Publications
Daniel Quint, Unobserved Correlation
in Private-Value Ascending Auctions, forthcoming, Economics Letters
Daniel Quint, Unobserved
Correlation in Ascending Auctions: Example and Extensions (working paper)
ABSTRACT. In private-value ascending auctions, the winner’s willingness to pay is not observed, leading to underidentication of many econometric models. I calculate tight bounds on expected revenue and optimal reserve price for the case of symmetric and affiliated private values.
Guillermo Caruana, Liran Einav, and Daniel Quint, Multilateral Bargaining with Concession Costs, Journal of Economic Theory 132 (1), January 2007
ABSTRACT. This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. We consider a demand game with the following additional ingredients: (i) there is an exogenous deadline, by which bargaining has to end; (ii) prior to the deadline, players may sequentially change their demands as often as they like; (iii) changing one's demand is costly, and this cost increases as the deadline gets closer. The game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium prediction in which agreement is reached immediately and switching costs are avoided. Moreover, this equilibrium is invariant to the particular order and timing in which players make demands. This is important, as multilateral bargaining models are sometimes too sensitive to these particular details. In our context, players with higher concession costs obtain higher shares of the pie; their increased bargaining power stems from their ability to credibly commit to a demand earlier. We discuss how the setup and assumptions are a reasonable description for certain real bargaining situations.
Daniel Quint and Liran Einav, Efficient Entry, Economics Letters 88 (2), August 2005
ABSTRACT. We present a dynamic entry game, in which entry costs become sunk gradually. In equilibrium the most profitable firms enter, as they commit faster not to exit. This rationalizes an equilibrium selection assumption often employed in the empirical entry literature.
Daniel Quint, Leiba Rodman, and Ilya Spitkovsky, New
Cases of Almost Periodic Factorization of Triangular Matrix Functions,
Working Papers
Daniel Quint, Economics
of Patent Pools When Some (But Not All) Patents Are Essential (working
paper)
Daniel Quint, Economics
of Patent Pools When Some (But Not All) Patents Are Essential – Technical
Appendix
ABSTRACT. Several recent technological standards have been accompanied by patent pools – arrangements to license multiple patentholders' relevant intellectual property as a package. A key distinction made by regulators – between patents essential to a standard and patents with substitutes – has not been addressed in the theoretical literature. I show that pools of essential patents are always welfare-positive, while pools which include nonessential patents can be welfare-negative – even pools which are limited to complementary patents and are stable under compulsory individual licensing. If pools gain commitment power and price as Stackelberg leaders, this reduces, and can even reverse, the gains from welfare-increasing pools.
Daniel Quint, Common-Value
Auctions with Two Bidders: When To Brag About What You Know (working paper)
ABSTRACT. I compare covert and open information-gathering prior to first-price, common-value auctions with asymmetric bidders. Information which is independent of one's opponent's private information is more valuable when gained openly, but information one's opponent already has is more valuable when gained covertly. In a dynamic game where a bidder can credibly signal when he's well-informed without disclosing the content of his information, always signaling “new” information, and never signaling redundant information, is consistent with, but not uniquely predicted by, equilibrium play. Full revelation of any information possessed by the seller increases expected revenue and is uniquely predicted in equilibrium.
Yuanchuan Lien and Daniel Quint, Bidding Reversals in a
Multiple-Good Auction with Global Reserve Price (working paper)
ABSTRACT. We examine two-bidder sealed-bid auctions for two objects, one more valuable than the other, and unit demand. The auction has a single “overall” reserve price, which must be met by the combination of winning bids, and each bidder can bid on both objects without fear of winning both. A bidder’s private values for the two objects are perfectly correlated, so types are one-dimensional. We demonstrate the existence of symmetric equilibria where over some range of types, (i) bidders bid on the lesser object for the purpose of “sabotaging” their (higher) bid on the greater object, and (ii) bids for the lesser object are a decreasing function of type.