug problems. Scholars who study crime and social control have been debating these issues since the 1970s and literally hundreds of books and articles have been written on the subject. There is a substantial criminology literature that empirically addresses the questions of whether mass incarceration is effective in reducing crime and of whether racial differences in imprisonment rates simply track differences in the rates at which different racial groups commit crimes or also reflect differential treatment by the criminal justice system. Space does not permit a review or critique of this empirical literature, except to say that it is very large, there are academics on both sides of these issues, and differences in the rates of actually committing the kinds of crimes that are punished with imprisonment are one major source of the racial difference in imprisonment rates (Blumstein 1982 and 1993; Coker 2003; DeLisi and Regoli 1999; Mauer 1999; Sorensen, Hope, and Stemen 2003).

For social movement researchers, it is important to recognize that many scholars in several radical or critical traditions have long characterized the overall escalation of incarceration and its racial focus as a form of political repression. An early 1970s critic of the “law and order” move to mandatory sentences argued that this would do nothing to help the racial disparities in the system (Motley 1973). Dello Buono (1992) argues that there has been a longstanding pattern of coercive repression of Black nationalist political activity and labeling it “ordinary crime.” Chambliss (1995b) specifically argues that supporters of “tough on crime” policies distorted poll data on public fears of crime to sell a political agenda, as the poll questions of the time clearly linked ordinary crime with riots when asking people about their concerns about personal safety in the late 1960s, as in the phrase “crime, lawlessness, looting and rioting.” He argues that crime did not emerge again until it was linked with drugs in the late 1980s, after the escalation of the “drug war.” Many others wrote about these trends as they were happening, often trying to sound alarms and arouse concern (Bush 1998; Chambliss 1995a and 1995b; Duster 1997; Goode 2002; Gordon 1994; Human Rights Watch 2000; Mauer 1999; Miller 1996; Tonry 1994b and 1994). Many critical observers called the 1980s drug war a politically motivated and racially targeted rationale for surveillance and repression of Black people (Chambliss 1995b; Gordon 1994; Mauer 1999; Tonry 1994b). The point for social movement scholars is not the simplistic argument that mass incarceration is the same thing as political repression, but that they have to pay attention to these trends if they want to have an adequate understanding of dissent and repression.

DISSENT AS CRIME AND CRIME AS DISSENT

Although distinguishing rational, politically motivated, collective protest from ordinary crime was an important signifier in the resource mobilization turn, in fact, the boundaries and distinctions between political dissent and “ordinary” crime have long been contested, and radical or critical scholars of social control have long argued that decisions about which economic activities or personal vices to criminalize are inevitably political and contested (for example, Reasons 1973). Considering a continuum from fully peaceful calls for reform through militant collective disruption or violence to individual acts of theft or assault or black market economic activity, different political and academic actors have drawn different distinctions.
depending on their political or theoretical agendas. In some times and places even a peaceful petition for redress of grievance was viewed by elites as the same kind of crime subject to the same kind of penalties as a collective riot or an individual assault or robbery. Depending on their theoretical or political orientation, social scientists might group protest and collective violence together and contrast them with crime, or might contrast peaceful protest with all forms of violent action or crime. Gurr (1977a) argues that the boundary between crime and civil strife always has been blurred. Elites always criminalize some forms of dissent, and any failure to cooperate with the laws and customs that maintain oppression is generally a crime. It is often a crime to criticize the government. It was a crime to violate the segregation laws of the Old South. It was a crime in England in the eighteenth century to refuse an offer of employment. Laws are often passed to criminalize successful protest forms. It is a violation of U.S. labor law to organize a secondary boycott. During the Montgomery bus boycott, a law was passed making it a crime to organize a carpool. After Chicano high school students walked out in Los Angeles in the late 1960s, felony conspiracy charges were brought against adults accused of organizing the walkout. After a series of disruptive protests at abortion clinics, many communities passed laws prohibiting collective assembly within several hundred yards of a medical clinic, often making violation a felony subject to a large fine or a jail term.

