Econ 805 – Advanced Micro Theory I – Fall 2007

Lectures:
Tuesdays and Thursdays
9:30-10:45 am
6116 Social Science
 
Office Hours:
Mondays 11-12
Wednesdays 10-11
7428 Social Sciences
 
 
 
Syllabus
Schedule of Student Presentations (with links to papers)
 
 
 
Problem Sets:
 
Problem Set 1 (due 9 a.m. Wednesday October 3)
Problem Set 1 Solutions
 
Problem Set 2 (due 5 p.m. Tuesday November 20)
Problem Set 2 Solutions
 
 
Lecture Notes:
 
 
Baseline Model – Independent Private Values
 
Lecture 1 - Overview, Review of Bayesian Games (PowerPoint slides)
Lecture 2 – Common Auction Formats, The Independent Private Values Framework (PowerPoint slides)
Lecture 3 – The Envelope Theorem and Revenue Equivalence (PowerPoint slides)
Lecture 4 – Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Equilibrium, and a little Stochastic Dominance (PowerPoint slides)
Lecture 5 – Mechanisms, the Revelation Principle, and Myerson’s “Optimal Auction Design” (pdf)
Lecture 6 – The Price-Discriminating Monopolist, Marginal Revenue, and Bulow and Klemperer, “Auctions Vs. Negotiations” (pdf)
 
 
Relaxing the Standard Assumptions
 
Lecture 7 – Risk-Averse Bidders: Revenue Comparisons and Maskin and Riley, “Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Bidders” (pdf)
Lecture 8 – guest lecture on empirical testing of auction theory (no notes available)
Lecture 9 – Strong and Weak Bidders: Maskin and Riley, “Asymmetric Auctions” (pdf)
Lecture 10 – Affiliation: Milgrom and Weber, “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding” (pdf)
Lecture 11 – Revenue Comparisons with Affiliated Interdependent Values (more from Milgrom and Weber) (pdf)
 
 
Common Value Auctions
 
Lecture 12 – Klemperer’s Anglo-Dutch Auction and Wilson’s Drainage Tract Auction (pdf)
Lecture 13 – Common Value Multiplicity, Almost Common Values, Distribution-Matching (pdf)
Lecture 14 – Information Aggregation: Wilson/Milgrom, Pesendorfer and Swinkels, Kremer, Harstad et al (pdf)
 
 
“Enlarging the Game” – Strategic Behavior Outside the Auction
 
Lecture 15 – Information Acquisition: Persico, Hernando-Veciana, Larson, Quint (pdf)
Lecture 16 – Endogenous Entry: Levin and Smith, “Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry” (pdf)
Lecture 17 – Collusion Among Bidders: McAfee and McMillan, “Bidding Rings” (pdf)
 
 
Other Topics – Double-Auctions, Multiple Units, All-Pay Settings
 
Lecture 18 – Sequential Auctions: Milgrom and Weber, “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding II” (pdf)
 Clarifying Note – Equilibrium Strategies in Sequential English Auctions (pdf)
Lecture 19 – Double Auctions: Satterthwaite and Williams, Reny and Perry (pdf)
Lecture 20 – Multi-Unit Auctions I: Uniform Price Auctions and Simultaneous Ascending Auctions (pdf)
Lecture 21 – Multi-Unit Auctions II: Vickrey, Bernheim-Whinston, and Ausubel-Milgrom Auctions (pdf)
 Example from Lecture 21 – an interesting two-bidder problem with package bids and private information (pdf)
Lecture 22 – Wars of Attrition (Bulow and Klemperer) and All-Pay Contests (Siegel) (pdf)
Lecture 23 – Recap (pdf)