MARZENA ROSTEK

 RESEARCH INTERESTS: MICROECONOMIC THEORY, MARKET DESIGN, FINANCE


Survey

  • Equilibrium Theory of Financial Markets: Recent Developments (with J. H. Yoon), revise and resubmit, Journal of Economic Literature. PDF

Decentralized-Market Design

  • Decentralized Exchange (with S. Malamud), American Economic Review 107, 11 (2017). PDF
     
  • Exchange Design and Efficiency (with J. H. Yoon), Econometrica 89, 6 (2021). PDF
     
  • Innovation in Decentralized Markets: Synthetic Products vs. Trading Technology (with J. H. Yoon), AEJ: Microeconomics, forthcoming. PDF
     
  • Financial Product Design in Decentralized Markets (with J. H. Yoon), revise and resubmit, Journal of Political Economy. PDF
     
  • Improving Access to Information Through Market Design (with X. Wu). PDF
     
  • Design of Market-Clearing Technology (with C. Lyu and J. H. Yoon).
     

Equilibrium and Stability/Interactions among Groups/Games in Contracts

  • Matching with Strategic Consistency (with N. Yoder). PDF
     
  • Matching with Complementary Contracts (with N. Yoder), Econometrica 88, 5 (2020, lead article). PDF
     
  • Complementarity in Matching Markets and Exchange Economies (with N. Yoder), revise and resubmit, Games and Economic Behavior. PDF
     
  • Games in Contracts: Formal and Informal Institutions (with R. Dix and J. H. Yoon).

Theory and Design of Imperfectly Competitive Centralized Markets/Divisible Good Markets

  • Price Inference in Small Markets (with M. Weretka), Econometrica 80, 2 (2012). PDF
     
  • Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions (with with L. Ausubel, P. Cramton, M. Pycia, and M. Weretka), Review of Economic Studies 81, 4 (2014). PDF
     
  • Dynamic Thin Markets (with M. Weretka), Review of Financial Studies, 28, 10 (2015). PDF
     
  • Information and Strategic Behavior (with M. Weretka), Journal of Economic Theory 158 (2015). PDF
     
  • Privacy in Markets (with M. Ollar and J. H. Yoon). PDF
     
  • Futures Contracts and Imperfect Competition (with C. Lyu and J. H. Yoon). PDF
     
  • Dynamic Imperfectly Competitive Markets: A Non-Recursive Approach (with J. H. Yoon). PDF
     
  • Supply Function Games with General Gaussian Information Structures (with J. H. Yoon), available by e-mail.
     
  • Reallocative Auctions and Core Selection (with N. Yoder). PDF

Optimization and Games in Spans: Applications to Financial Innovation, Information Disclosure, and Bundling Many economic problems involve sellers choosing collections of ''bundles'' in order to maximize the bundles' market value. Instances of optimization over bundles include issuance of asset-backed securities by real asset holders, choosing a portfolio of risky assets to offer by central banks and Treasury Departments, and selection of product variety by multiproduct sellers with a bundle interpreted as a product with multiple continuous characteristics or attributes. To study these economic problems, the following introduce and analyze a class of single-agent problems and games in which strategies are spans.

  • Competition in Financial Innovation (with A. Carvajal and M. Weretka), Econometrica 80, 5 (2012). PDF
     
  • Information Design and Capital Formation (with A. Carvajal and G. Sublet), Journal of Economic Theory 176 (2018). PDF

Qualitative Decision Making

  • Quantile Maximization in Decision Theory, Review of Economic Studies 77 (2010). PDF

Misc

  • Price Discrimination and Resale (with A. Basuchoudhary, C. Metcalf, K. Pommerenke, D. H. Reiley, C. Rojas, and J. Stodder), Journal of Economic Education (2008), 39 (3).
     
  • Thin Markets (with M. Weretka), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online (2008), Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blume, Eds. Palgrave Macmillan.
     

 

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