A more complex problem is the implicit dissent in “ordinary” crime and the relation between “ordinary” crime and political legitimacy. Marginalized political movements do sometimes engage in social banditry (like Robin Hood—steal from the rich and give to the poor), violently attack political enemies, or support themselves through property crime or drug dealing. Conversely, it is fairly common for street gangs to have or gain political consciousness and to try to shift (or claim to try to shift) their activities toward community betterment. In addition, “ordinary” criminals often offer political or quasipolitical accounts or justifications for their crimes in structures of inequality, and often draw on larger movement rhetoric in making these justifications. Many criminals report making moral or political judgments about who should and should not be victimized. Apart from social banditry, crime often benefits one group at the expense of another. Many thieves and drug dealers share their gains with their family and friends. Even if they are selfish, the proceeds of their thieving or drug dealing have economic consequences for their communities in the goods and services they purchase. When people feel a sense of injustice about their circumstances, they often feel less constrained to avoid criminal activity to satisfy their needs or desires.

Trying to dichotomize people’s actions by their motives is futile, for people generally have complex and mixed motives. Studies of rioters in the 1960s found a mixture of motives, ranging from strategic calculation to political anger to wild celebration (similar to the drunken riots of college students after football games) to the desire to obtain free merchandise through looting. There were differences among individuals in their motives, and the same person might have multiple motives. The very act of attributing motives to an actor is, itself, a political act. To give an intelligible account of a person’s motives is inevitably to seem to justify the behavior. Opponents of an action tend to deny its motives, to call it purposeless or mindless or lawless or criminal. One of the “problems” of regime legitimacy is to persuade the disadvantaged members of a society that their society’s inequality and hierarchy are just. Other things being equal, property crime is higher where there is more inequality. Political ideologies often justify certain kinds of crimes. In the early 1970s, some White radical friends of my acquaintance would describe the theft of a bottle of orange juice as “liberating” it from the grocery store, and young, relatively affluent, White students tell me this still happens in their groups today. In the 1970s, there was evidence that crime was higher in cities that had strong civil rights movements (Jackson and Carroll 1981). LaFree (1998) argues that the Civil Rights Movement’s attacks on the legitimacy of the system (along with other political movements) fed into higher crime rates. LaFree and Drass (1997) show that Black arrests for robbery and burglary rose with Black collective action in the 1950s and 1960s, then continued to rise after the Black riots subsided in the 1970s. The fact that these arguments are often
advanced from a stance that is relatively unsympathetic to social justice movements should not blind us to the reality that dissent and crime intertwine. This is not to argue that mugging a grandmother is morally or politically comparable to a disruptive protest, but it is to say that there are continua between them, not sharp boundaries.

Trying to separate crime from dissent by making a distinction in form between individual and collective action also breaks down in practice. There is individual dissent and collective crime, and both are common. The more repressive a system, the more dissent takes the form of individual, often anonymous, acts of resistance. Weak actors in oppressive systems may look for ways to reduce the risk of dissent through what appear to be “random” criminal acts, such as posting graffiti, circulating anonymous documents critical of the regime, vandalism, or theft. Johnston (2006) gives examples of how graffiti and other small transgressions can be forms of resistance in repressive states, as they feed into the contentious political talk that is essential for constituting resistant groups. On the other hand, collective crime is common. This is most obvious for organized crime or gang-related crime, but groups also commit much “ordinary crime.” In some cases, intentionally political groups run criminal enterprises to fund their efforts, or target certain individuals for assault or death as part of their political strategy.

**SOCIAL CONTROL: LEGITIMACY, CHOICES, AND INTERGROUP CONFLICT**

In this section, I raise several issues central to the task of developing an understanding of social control that links crime control and political repression. Even a cursory reading of the empirical literature makes it clear that the empirical correlation between common crime and either violent or nonviolent dissenting collective action is varied. This should not be surprising, as neither crime nor dissent have simple empirical correlates. On the crime side, the rates of property and violent crimes often do not correlate with each other, and crime rates are affected by a wide variety of different kinds of social conditions. On the collective action side, different forms of action are not necessarily correlated with each other and are similarly impacted by different kinds of social conditions. In short, both crime and collective action are abstractions from an extremely diverse and complex set of empirical instances.

That said, as abstractions, crime and dissent share the properties that they involve challenging the dominant social order and that they are subject to social control. When we recognize that it is possible to target people who are dissenters for control, whether or not they commit specific illegal acts of dissent, and when we recognize that one major function of the criminal code is to protect unequal distributions of resources, we are ready to see that “crime control” and “dissent control” can never be empirically disentangled. They are specific instances of the more general problem of social control, of the maintenance of social order.

Why do people restrain their selfish impulses and not steal unguarded property? Why do people not protest against the government? The most important sources of social control are system legitimacy and normative compliance (see, for example, Black 1984; Garland 1985; Garland 2001a; Garland 2001b). System legitimacy is central: People who are satisfied with what they have and with the political situation generally do not dissent or steal because they see no reason to do so. If there is widespread dissatisfaction, there are more people who are motivated to commit crimes or dissent. The second fundamental source of social order is the normative structure of social relations: people feel pressure to do the things approved of by those close to them. The content of the normative structure obviously varies: retail theft, failing to stop for a pedestrian in a crosswalk, and complaining about government officials are behaviors that are approved by some members of our society, but considered unacceptable by others. Further, there is obviously a close relation between the normative order and extent to which most people’s needs are met in a society. Groups in which most people are basically satisfied tend to be groups in which the normative structure supports the regime.

Regimes that are legitimate to the governed do not get much dissent and do not need to
do much repressing. Regimes need repression when they are not legitimate and not satisfying their populace. Thus, from the dominant actors’ point of view, the social control problem involves weighing the benefits and costs of making subordinates satisfied, so they will not rebel, versus the benefits and costs of preventing their rebellion through repression. The U.S. could have responded to the challenges of the Black movement by more fully opening the doors of economic opportunity and political power to Black people. Instead, it chose to escalate repression in the mix. Why it chose repression is another story that is linked to ethnic conflict, discussed below. But that it needed repression because it failed to satisfy people’s basic needs and desires is central to the story. Given that their needs and desires are not being met, oppressed people can choose acquiescence or some form of resistance. That resistance may take many forms, including both illegal ways of making money and political mobilization. The more political mobilization and collective action are blocked or seem fruitless, the more attractive property crime or illegal markets are likely to seem as alternatives.

**How Repression Works: Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Surveillance**

We can see how crime control meshes with political repression if we consider how repression does its job. If the dominant group chooses coercive repression as a strategy, it has a wide array of repressive tactics from which to choose. Analytically, there are three ways coercive repression “works” to affect the behavior of dissidents: deterrence, incapacitation, and surveillance. Deterrence works when the threat of punishment for a particular class of acts persuades people to avoid that kind of action. The theory of deterrence is action specific. That is, to prevent protests in abortion clinics, you increase the penalties for protesting in abortion clinics. To prevent the use of guns in crimes, you create penalty enhancers for using a gun in the commission of a crime. The deterrence of protest requires sanctions against protest.

However, incapacitation works by removing people from the system before they commit the undesired actions. Incapacitation works best if people are identified as potential criminals or dissenters before they actually commit a real crime or a real act of dissent. Thus, from the point of view of incapacitation theory (and ignoring any issues of justice or civil liberties), pretexts are needed for incarcerating the kind of people who will become troublemakers, and there is logically no necessary relation between what people are arrested for and the kind of behavior the system is trying to prevent. Importantly, people who are incapacitated from crime are incapacitated from everything else, as well: from earning a living, shopping in local stores, parenting their children, or participating in community or political organizations.

The third mechanism, coercive surveillance, also works by gaining information to identify the people to target for control and by disrupting or blocking the social organization of collective action. Again, the pretexts for surveillance bear no necessary relation to the behavior to be prevented. In fact, if you are trying to prevent protest, a pretext is what you need. In short, for two of the three ways coercive repression prevents dissent, the control of “ordinary” crime can work to accomplish the control of dissent. If it is recalled that the boundary between “ordinary crime” and “dissent” is necessarily fuzzy, and that much ordinary crime can be understood as an individualized response to inequalities that could be addressed politically, it can readily be seen that the policing of crime has to be taken into consideration in assessing the level of repression arrayed against potential dissenters.

**Avoiding Errors in Measuring Repression**

As Earl notes in her reviews cited above, there has been extensive debate around the question of whether repression reduces or inflames protest. Part of the confusion around this issue arises from a failure to make the important distinction between the number of acts of repression and level of repressiveness in a society. The problem is that repressiveness, when it works, prevents protest from happening at all. Any study that measures repressiveness by counting arrests of protesters or other acts of repression against specific acts of dissent will
form a false picture of the level of repressiveness in a society. There is an inherent positive correlation between protest and the arrest of protesters: you cannot be arrested for protesting if you do not protest. An example of this can be seen in figure 4, which is my re-analysis from data generously provided by Ruud Koopmans (1995) based on newspaper accounts of protests. Koopmans’s data contain an estimated number of participants and number of arrests for protesting for each month in the series. Panel A shows the relation between the number of protesters and the number arrested for protest: the relationship is positive and the correlation is +.47. Does this mean that repression fosters protest? Well, no, it does not. Panel B plots repression as the ratio of the number arrests for protesting to participants in protest. Now the

**Figure 4:** Comparing Participants and Arrests in German Protests.

Panel A. Participants and Arrests for Confrontation and Violence in German Protests

Panel B. Ratio of Arrests to Participants in Confrontation and Violence in German Protests

*Note: Authors calculations from data provided by Koopmans (1993)*
correlation is negative, -.27. The relationship is not strong, as \( r^2 \) is only .07, but there is some suggestion that repressiveness (the likelihood of being arrested at a protest) might inhibit protest.

But even the ratio of arrests of protesters to protesters cannot truly measure the level of repressiveness. People who are incapacitated for crime by imprisonment are also incapacitated for everything else, including political action. People who are under surveillance for potential drug dealing are also under surveillance for any extremist political organizing they may be doing, and activities designed to disrupt collective criminal activities may also disruptive collective protest activities.

Implications for Intergroup Conflict and Repression

Social control theorists have long recognized the interplay of policing and intergroup conflict. Policing is almost always differentially targeted on subordinate social groups and is often one of the tools dominant ethnic groups use to maintain their dominance over other ethnic groups. Most countries have some disadvantaged ethnic group that has higher official crime rates and is arrested and incarcerated at higher rates than the majority (Mauer 2003), and a great deal of research has documented class or ethnic inequalities in policing of both ordinary crime and civil unrest. Dominant groups will often support policies to intensify the social control of groups threatening their domination.

There is substantial evidence that the U.S. policing buildup in the late 1960s and 1970s was directly related to the majority White desire to control a threatening Black population. It is often argued that the policing and incarceration boom tied to the “drug war” of the 1980s was misguided and politically motivated (Chambliss 1995b; Mauer 1999; Tonry 1994b and 1995). While it is definitely a matter of hot political debate whether the intentional purpose of the drug war was the suppression of Black revolt, there can be no doubt that one consequence of the drug war was the intensification of the surveillance and control of the Black population, and the incapacitation of a very high percentage of its people.

Similarly, intense interest in controlling “gangs” can be understood in an intergroup conflict perspective. Gangs tend to arise in contexts of inequality and ethnic conflict. Gangs vary in form and content from what are really no more than juvenile play groups, boys who hang around together and commit petty crimes, to highly organized businesses (Hagedorn 1988). Some gangs operate like warlords in many parts of the world, dominating and governing a territory, defending it from outsiders in exchange for tribute. Hagedorn (2006) argues that it was intense policing and incarceration that institutionalized gangs in Chicago. In some cases, “gangs” developed ideologies and political agendas and were part of the broader Black Power movement. Black gangs said to be the nexus of the illegal drug trade were subject to infiltration and surveillance that was very similar to the infiltration and surveillance of Black Power organizations in the late 1960s. In this vein, the Federal Bureau of Prisons recognizes the “Black Guerilla Family” as a gang started by former Black Panther George L. Jackson that has a “strong political ideology that promotes Black revolution and the overthrow of the government” (Office of the Inspector General 2003).

Another trend that was happening in the 1980s and the 1990s was the deindustrialization of inner cities and the loss of blue-collar jobs, coupled with the growth of inequality and new wealth. Some argue that the mass incarceration of lower class people has blocked the rebellion that might otherwise have been expected from the growing economic distress of working-class people of all races. It is argued that mass incarceration in the U.S. leads to an underestimate of the true rate of unemployment in the country (Western and Pettit 2000). Many observers have linked the mass buildup of coercive social control to interlinked patterns of deindustrialization, economic inequality, and ethnic and racial conflict. Echoing historical sociologists’ arguments about the importance of the police for preventing working-class rebellion, Jacobs stresses the importance of high levels of inequality, especially the presence
of the very wealthy, finding that inequality is associated with greater expenditures on police forces in 1970 (Jacobs 1979) and a higher rate of police killings of civilians (Jacobs 1978), as well as higher rates of property crime in 1970 (Jacobs 1981); states with higher inequality were likely to have larger Black populations (Jacobs 1982). Civilian killings and assaults of police are also higher where there is more Black-White inequality, but a Black mayor weakens this effect (Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). Incarceration rates are higher where Republicans are stronger and there are more Black residents (Jacobs and Carmichael 2001). Although political conservatism, a stronger Republican party, and racial threat explain whether a state ever used the death sentence, the states which actually execute large numbers of people are those with greater membership in conservative churches and higher violent crime rates (Jacobs and Carmichael 2004).

These lines of argument and research all suggest that there needs to be much more investigation of the relationships between crime and political mobilization in disadvantaged communities, as well as of the factors that lead dominant groups to support repressive strategies toward minorities.

**Whatever Happened to the Black Movement?**

The Black Civil Rights Movement was “the” U.S. movement of the early 1960s and the archetypical movement for resource mobilization and political process theories. There are few sociologists are studying the U.S. Black movement today. It seems that the movement just went away. Certainly this is the picture we get from figure 5, the plot of *New York Times* news articles about African American protests copied from Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone (2003). This is also the picture derived from Chicago news sources by McAdam, Sampson, Weffer, and MacIndoe (2005). Well, why exactly did the movement decline? Why has there been so little Black resistance in the past thirty years? McAdam and his colleagues (2005) tell us that theory has given us a distorted view, that protests in Chicago are no longer disruptive actions

**Figure 5.** African-American Protest Events, Coded from the *New York Times.*

by poor Black city residents, but peaceful actions by affluent White suburbanites, and that we need to fix our theory to give a better account of protest by the affluent. Jenkins et al. argue from their data that the pattern is due primarily to the rise in Black elected officials (giving more routine political access) and the decline in Black political influence via electoral competition and northern Democratic Party strength, as well as a decline in the level of grievances represented by a rise in the ratio of Black to White median family income. While not disputing the relevance of these and other factors, nor the reality of the shift of political momentum to the affluent in the U.S., it seems possible that another reason we are seeing relatively little Black protest—especially by the poor Black people who have not benefited from the positive trends cited by Jenkins et al.—is that there has been massive repression of poor Black communities in the last thirty years. Chicago for its part has had several decades of heavy-handed policing and incarceration of poor Blacks in the war against gangs and drugs, including several scandals involving outright criminal activity on the part of the police.

It is certainly possible that the Black movement might have declined just as much as anyway, without repression, and it would take detailed research to determine whether repression around the drug war did or did not actually suppress Black political mobilization, or at least the political mobilization of poor Blacks. But given the magnitude of the repression, it is a question well worth asking. Assessing the true impact of coercive repression may lead to an entirely new understanding of why we see some movements and not others in a particular era.

CONCLUSION

Part of a theoretical and political agenda among social scientists in the late 1960s was to reject older treatments of social movements that lumped them together with other forms of “deviance.” As part of the debates about the meaning of the Black riots, many social scientists argued that they needed to be understood not as mere criminality nor as mindless emotional expression, but as extreme expressions of political grievance. But along with these political concerns, a generation of sociologists was engaged in a sub-disciplinary movement to create and legitimate a specialty in the study of collective behavior and social movements. That is, what we call the “resource mobilization” turn was not just about a particular theoretical perspective, it was about creating a sub-discipline. This is important for understanding why blindness developed around crime control as repression. Social movements had previously been classed as a subtype of collective behavior, and both had typically been viewed in the field as subcategories of deviant behavior. Theories to explain them had typically been individual-level social psychological accounts of inadequate socialization or frustration, similar to the social psychological accounts of criminal behavior. The subdisciplinary project thus involved setting boundaries and distinguishing political movements from other phenomena with which they had previously been grouped. Within a very few years, there were quickly theoretical critiques of the resource mobilization perspective per se, calling for recognition of political processes, meaning construction, culture, frames, and so forth. But these were all elaborations that occurred within the subdisciplinary project, not a rejection of it. That is, they did not question the boundaries of the field. The sharp distinction between political collective action and common crime that was important in the foundation of the subdiscipline was never revisited.

This theoretical blindness was not noticed because most movement researchers were focused on understanding the movements they could see, and developing concepts to help explain them. The movements they could see were predominantly White middle-class movements. Few asked about why the movements they could not see were missing. The people who were noticing and writing about the mass policing of Black people were criminologists, or scholars of race. They were often raising alarms about the repression of poor Blacks, but not drawing links to the way this repression affected the capacity for political mobilization.
Repression and Crime Control

The attempt to distinguish political dissent from apolitical crime has led to a failure to appreciate the ways in which regimes criminalize dissent and the ways in which dissent is expressed in crime. It is time to back up and take a wider perspective on the problem. In particular, it is time to reconnect the policing of crime with the policing of dissent. There is, of course, a huge difference between an antiwar rally or gay pride march on the one hand and mugging old people or robbing convenience stores on the other, and it is important to develop analytic and theoretical strategies for understanding the differences among different types of crimes and different types of dissent. But we will only confuse ourselves if we try to maintain a sharp boundary between political dissent and ordinary crime, especially if we study only the former and ignore the latter. Scholars of protest in the 1960s and early 1970s understood the importance of these relations, and many criminologists still do.

Bringing these two problems back together and revisiting just what happened in the responses to the 1960s riots forces us to take a new look at the role of coercive repression in constraining the possibilities for collective mobilization. We need to question our tendency to focus on the dependent variable, that is, to focus on the protests that are happening, not the protests that are not happening. An alternate starting point is to identify the key axes of inequality and injustice in our society and ask why they are there, what forces maintain them, and what forms resistance takes.

We need to rethink the kind of data we need if we want to study the interplay of repression and mobilization. There is a great deal of official data about crime and social control available. These data are not unproblematic, and anyone who wants to use them needs to become conversant with the relevant methodological and theoretical debates about how crime is measured and the relation between arrest and crime statistics. We need to get good data on protest, or collective violence, or political mobilization and link it with criminal justice data as well as with political, economic, and social factors. Some scholars are already moving in this direction. For example, McVeigh (2006) studies the relations between rates of crime, activist organizations, and voting in U.S. counties, although he ignores the race dimension entirely. As noted above, Jacobs has over the years conducted a large number of studies examining the relation between political factors on the one hand and crime and social control factors on the other. The key is to take off the blinders, and look for ways to examine the relation between the criminal justice system, social movements, and collective violence. For example, there were major riots in Miami in 1980 and in Los Angeles in 1992, and there have been many other smaller riots in other cities: do these have discernable impacts on the levels of arrest or incarceration after the riot is over? What happens to political or movement mobilization after a riot?

There is a need for both quantitative studies testing the hypotheses about the relation between incarceration and social and political mobilization, and qualitative studies examining the character of political responses in besieged communities. These studies cannot be romantic: there are real issues of serious crime in poor Black neighborhoods, and real questions about the complex interplay of economic conditions, discrimination and segregation, incarceration and its disruptive impacts on families and communities, young people who seem angry and unsocialized, drug addiction and drug dealing, and responses to oppression, as well as the countervailing ideologies and practices of resistance, morality, and survival. Morris and Braine’s discussion of cultures of opposition and subordination (Morris and Braine 2001) may be helpful for theorizing the constructive and destructive ways people respond to oppression, the ways in which people mingle adaptation to subordination with resistance. We need to ask how oppressed people can gain redress under conditions of extreme repression, and to understand the forms that resistance can take when the possibility of direct resistance is blocked. We also need to pay attention to the politics of the majority in its support for repression of ethnic minorities, and the role of fear, crime, and memories of violence in that support. In short, research about protest and social movements needs to be pay attention to how they are linked to the structures of social inequality.
NOTES

1 The worker was David Dawley, a returned Peace Corps volunteer and Civil Rights worker who went on to live and work with the Vice Lords, a politicized Black gang in Chicago, before moving on to be a consultant.

2 I mention this because Gary LaFree, whose book *Losing Legitimacy* I found very useful for thinking about these issues—although I disagree with parts of his analysis—repeatedly claims in this book, and in his *Social Forces* article LaFree and Drass (1997), that these authors assert that collective action is unlike crime; in fact, none of them even mentions crime.

REFERENCES


Mobilization


